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Abstract 
 
The quality of the services provided to the passengers is synonymous with a wide range of 
characteristics of the transportation system, such as safety, on-time performance, accessibility, efficiency, 
and many others. Today, more and more public transport operators and associated bodies (e.g. ministries 
and supervising organizations) worldwide invest in quality control programs in order to assess and 
improve the services provided to the passengers. The paper provides an overview of the Methodology 
developed by the Hellenic Institute of Transport to assess the levels of quality and performance of public 
transport services. Key results from the application of this Methodology to the major public transport 
organization in Greece (OASA) are provided as a case study. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Among the prime goals of all actors involved in the public transport business is the 
creation of a well-organized transit system, within which citizens can find a sufficient 
level of mobility and satisfy their important need for the efficient movement under safe 
and comfortable conditions. This overall principle entails many significant quality 
characteristics of the public transport system, such as safety, on-time performance, 
accessibility, efficiency, information provision and many others. 
The quality in public transport stems from the ability of the respective operators to 
manage and to further develop their services. Even more and more relevant operators 
and associated bodies (e.g. ministries and supervising organizations) worldwide employ 
quality control programs in order to assess and improve the services provided to the 
passengers (PORTAL, 2003) (QUATTRO, 1998) (EQUIP, 2000). The backbone of 
these programs is a variety of quality attributes and indices that assess the levels of the 
services provided to passengers and the performance of the transportation system 
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(Giannopoulos, 1989). Furthermore, such programs provide operators strategic tools 
that enable them to be closer to passengers and adjust the transportation service to their 
needs and requirements, while the knowledge gained from these programs feed with 
valuable data and facilitate their decision making process (Tyrinopoulos, et al., 2004). 
In metropolitan areas with complex transportation systems managed by multiple 
operators (such as London, Athens, Rome and others), the implementation of quality 
control programs seems to be an integral part of their business operation. In some major 
cities, like London and Rome, the quality control is a daily practice (London Buses, 
2004) (TRAMBUS, 2003). In many cases, the results of this practice define the contract 
rules between supervising and subsidiary organizations, the scheduling of the 
transportation system and the decision making process itself. Nowadays, many large 
and medium size public transport organizations and operators apply quality control 
systems, accompanied with scientific and technological aid. In the long run, such 
initiatives may contribute to attract more customers and facilitate the economic viability 
of transit organizations. 
The Hellenic Institute of Transport (HIT), the body devoted to the promotion and 
execution of transport in Greece, provides consultation services to many transport 
organizations. Public transport is one of the transport sectors, where HIT possesses 
significant expertise and experience. Addressing the great demand nowadays in Greece 
for the assessment of the levels of quality and performance of public transport services, 
the researchers of HIT have developed a complete Methodology that has been adjusted 
and applied to the major urban and interurban public transport organizations in Greece, 
the Athens Urban Transport Organization (OASA), the Organization of Urban 
Transport of Thessaloniki (OASTh) and the Hellenic Railways Organization (OSE). 
The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of this Methodology with its main 
elements, the indicators used for transit quality and performance assessment, examples 
of the indicators’ calculation (mathematical equations) and sampling considerations. 
Furthermore, key results from the application of the Methodology to the major urban 
public transport organization in Greece (OASA) are provided as a case study. The 
benefits for the transit organizations that will adopt the Methodology are also discussed. 
 
 
2. Presentation of the Methodology 
 
2.1 Methodology development and adjustment 
 
The Methodology developed by HIT has been inspired by the need to give to public 
transport organizations an operational and strategic tool capable of monitoring and 
assessing different aspects of the services provided to passengers. It addresses the 
quality of transit services and the operational performance of the transportation system 
(terminals, stop points, vehicles, etc.), while it does not cover aspects related to 
infrastructure, organization and economics. 
The initial development of the Methodology and its adjustment to a particular transit 
environment/operator is a three-phase process composed of the following activities: 
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A. Generic Methodology development 
 
This first phase aimed at developing the generic Methodological Framework to be 
further customized to and used by the public transport system under assessment. This 
Framework includes quality and operational attributes and criteria, sampling 
considerations, data collection methods, data analysis techniques, procedures for the 
surveys organization and other elements that should be adopted and followed to achieve 
a sound depiction of the existing situation (levels of services quality and transit system 
operational performance) and to set the foundations for the effective monitoring of the 
services quality in the future. Two are the activities that took place in this phase: 
 
1. Bibliographical review (standards, indicators and methodologies) 
In the international bibliography, someone will meet indicators of various types 
(quality, operational, performance, etc.) that aim to assess different aspects of the 
transportation system (infrastructure, services, organization, etc.). The aim of this task 
was to identify and advise the standards and the methodologies that are currently 
available and documented in the international bibliography with regard to quality 
indicators of the passenger services. 
 
2. Existing knowledge and experience 
The researchers of HIT involved in this initiative possess the necessary know-how 
and expertise that led to the development of the generic Methodological Framework. It 
is very important the fact that, through its long provision of many consultation services, 
HIT has an excellent knowledge of the Greek public transport system allowing a 
straightforward and effective customization of the generic Methodology to the particular 
needs and priorities of the transit operators. 
 
 
B. Methodology adjustment 
 
This phase entails the adjustment of the generic Methodology to the public transport 
system to be assessed. It includes a series of activities that allow the development of a 
Methodology totally customized to the needs and priorities of the transit operators, as 
well as to the requirements of the passengers that use this transit system. This phase 
includes four activities: 
 
1. Needs and priorities of the transit operator 
An activity of primary importance is the sound identification of all attributes of the 
local transit system. Although a basic knowledge might exist, each transit operator has 
its own characteristics and particularities that require different approach. The goal is to 
collect and analyze all the necessary information about the network, the infrastructure 
and any other operational element that will shed light to the transit services. 
 
2. Analysis of the experience of similar European organizations 
It is advisable to take advantage of the experience of similar public transport 
organizations with long experience in the implementation of quality control programs. 
In the context of two such programs HIT implemented on behalf of the Athens Urban 
Transport Organization and Thessaloniki Transport Authority, HIT visited two 
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European transit organizations (Transport for London and ATAC (Rome)). These are 
organizations with extensive experience in quality indicators (e.g. London) and manage 
the transportation networks of cities similar to those of Athens/Thessaloniki (e.g. 
Rome). The know-how and experience of these organizations provided valuable 
information for the quality control programs applied to Athens and Thessaloniki. 
 
3. Customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction survey 
A customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction survey is another important activity that should 
be conducted in order to identify the priorities, expectations and degree of satisfaction 
of the passengers regarding the transportation services. In such surveys, the passengers 
provide the importance and satisfaction given in a series of quality and operational 
attributes of the transportation system, and by applying the appropriate methods (e.g. 
Quadrant analysis) the study team is able to derive those attributes that are important 
and do not perform satisfactorily, always according to the passengers’ opinion. 
 
4. Pilot Quality Control Program - Quantification of indicators of high priority 
An activity that can be proved fundamental for the solidarity and comprehensiveness 
of the final Methodology is the quantification of specific indicators that are of high 
priority for the local transit operator. This is a kind of pilot program and upon 
conclusion, the study team can make an appraisal of the methodology applied and the 
results of the priority indicators in order to make adjustments and refinements for the 
future quantification of these and other indicators. 
 
 
C. Adjusted Methodology Handbook 
 
The above four activities lead to the development of a complete Handbook for the 
full-scale implementation of the Methodology, based on which the public transport 
organizations can schedule and apply their quality control programs. Major components 
of this Handbook are: 
 
• Detailed description of the indicators 
• Mathematical equations 
• Sample determination 
• Procedures for the surveys organization 
• Needs in human resources mobilization 
• Data collection methods 
• Questionnaires and other documents/matrices 
• Time plan for the surveys implementation 
• Statistical methods (e.g. factor analysis and ordered logit modelling) for further 
analysis of the data to facilitate the decision making process 
 
The overall approach described above is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 1-16 
 5
Customer satisfaction/
dissatisfaction survey
Analysis of the
experience of similar
European organizations
Bibliographical review
(standards, indicators
and methodologies)
Existing knowledge and
experience
Generic Methodology
development
Methodology
adjustment
Needs and priorities of
the transit operator
Pilot program -
Quantification of high
priority indicators
Adjusted Methodology
Handbook
 
 
Figure 1: Methodology development and adjustment process. 
 
2.2 Overview of the indicators 
 
The proposed Methodology contains 39 indicators classified in seven major categories: 
 
A. Safety – Comfort – Cleanliness: it entails quality attributes related to the 
infrastructure of the public transport operator and more particularly to the safety 
of the journeys, safety at the stop points and terminals, comfort during the 
journeys execution onboard the vehicles, cleanliness of the vehicles, stops and 
terminals. 
 
B. Information – Communication with the passengers: it entails attributes related to 
the quality, comprehensiveness and timeliness of the information provided to the 
passengers for all aspects related to the transportation service and the means used 
for the communication of this information. 
 
C. Accessibility: it contains quality attributes related to the ease accessibility of the 
vehicles, stop points and terminals by all categories of the population in general 
and the mobility impaired people in particular. 
 
D. Terminals and stop points performance: it includes attributes related to the 
execution of the vehicles schedule, as well as additional parameters concerning 
the time dimension of the services provided at the terminal stations and stop 
points (e.g. on-time performance). 
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E. Lines performance: it includes attributes related to the performance of the 
lines/routes and the vehicles that serve them. The vehicles load, the vehicles 
average speed and the journeys’ run times are among the indicators included. 
 
F. General elements of the public transport system: it entails quality attributes not 
included in one of the above four categories and concern the wider transportation 
system and the services provided by the public transport operator. Quality 
parameters to be assessed are the fare and ticketing system, service provision 
hours, bus lanes, etc. 
 
G. Compound indicators: it entails a number of compound indicators calculated 
based on the results of the indicators of the previous five categories. These 
compound indicators give a consolidated picture of the performance or 
satisfaction/ dissatisfaction of specific quality parameters (e.g. vehicles 
scheduling). 
 
Each of the above categories contains two or more indicators. These indicators are of 
three types: either qualitative indicators (pure quality factors), either operational-
performance indicators (addressing the operational dimension of the transportation 
system) or both. Table 1 presents the 39 indicators. 
Special reference has to be made to the Compound indicators of category G. The 
individual indicators that compose the compound indicators are appropriately combined 
using weights to estimate the overall service level. The selection of weights has been 
made as follows: 
 
> Indicator G.1 “Customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction” is calculated based on the 
values of the qualitative indicators of the previous categories, such as Safety conditions 
onboard the vehicle (A.2), Attitude of the personnel (A.3), Lines frequencies (E.5) and 
Current information provision about the transportation service (B.1). The weight 
assigned to each individual indicator is derived from the importance given by the 
passengers during the pilot Customer satisfaction/ dissatisfaction survey described 
above to specific quality and operational attributes of the transportation system (3rd 
Activity in the Methodology adjustment). In this way, the Methodology has embedded 
the priorities of the passengers in the calculation of this user oriented compound 
indicator, thus contributing to more safe and reliable conclusions. 
 
> Indicator G.2 “Vehicles scheduling performance” is calculated based on the 
indicators “On time performance at the terminal stations” (D.2) and “Relation between 
the executed headways and the lines frequencies at the stop points and terminal 
stations” (D.5). This compound indicator has been derived in consultation with the 
transit operators, where the Methodology has been adjusted and applied, providing a 
generic conclusion about the performance of the operators’ scheduling program at 
terminals. Due to their nature and scope, the two individual indicators (D.2 and D.5) 
have equal weight. 
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Table 1: Overview of the indicators. 
Code Category / Indicator 
A Safety – Comfort – Cleanliness 
A.1 Safety conditions at stops and terminal stations 
A.2 Safety conditions onboard the vehicle 
A.3 Attitude of the personnel 
A.4 Vehicles, stops and terminal stations cleanliness 
A.5 Easiness in the embarkation on/disembarkation from the vehicles 
A.6 Criminality 
A.7 Deaths and injuries 
A.8 Incidents 
B Information – Communication with the passengers 
B.1 Current information provision about the transportation service 
B.2 Submission of complaints and advices by the passengers and reply of the transit operator 
C Accessibility 
C.1 Ease accessibility to elderly and disabled persons 
C.2 Distance between the origin point and the ticket selling point 
C.3 Distance between the ticket selling point and the embarkation stop point 
C.4 Distance and time between the interchange points 
D Terminals and stop points performance 
D.1 Journeys execution at the terminal stations 
D.2 On time performance at the terminal stations 
D.3 Mean waiting time of the passengers at the stop points and terminal stations 
D.4 Excessive waiting time of the passengers at the stop points and terminal stations 
D.5 Relation between the executed headways and the lines frequencies at the stop points and 
terminal stations 
E Lines performance 
E.1 Journeys run times 
E.2 Average speed of the vehicles 
E.3 Vehicles delay at the stop points 
E.4 Vehicles load 
E.5 Lines frequencies 
F General elements of the public transport system 
F.1 Service provision hours 
F.2 Waiting time for the issuing of cards 
F.3 Waiting time for the purchase of tickets 
F.4 Vehicles of all types operating in peak hours 
F.5 Coverage of the network 
F.6 Bus lanes violation 
F.7 Types of tickets and cards available 
F.8 Prices of tickets and cards 
F.9 Sufficiency of the tickets selling network 
F.10 Condition of the tickets issuing machines 
F.11 Condition of the tickets validation machines 
F.12 Condition of the stop points and the terminal stations with relation to the seats and shelters 
G Compound indicators 
G.1 Customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction 
G.2 Vehicles scheduling performance 
G.3 Easiness in the tickets purchase and validation 
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> Finally, indicator G.3 “Easiness in the tickets purchase and validation” assesses 
the overall easiness of the passengers in purchasing and validating their tickets, and the 
effectiveness of the operator’s ticketing network. This compound indicator combines all 
individual indicators related to the ticketing element of the transportation system, such 
as Distance between the origin point and the ticket selling point (G.2), Waiting time for 
the issuing of cards (F.2), Sufficiency of the tickets selling network (F.9) and Condition 
of the tickets validation machines (F.11). The weight assigned to each individual 
indicator is derived from the importance given to this transportation attribute by the 
passengers during the Customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction survey with some minor 
adjustments by the transit operator in question to address its particular characteristics, 
priorities and needs. Therefore, the weights calculation process has incorporated the 
unbiased opinion of the passengers, but also the particularities of the transportation 
network. 
 
 
2.3 Examples of indicators calculation 
 
A complete sub-methodology has been devised for the measurement of all 39 
indicators. It contains specifications and mathematical equations for the calculation of 
the indicators, data collection techniques, etc. The mathematical equations of many 
indicators, mainly those addressing qualitative attributes of the transit service, are quite 
simple and straightforward. In other, however, indicators their estimation is more 
complicated and encompasses more complex queries and calculations. The 
mathematical equations for three representative indicators are provided below: 
 
 
Excessive waiting time at the stop points and terminal stations 
 
This indicator estimates the excessive waiting time of the passengers at the terminal 
stations or the stop points for their embarkation in the vehicles. The indicator is 
examined from the perspective of the transit operator and is calculated for each line, 
taking into account the outcome of the operator’s scheduling process (scheduled 
headways) and the actual measurements on site (executed headways). The mathematical 
equation of the indicator is the following: 
D.4i: Excessive waiting time of the passengers at the terminal (or stop point) for their 
embarkation in the vehicles of line i 
SWi: Scheduled mean waiting time of the passengers at the terminal (or stop point) 
for their embarkation in the vehicles of line i 
AWi: Actual mean waiting time of the passengers at the terminal (or stop point) for 
their embarkation in the vehicles of line i 
D.4i = 
i
ii
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Where, 
shij = all the scheduled headways of line i 
ahij = all the actual (executed) headways of line i 
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Vehicles load 
 
The indicator estimates the load of the vehicles during their daily operation and it is 
expressed as the number of passengers onboard divided by the capacity of the vehicles. 
During journeys’ execution, the members of the survey team onboard the vehicle (one 
in each door) count the passengers embarking on and disembarking from the vehicle. 
The analysis of the collected data mainly contains three results: maximum vehicles load 
(including the segments of the lines where the maximum load has been occurred), mean 
vehicles load and lines percentage where the load exceeds 1. The mathematical equation 
for the calculation of the maximum vehicles load is the following: 
The first step is the calculation of the passengers onboard a vehicle per line segment 
(between two subsequent stop points): 
j
ii
j
ii
j
i
j
i DEPP ,1,11 −−− −+=  
Where: 
j
iP : passengers onboard the vehicle in segment i of line j 
j
iP 1− : passengers onboard the vehicle in segment i-1 of line j 
j
iiE ,1− : passengers embarking the vehicle in the stop point between the segments i-1 and i 
of line j 
j
iiD ,1− : passengers disembarking the vehicle in the stop point between the segments i-1 
and i of line j 
 
The calculation of the maximum load is based on the sum of the passengers onboard 
the vehicles of all journeys examined per line segment separately. The segment with the 
maximum sum is the one with the higher load in the specific line. Therefore, the 
mathematical equation for the calculation of the maximum vehicles load in a particular 
line is the following: 
max
jL : maximum vehicles load of line j 
∑
∑
=
=
=∀
=
n
z
zj
n
z
zj
i
j
C
miP
L
1
,
1
,
max
)...1,max(
*100% 
Where, 
zj
iP
,
= passengers onboard the vehicle executing the journey z in the segment i of the 
line j 
zjC , = capacity of the vehicle executing the journey z in the line j 
 
 
Sufficiency of the tickets selling network 
 
This is a qualitative indicator aiming to assess the sufficiency and effectiveness of the 
tickets selling network and the easiness to purchase tickets from the various selling 
points. The data collection for this indicator includes mystery-shopping surveys. The 
mystery-shoppers collect the following data for each selling point: 
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• Tickets availability. 
• Existence of the special indication informing customers about the availability of 
tickets in this selling point. 
• Position and visibility of the indication. 
 
The analysis of the above data is quite straightforward resulting to the percentage and 
location of the selling points that do not have tickets to sell, the percentage of the selling 
points having the special indication and the percentage of the latter points, where the 
indication is clearly visible. 
 
 
2.4 Sampling considerations 
 
The sampling process refers to both the passengers and the transportation units (i.e. 
vehicles, terminals, lines, etc.). The determination of the sample size in the passengers’ 
survey should take into consideration the spatial distribution of the population and the 
minimum sample per geographical area. Standardized statistical methods used for 
similar surveys must also be used. According to a well-known method (Johnson, 
Wichern, et al., 1992), the sample size (n) is calculated using the following equation: 
12
2/az
d
)P1(*P
1N1Nn
−










−
−
+≥  
Where, 
N = size of the population that in this case is the passenger traffic of the transit 
system 
P = the quality characteristic to be measured (satisfaction); if no previous 
experience exists then the neutral situation (P=0,5) is considered 
d = margin of error (5%) 
za/2 = 1,64 for level of confidence 90% 
 
Concerning the transportation units such as vehicles, terminals, lines, etc., the 
situation is much different. The transit operator wishes to take the most of such surveys 
and include in its quality control program the majority of the terminals, lines, stop 
points, etc. This is mainly the case and it is also feasible for small transportation 
networks (less than 50 lines). However, the experience gained from the use of the 
proposed Methodology to the largest Greek bus transit operator (ETHEL, see §3.2) and 
the review of the quality control programs applied to two European transit organizations 
(Transport for London and ATAC (Rome)), showed that in large transportation 
networks served by multiple operators (buses, tram, metro, etc.) with more than 300 
lines, a sample size of 10-20% of the various units is capable of providing sound 
estimations and reliable conclusions. It must also be stressed that decisive factors in the 
selection of the transportation units’ samples are the needs and priorities of the transit 
operator, as well as the available budget. 
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2.5 Statistical methods for data analysis 
 
The measurement of the indicators presented previously does not require any 
particular statistical processing. The mathematical equation of each indicator can be 
calculated using simple data processing techniques and programs. However, additional 
elaboration may be needed when trying to derive useful information about the 
performance of the transit services and the customers’ satisfaction to facilitate decision-
making process. 
A very interesting and useful for the transit operators information is the relation 
between quality of public transport service and customers’ satisfaction. In that case, two 
statistical methods that could be used are factor analysis and ordered logit modelling. 
More particularly, the principal component factor analysis may be performed to reveal 
the common – hidden factors from the passengers’ rating of the quality indicators 
satisfaction. Then, a multinomial logistic regression model can be developed for 
understanding and explaining the overall satisfaction of a customer. These two methods 
are proposed by the Methodology and are briefly explained below. The detailed 
description of these methods is beyond the scope of this paper, however more 
information can be found at the literature review (references) at the end of the paper. 
 
Factor analysis 
Factor analysis was developed in the early 20th century by Karl Pearson Charles 
Spearman with the intent to gain insight into psychometric measurements, in particular 
the directly unobservable variable intelligence (Johnson and Wichern, 1992). Factor 
analysis is based on a specific statistical model (Washington et al., 2003) and it is used 
to reduce the large number of qualitative attributes to a smaller number of factors for 
modeling purposes. Variables should be responded to on interval or quasi – interval 
scale (Likert, 1932). The first thing to do when conducting a factor analysis is to look at 
the correlation between variables. Various techniques to check data quality, the strength 
of the relationship among variables and the adequacy of each variable are used, while a 
rotation process is applied and a factor score coefficient matrix is produced at the final 
stages of factor analysis. 
 
Multinomial logistic regression 
In addition to the composite factors, operational indicators of the transportation 
system (calculated from onsite measurements to investigate the system’s operational 
performance) are used to develop a multinomial logistic regression model in the attempt 
to investigate whether or not the operational indicators influence customers satisfaction 
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Multinomial logistic regression exists to handle the 
case of categorical dependents in order to determine the percent of variance in the 
dependent variable (overall satisfaction on the transportation system) explained by the 
independents (composite quality factors and operational performance) (Venables and 
Ripley, 2002). 
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3. Case study 
 
As mentioned earlier, the generic Methodology described above has been adjusted 
and applied to the major urban and interurban public transport organizations in Greece, 
the Athens Urban Transport Organization (OASA) (HIT, 2004), the Thessaloniki 
Transport Authority (THETA) / Organization of Urban Transport of Thessaloniki 
(OASTh) (HIT, 2005) and the Hellenic Railways Organization (OSE) (HIT, 2004). In 
this chapter, the process followed for the Methodology adjustment and some indicative 
results from its application to OASA are briefly described as a case study. 
 
 
3.1 Methodology adjustment 
 
In 2003, OASA assigned to HIT, on a contract basis, the implementation of a quality 
control program with aims to assess the quality of the services provided to the users, to 
investigate the performance of the current transportation system and finally to formulate 
a complete Quality Control System that can be used in the future. This program with the 
generic Methodology adjustment contained three phases: 
 
1. The quantification of quality indicators that are of high priority for the transit 
operator: Based on its needs and priorities, OASA in cooperation with HIT 
defined and calculated a small number of quality and operational indicators with 
individual measures, involving on-time performance, journeys execution at the 
terminal stations, vehicles cleanliness, bus lanes performance, tickets selling 
network performance and average speed of the vehicles. 
2. The development of the specifications for an integrated Quality Control System: 
This phase included a customer satisfaction/ dissatisfaction survey, an extensive 
bibliographical review, visit to the public transport systems of London and Rome, 
benchmarking and an assessment of the methodology and the results of the 
indicators measured in the previous phase. These activities enabled the selection 
of indicators that in addition to the indicators defined in the 1st phase constituted 
the backbone of the Quality Control System of OASA. This phase concluded to 
the development of a handbook for the full-scale implementation Quality Control 
System in the future. 
3. The development of a software for the measurement of the indicators specified in 
the Quality Control System in the future: This is an in-house application that is 
based on a relational database system, allowing a user friendly data import from 
various terminals inside or outside the organization, interfacing with existing files 
(e.g. time schedules), efficient and reliable indicators calculation, graphical and 
tabular presentation of the indicators values, comparisons between indicators and 
time-periods etc. 
 
 
3.2 Profile of the survey 
 
The study area includes the urban and suburban Athens with a population of close to 
4,5 million citizens. At the time of the survey, the area was served by four transit 
operators: 
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> Attiko Metro Operation Company (AMEL), a subsidiary of Attiko Metro S.A., 
with main objectives to organise, manage, operate and develop the underground 
railway network on lines 2 and 3, and any extension thereof within the Prefecture 
of Attica, as well as their facilities, vehicles, materials and media. The two metro 
lines operated by AMEL are integrated with the electric railway line (line 1) 
operated by ISAP (see below). Today, 23 Metro Stations are in operation at both 
METRO lines. These lines serve 650,000 passengers per day. The frequency of 
trips is every 3 minutes in rush hours and 5 to 10 minutes in non-rush hours. 
According to the European Performance Satisfaction Index (EPSI) Rating Institute 
(EPSI, 2005), AMEL has the highest customer satisfaction index compared with 
other means of public transport across Europe. 
 
> Company of Thermal Buses in Athens (ETHEL), which provides urban transport 
services with thermal buses in the Metropolitan area of Athens. The company 
serves 310 total bus routes and operates 16,000 trips daily, which represent 98.6% 
of all scheduled trips. This percentage is considered very high, given the constant 
deterioration of traffic conditions, as well as the continued decrease of the buses’ 
average speed. ETHEL owns and operates a fleet of 2,099 buses. Currently, there 
are 1,822 buses in operation during peak hours. 
 
> Athens-Piraeus Trolley Busses (ILPAP), which operates an electric bus network 
(also called “trolley buses”) of 22 lines that serve primarily the Athens and 
Piraeus city centers. Ten of these lines are being monitored by a telematic system. 
The company owns and operates a fleet of 315 single trolley buses (12m long) and 
51 articulated trolley buses (18m long). The number of operated trolley bus trips 
per day is 1,943 (first semester 2005 average). The total number of trolley bus 
passenger trips in 2004 was 77 million. 
 
> Athens-Piraeus Electric Railways (ISAP), which operates the Electric Railway 
line that runs between Piraeus and Kifissia (metro line 1), serving 24 stations. The 
total length of line 1 is 25.6 km, while the total journey time (in one-direction) is 
51 minutes. ISAP operates 607 trips daily. The maximum speed of the ISAP trains 
is 70 km/h. The total daily number of ISAP passenger–trips is currently 450,000. 
ISAP has currently 84 trains, which amount to 363 wagons. 
 
The assessment of public transport services performance and quality in the study area 
mentioned above was based on two axes: 
 
1. A customer satisfaction survey was conducted involving a number of service 
qualitative attributes (parameters). The list of attributes used was based to a large 
extent on the guidelines provided in the TRB (TRB, 1999) and other Handbooks 
and Manuals (CEN, 2002), following some adjustment to reflect existing 
conditions in the area and the particular characteristics of the local transportation 
system. The attributes finally selected were 20 and they cover a wide range of a 
public transport service, such as accessibility, safety, on-time performance, 
information provision, ticketing, frequency and many others. For each attribute, 
respondents were asked to put a score for satisfaction and importance. 
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The sampling procedure for this survey was carefully designed, taking into account 
the spatial distribution of the population and the minimum sample per geographic area. 
In this context, a sample of up to 400 passengers was considered to be satisfactory. 
 
2. In parallel, certain operational attributes of the local transportation system were 
measured, through onsite and mystery shopping surveys, to assess the system’s 
operational performance. These attributes involve vehicles load, average 
passengers waiting time at terminals and stops, on-time performance, average line 
speed and others. The surveys were conducted in 6 terminals, where the 78% of 
the total journeys is executed, in 33 bus stops and in 25 lines. 
 
The data collected through the three different types of surveys, i.e. customer 
satisfaction, onsite and mystery shopping, was imported in a relational database and 
using the mathematical equations of the Methodology described earlier the values of the 
indicators were calculated. 
 
 
3.3 Implementation outcome 
 
The quality control program for THETA was successfully implemented and gave the 
organization valuable findings concerning the quality and performance of the 
transportation services provided to passengers, and moreover a tool that will allow the 
organization to maintain a complete monitoring and assessment quality control system 
in the future. 
Although the values of the indicators measured are confidential information for 
OASA, the application of the quality control program showed that more coordination 
among the various transit companies at transfer points is required. This is quite 
expected, since currently six companies provide transit services to the residents in the 
Attica region. The passengers are somehow satisfied with the existing transit services 
and they focus the improvements on quality attributes comprised of prices, information 
provision, waiting and in-vehicle conditions, and accessibility. The results, however, 
differ according to the type of the transit company. For the transit company operating 
the metro system, for example, the high quality services are taken for granted and thus, 
customers emphasize on other quality attributes, such as the transfer coordination with 
other means and information provision. 
On the operational aspect of the transit system, the performance of the services moves 
at satisfactory levels. This is an important finding, since the actual service frequency, 
for example, sometimes suffers, either due to the scheduled service limitations, or due to 
unforeseen external factors, such as congestion, vehicles breaking down, demonstrations 
or road maintenance blocking roads or strikes. The variety and complementarity of the 
operational attributes measured provided OASA very useful information that will enable 
the responsible officers to take the necessary measures to improve the transit service. 
Finally, the three-phase process followed for the HIT’s generic Methodology 
adjustment and implementation proved to be beneficial, since the indicators chosen and 
the tools employed for the data collection and analysis were capable of uncovering 
weak elements of the current transportation system and quality attributes that need 
special attention, and defining several measures that will shape a well coordinated and 
reliable transportation environment in the Attica region. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
4.1 Methodology adoption 
 
As in all cases, the proposed Methodology requires adaptation to the local 
characteristics of the transportation system under consideration. The indicators, the 
sample size, the surveys organization and other elements of the Methodology require 
customization to the size of the network, to the timetables of the transportation service 
and of course to the needs and priorities of the public transport operator or organization. 
The modular character of the Methodology and the associated software allows the 
implementation of parts of it. 
The extensive know-how of the research team and the experience gained from the 
implementation of the Methodology to the various public transport operators mentioned 
earlier gave HIT the opportunity to establish a strong knowledge record and base in the 
field of quality control programs in the public transport business that could be applied to 
other transportation areas as well, such as Short Sea Shipping, intermodal urban 
transport and interurban bus transportation. 
Two important characteristics of the Methodology that differentiate it from others and 
will encourage public transport operators to adopt it are: 
 
1. It allows the estimation of the overall service level through the measurement of 
the appropriate compound indicators. This provides a consolidated picture of the 
performance or passengers’ satisfaction/ dissatisfaction of quality services. 
2. It facilitates the formulation of targets in service quality and performance based 
on the values of selected indicators and in consultation with the transit operator. 
Furthermore, it provides the necessary mechanisms and tools in order to 
investigate whether or not these targets have been reached. 
 
 
4.2 Anticipated benefits 
 
All medium and large size public transport organizations and operators worldwide 
take major initiatives at various levels (organizational, operational, technological etc.) 
towards developing a modern transportation scene, within which passengers can find an 
attractive, safe and efficient level of mobility. Especially in the last decade, most well 
organized public transport organizations have recognized that the Quality Control 
System should be one of such major initiatives. 
The adoption of the proposed Methodology or a similar one by a public transport 
organization is undoubtedly a wise investment. In particular, the establishment and 
maintenance of such a Methodology will allow a public transport organization to: 
 
• assess the performance of the transportation services; 
• take measures towards services improvement; 
• monitor the progress of the quality of its services in the future; 
• better understand the needs and priorities of the passengers; 
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• establish an effective communication and cooperation channel between all parties 
involved in the local transportation system (operators, subsidiaries, ministries, 
municipalities, etc.); 
• perform a customer-oriented scheduling process of the transportation service and 
internal operation of the organization; and 
• support the decision making process of strategic character. 
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Abstract 
 
A key theme of the EU Port Policy has been the establishment of free market access to the provision of 
port services in EU ports. However, two successive European Commission proposals for a relevant EU 
port services directive (PSD) failed to produce a new policy regime. This paper examines the mobilisation 
of maritime interests, aiming to identify stakeholders’ preferences and their contribution to the rejection 
of this port policy proposal. The analysis suggests that, although they did not share the same perspective, 
the views of organised maritime interests shared a common denominator: they were against the proposed 
EU rule due to its structural deficiencies. Assisted by the industrial heterogeneity, the difficulties to 
implement a ‘one size fits all ports’ policy, and the observed institutional tensions a variety of vested 
interests frequently with monopolistic positions contributed to the produced policy output failure. 
 
Keywords: Intra-port competition; Port policy; Maritime interests. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following a lengthy consultation process, an overwhelming majority of the European 
Parliament (EP) voted, in January 2006, against the adoption of a European 
Commission proposal for a Directive aiming to establish free market access to port 
services, the so-called ‘port services directive’ (PSD). The paper analyses the role of 
maritime interests within this consultation process and assesses their contribution to this 
policy output failure.  
This was the Commission’s second unsuccessful attempt to establish a common 
European regulatory framework regarding the provision of port services in the major 
European ports. A narrow majority of the EP plenary session rejected the first proposal 
in December 2003. The almost immediate publication of a revised PSD proposal (PSD 
II) in October 2004 aimed to iron out the most controversial issues, yet the EP argued 
that this second proposal resembled the first one. Still, the EP reactions to the 
Commission’s political manoeuvres can partially account for the produced output-
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failure. This is because in both cases the EU-level interest groups representing 
stakeholders have been mobilised aiming to influence the policy-making process. Some 
of them united in seeking to preserve the status quo and did so successfully.  
The search for a long-term EU Port Policy has been marked by the mobilisation of, 
and conflicts between, contending maritime interests, frequently with monopolistic 
positions (Baird, 1982; Pallis, 1997; Chlomoudis and Pallis, 2002). European Port 
Policy changes are the result of a dynamic process within which national governments 
and EU institutions need stakeholders’ consensus to transform policy ideas to policy 
rules. Evidently, there are different opinions regarding several aspects of this policy, 
including the proposed PSD on port services liberalisation. Thus, the EU policy-making 
does not necessarily produce collective policy outcomes. 
Via a comparative content analysis of their position papers published at various stages 
of the consultation process, the paper concludes with the contribution of maritime 
interests to the failure of translating the Commission’s second proposal into an adopted 
EU port services directive.  In Section 2, the paper briefly presents the content of the 
proposed port policy regime, while Section 3 discusses the observed institutional 
tensions between the Commission and the European Parliament regarding the prospect 
of converting this proposal into an EU policy. Section 4 analyses the stance of vested 
interests and the final Section presents the conclusions of this analysis. 
 
 
2. The proposal for a Port Services Directive (PSD) 
 
On November 20, 2003, the EP rejected the European Commission’s first proposal on 
a PSD that would liberalise market access to port services, by a narrow majority (CEU, 
2001). Within less than a year the Commission reintroduced the issue in the agenda of 
the EU port policy emphasising its intention not to abandon this effort. The PSD ‘was 
complex, but necessary’ (ESPO, 2004a); thus, in October 2004, it published a second 
proposal, the PSD II (CEU, 2004). 
The initial proposal aimed at establishing open access on the basis of transparency, 
non-discrimination, and principles on issues like charging, public service obligations, as 
well as safety. Another objective was to assure that there were at least two service 
providers for each one of the three categories of port services: (a) technical-navigational 
services (pilotage, towage, mooring); (b) cargo-handling services (stevedoring, stowage, 
transhipment and other intra-terminal transport, storage, depot and warehousing); and 
(c) passenger services (embarkation, disembarkation).  
The right to grant authorisations would be maintained by national governments, while 
the level of investment contemplated by the service provider would determine the 
maximum length of each authorisation. The aim was to ensure free competition within 
each port. In general, intra-port competition helps to eliminate any (private or public) 
strategy of price discrimination (i.e. according to demand elasticity) and monopolistic 
rent seeking. Inter-port competition also fosters specialisation (De Langen and Pallis, 
2006a; Goss, 2006). 
A further provision considered the right of port users to cargo self-handling. “Self-
handling’ is a situation in which an undertaking, which normally could buy port 
services, provides for itself, using its own land-based personnel and its own equipment, 
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one or more categories of port services. Along with the liberalization of pilotage, these 
have been the most controversial issues within the EU decision-making process. 
Following a lengthy consultation, the EU institutions detailed a compromise 
including: (a) the obligation of every port to submit information on its financial 
relations; (b) the obligation of newly authorised service providers to compensate former 
providers in those cases that the duration of their authorisation would be reduced; (c) the 
application of the rule in the case of pilotage according to safety criteria and public 
service requirements; and (d) the conditional permission of self-handling. Still, the 
European Parliament rejected this agreement (November 2003). This rejection was 
portrayed as a triumph by a heterogeneous spectrum of stakeholders ranging from 
dockers to some private ports (Psaraftis, 2005). 
The revised PSD proposal was very similar on the grounds of definitions, scope, and 
objectives, (i.e. selection procedures for authorisations, neutrality of competent 
authority in selection, limitations, provisions for pilotage, financial transparency issues), 
with the exception of self-handling. The spirit of change could be found in the strictness 
and the mandatory character of the regime regarding authorisations, shorter maximum 
durations for each authorisation, and a new and broader definition of self-handling 
(Pallis and Vaggelas, 2005). 
The directive would apply to any EU port, provided that its average annual throughput 
over the last three years has not been under three million tonnes or 500.000 passenger 
movements. In cases of ports reaching the freight traffic threshold without reaching the 
corresponding passenger movement one, the provisions of the Directive would not have 
been applicable to port services reserved exclusively for passengers, and vice versa. The 
implication was that, if adopted, the directive would have had an immediate effect on 
the provision of port services in 364 ports throughout Europe (DfT, 2005), 
comprehensively altering the structure of the EU port system. 
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Table 1: Total freight and passenger movement in ports implementing the PSD and in all EU ports (by 
EU member-state; in .000) 
  Total freight tonnage, by  Total passenger movements, by 
Member State No of 
PSD 
ports 
(i) PSD 
ports 
(ii) all 
ports 
PSD as % 
of total 
No of 
PSD 
ports1 
(i) PSD 
ports 
(ii) all ports PSD as % 
of total 
Belgium 4 178,689 181,110 99% 0 591 739 80% 
Cyprus 2 4,823 7,220 67% 0 287 287 100% 
Denmark 14 77,061 103,954 74% 36 47,352 48,653 97% 
Estonia 4 43,467 44,682 97% 0 5,172 5,172 100% 
Finland 16 90,633 104,439 87% 2 15,865 16,341 97% 
France 19 308,767 319,032 97% 8 27,148 27,405 99% 
Germany 16 246,349 254,834 97% 22 30,009 32,146 93% 
Greece 20 132,870 - - 0 - - - 
Ireland 4 36,927 44,919 82% 2 3,567 3,747 95% 
Italy 38 457,789 477,028 96% 27 79,831 82,576 97% 
Netherlands 10 407,421 410,330 99% 0 1,981 2,015 98% 
Norway 11 148,486 190,034 78% 1 4,598 4,656 99% 
Poland 5 50,712 51,020 99% 0 2,886 3,188 91% 
Portugal 5 53,888 57,470 94% 0 - - - 
Slovenia 1 10,720 10,788 99% 0 - - - 
Spain 24 321,651 326,001 99% 2 19,510 20,041 97% 
Sweden 25 136,626 161,454 85% 5 32,263 32,748 99% 
UK 40 526,869 555,662 95% 5 33,009 33,708 98% 
Note 1: In addition to ports that already meet the freight traffic threshold. 
Source: UK Department for Transport, 2005 (Annex, D). 
 
 
3. Major issues of conflict 
 
This Commission’s second initiative (PSD II) created tensions between stakeholders 
and the EU institutions. A major issue related to the selection procedure for 
authorisations for service provision. Among the main questions was the maximum 
duration of authorisations, with port authorities demanding lengthier periods than those 
suggested by the Commission. This preference could be adequately explained taking 
into account that the ports have opted in several cases for authorisations that extend to 
75 or even 99 years of duration. Port operators and port authorities argued that shorter 
time authorisation could not allow for the full amortization of their investments in 
movable assets, and especially those investments immovable assets fully amortized. 
Evidently, these concerns triggered the reaction of port authorities on other issues as 
well.  
Compensations to existing service providers and the transitional regime were two 
further controversial issues. Details regarding compensation for past investments, 
especially in cases when a service provider would not yet be able to renew its 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 17-31 
 21
authorisation, were of great importance for port operators. Yet these details were not 
clarified in the context of the PSD II proposal. As regards the transitional period 
between the adoption of the PSD and its implementation, the industry (foremost port 
authorities) demanded sufficient time that would facilitate the amortization of past 
investments. 
There was also a dilemma regarding whether port authorities would continue to 
provide port services within the future regime, or if they should be neutral arbiters of 
port services provision by third parties. Whilst the Commission initially opted for the 
former option, port authorities opted for the latter. 
The various forms of state aid provided to ports by EU member states was an 
additional controversial issue. This public funding has the target to restructure the port 
facilities and allow for adjustment to contemporary challenges. However, it is also 
responsible for situations that cause distortions of port competition. Market opening 
within a port demands clarification of the condition for capital mobilisation in order to 
avoid situations where this mobilisation favours certain port enterprises. As explained in 
the forthcoming sections, certain stakeholders were particularly interested in such 
clarifications.  
The proposed permission of self-handling and the liberalisation of pilotage led to 
numerous reactions as well. On the issue of self-handling, under current national rules, 
port authorities in Europe are required to employ only local union labourers to load and 
unload cargo. However, exemptions are not rare and are (mostly) observed in dedicated 
terminals. Shipping companies and some ports would like casual labourers or ship 
crews to be allowed to perform these services. Trade unions, as well as port operators, 
were against the potential of self-handling services. Port authorities were divided, 
because in some ports self-handling is already applied. Shipowners and shippers had a 
united front in favour of allowing self-handling. As regards pilotage, many stakeholders 
advocated the degrading safety implications due to a potential liberalisation of this 
service. Maritime pilots felt strongly, stating that “pilotage isn’t a commercial service 
but a Maritime Public Safety Service with responsibility for protection of the 
environment” (EMPA, 2005). 
 
 
4. Policy makers’ reactions 
 
Despite the presence of all these controversies, a number of parameters contributed to 
the institutional ‘push’ toward the fast re-introduction of the PSD proposal in the 
European agenda. For the EU policy-making standards, the time span between the 
rejection of the controversial initial proposal and the re-opening of the process was 
extremely tight indeed.  
European integration is based on the liberalisation of the economy. Both PSD 
proposals were consistent with this spirit. Within the European integration experiment, 
the port sector has been among the few cases in which the liberalisation process has not 
progressed. Both the industrial complexity, produced by the heterogeneity of the 
industry, and the difficulties in identifying port policy either as an ‘industrial’ or as a 
‘transport’ policy, contributed to the observed difficulties to promote a supranational 
regime (Pallis, 1997).  
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On the other hand, in the 1990s, port market liberalisation progressed in the context of 
the national policies (i.e. Italy, Spain, etc). Notably, alongside PSD II, the Commission 
introduced a proposal for another directive (the ‘Bolkenstein’ Directive) aiming to 
eliminate any barriers that prevent businesses from offering services across the EU. This 
initiative re-emphasised the EU commitment to liberalise services in the Single 
European Market, and even though it was decided to exclude transport and thus port 
services from the scope of the directive (due to their peculiarity), the spirit is apparent. 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice had started to examine concessions to port 
service providers or labour organisations on a case-by-case basis. 
Bureaucratic politics stand as another influential parameter. The urgent reintroduction 
of the PSD took place just two months before the Commission’s college stepped off 
power, with ‘self-motivation’ of the departing politicians being evident. To the 
Commissioner of the time responsible for Transport (Loyola de Palacio), the PSD 
proposal was a key theme of the transport strategy that she pursued during her stay in 
office. In an attempt to push it through, she had already advanced the application of the 
rule in her country of origin, Spain (Orru, 2005). Similarly to what it has done in other 
relevant policy areas, like maritime safety (Pallis, 2006) and shortsea shipping 
(Alexopoulos, 2000), the European Commission attempted to act as policy-innovator 
and act as the key actor for promoting port policy. The potential of progress was limited 
by that fact as the content of this second proposal was considerably different from the 
text that the conciliation between the Commission and the European Parliament had 
produced in 2003. The EP, which had voted against the first proposal, was not happy 
with this ‘premature’ Commission initiative. 
This institutional conflict advanced the existing participation of maritime interests in 
the EU port policy-making process. In general, both the EP and the Commission 
maintain a rather good relationship with interest groups (Mahoney, 2004), and in the 
case of the PSD, the EP invested further towards this direction. Consistent with the 
route of the enforcement of the relationship with the interest groups, the EP organised a 
public hearing with the participation of all interest groups (June 2005). The results of 
this meeting, along with a number of impact studies that were presented during the 
public hearing, or were publicly circulated (ESPO, 2004b; DfT, 2005; OSC, 2005), 
further enhanced the discontent vis-à-vis the Commission’s proposal. 
At the national level, governments were divided as well. Although they all agreed in 
principal, several tensions were apparent and portrayed as a conflict between the 
continental and the Anglo-Saxon approach to port organisation. In fact, some member-
states that had already opened access to the port services market worried that the PSD II 
would have negative effects, i.e. crowding-out of existing investors, and creating a mid-
term legal uncertainty. Others (i.e. the Mediterranean countries and the new members of 
the EU), however, were in favour of the PSD II proposal, seeking the introduction of 
intra-port competition in their national port systems. 
 
 
5. Interest groups reactions 
 
A number of interest groups attempted to promote a large number of amendments and 
lead the PSD proposal toward a more positive (in their terms) direction, or even to 
provoke the rejection of the proposal. They did so by following multi-level lobbying 
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practices (Pallis, 2007), which acknowledge the dynamic of both the Commission and 
the EP in the EU institutional setting. Impact studies, either commissioned by 
stakeholders (ESPO, 2004b), national governments (DfT, 2005; ECORYS and 
Trandemco, 2005) or third-parties (OSC, 2005), provided an input towards the 
formation of the critical stance advocated by these interest-groups. 
In practice, the strong stance of port stakeholders towards the PSD II led to the 
formation of an informal alliance and an ‘issue network’ (Greenwood, 2003). The joint 
position statement of ESPO and FEPORT (2002) provides an illustrative example. 
However, this network was formed incidentally, and corporation between the maritime 
interest groups remains occasional. 
 
 
Port Authorities 
 
For port authorities, reaching a common position vis-à-vis the PSD II was not an easy 
task, especially since the Euro-federation that represents them (ESPO - European Sea 
Ports Organisation) has a wider membership than the EU. Some ESPO members 
opposed the directive, with others being neutral. The existence of (quasi)open market 
access regimes in some North European ports added to the Anglo-Saxon thoughts that 
the directive might induce a number of disturbing structural changes. This was observed 
especially in those cases in which intra-port competition is already a fact. In the context 
of ESPO, port authorities reached a sceptical common position, and they actively 
promoted this stance in the EU policy-making process. 
During the consultation process regarding the initial PSD proposal, ESPO was in 
favour of the directive. The situation changed dramatically after the hasty reintroduction 
of the matter in the agenda. The core of the problem was that PSD II ignored the 
amendments of the conciliation procedure that had taken place in the context of the 
discussion of the first proposal (2003). For port authorities, the details of the agreement 
that had been reached within that process were very important: the agreement had 
incorporated most of their demands.  
The reaction to the PSD II proposal was mostly based on the adoption by the 
Commission of a ‘one size fits all’ policy approach and the consequent ‘absence of 
flexibility’. On these grounds, the main areas in which ESPO sought to alter the 
Directive proposal were: 
• The protection of the interests of existing providers of port services in European 
ports. 
• The mandatory authorisations for potential and existing providers. 
• The maximum durations for authorisations. 
• The provisions regarding self-handling of cargoes. 
• The simplification of the proposed regime. 
As regards authorisations, ESPO requested an increase in the number of criteria for 
the limitation of (existing or potential) service providers and demanded that the 
personnel should be a choice of the service provider itself. ESPO expected a 
clarification on the exact way that the new regime would limit the continuation of the 
existing providers’ operation, demanding a reconsideration of the rights of existing 
providers. Furthermore, it advocated that the port authority and the competent authority 
for granting and monitoring authorisations should be the same body. ESPO’s 
proposition about durations was: (a) in the case of no-investments by the providers, it 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 17-31 
 24
recommended a 10-year limit; (b) in the case of investments in movable assets, it 
recommended a 15-year limit; (c) in the case of investments in immovable assets, it 
recommended a 45-year limit. As expected, port authorities were strongly discontented 
with the prospect of allowing self-handling by shipping companies. 
ESPO (2005) demanded the withdrawal of the PSD II proposal (November 2005). To 
support this view and, not least, to enhance the quality of the internal consultation, 
ESPO initiated an economic impact study, which assessed the consequences that the 
implementation of the PSD II would have. This study produced two very interesting 
results. First, that 19 out of the 20 participating ports identified a negative impact by the 
implementation of the PSD II. Second, that the participating ports had once again 
demonstrated the vital heterogeneity of the port industry, either by expressing different 
opinions on the same issue, or by giving different answers to the same questions, 
(ESPO, 2004b). 
Precisely because of this heterogeneity, the various impact studies that took place 
during the same period reached different conclusions depending on the examined 
sample. Some concluded that there would be no substantial impact (OSC, 2005), whilst 
others predicted a positive impact (Pallis and Vagellas, 2005). These differentiated 
results came to emphasise the importance of the sector’s diversity. 
 
 
Private Port Operators 
 
Reaching a unanimous position was less complicated for private port operators. The 
Federation of Private Port Operators (FEPORT) opposed both Commission PSD 
proposals. PSD II was even more annoying than the first one; insofar as it differed in the 
agreement that had been reached during the conciliation procedure of the first proposal. 
On the practical front, FEPORT had major objections, in essence demanding a rewriting 
of the proposal. In addition to the self-handling provisions which were considered as the 
major problem, FEPORT requested changes in the provisions about mandatory 
authorisations, durations, compensation, and transition periods.  
FEPORT’s view was that the criteria for providing an authorisation should be further 
increased. Agreeing with ESPO, FEPORT argued that the port authority and the 
competent authority could be the same body, as far as an anti-trust organization would 
secure the fair and transparent functioning of the port. FEPORT also shared ESPO’s 
position on the issue of service providers’ limitation. As regards the “really important” 
duration of authorisations, FEPORT demanded an increase of the authorisations’ 
maximum length, the preservation of the right to extend an authorisation, and the 
examination of each case with an agreement between the two contracted parts. As far as 
self-handling was concerned, FEPORT advocated the need for the same criteria as in the 
case of other services to be applied, and the examination of each case separately. 
Finally, FEPORT (2005) demanded a framework that, in case of authorisation 
termination, would provide compensation which would be greater than the amount of 
amortized investments. 
The opposition of the port industry as a whole (i.e. including both port authorities and 
private operators) had been detailed earlier by a joint ESPO and FEPORT statement 
(March 2002) concerning the first PSD proposal. The core of the problem was that, 
according to these two interest groups representing the most significant parts of the port 
industry, the conciliation draft, which had not been taken into consideration by the 
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Commission, could be a starting point. The second proposal had the problems of the 
first one, while it introduced additional ones as well.  
Port authorities and private operators assessed that, at this point at least, the European 
Parliament provided a stand to advocate their cause. Hence, during the consultation 
process, ESPO and FEPORT decided to publicise their positions and lobby the 
European Parliament with a more intense and systematic way. Due to the indications of 
a shift of powers between the European institutions, the strategy of these two interest 
groups also changed: they decided to accompany the strategy of approaching the 
Commission’s and other institutions’ officials (access strategy), with the use of 
strategies which had a more public appeal (voice strategy). 
 
 
Shipowners 
 
The stance of shipowners and shippers vis-à-vis the liberalisation of port services and 
the PSD II proposal had constantly been positive. Shipowners in particular advocated 
the liberalization of the port services for more than a decade, whether or not this 
liberalisation has been discussed in the context of other maritime policy initiatives (i.e. 
the promotion of shortsea shipping in Europe) or the port policy per se. ECSA 
(European Community Shipowners Association) reassured this positive stance even 
after the rejection of the PSD II proposal by the European Parliament. In reaction to this 
rejection, French shipowners stated their will for a restart of the process of port services 
liberalization as soon as possible.1 
Shipowners expressed their own position in almost all the controversial fields of the 
proposal. According to them, authorisations should be of optional character and each 
service provider should be scrutinized for professional efficiency. On the issue of 
limitations to services’ provision, ECSA was not very positive. Shipowners argued for 
an exclusion of these provisions from the EU policy framework, as well as for the need 
to further clarify the proposed criteria and the ‘reasons of national security’ that could 
lead to such limitations. Finally, ECSA advocated that there should be at least two 
service providers for each port service. As far as authorisations were concerned, ECSA 
demanded the reduction of their duration and the extension of the authorisation only in 
the cases in which important investments occurred. On the issue of self-handling, ECSA 
endorsed a positive stance but wanted the implementation of self-handling to be limited 
to ocean shipping personnel, rather than expanded to land-based personnel. Within its 
statement during the PSD II related public hearing organised by the European 
Parliament, ECSA (2005) stated that: “Whilst insisting on a further liberalization, ECSA 
feels that the proposed Directive II, needs further study and analysis particularly on five 
critical points notably: authorisation, duration, compensation, transitional periods and 
self-handling”. 
Shipowners are among the most powerful stakeholders, and they demonstrated the 
ability to influence EU maritime transport policy developments and direct them towards 
their interests (Pallis, 2002). Their relative power is the outcome of their economic 
power and, foremost, of the advantage offered by capital mobility (Aspinwall, 1995), 
which allows them to pressure political institutions successfully at national and regional 
supranational levels. As a powerful maritime interest group, ECSA had used different 
                                                 
1
 See the reaction published only five days after the rejection of the Commission proposal: French 
owners: EU port talks must restart. Lloyd’s List, 23 January 2006. 
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strategies, taking advantage of its economical and political power. Like port industry 
representatives, in the case of the PSD II proposal, ECSA expressed its preferences 
publicly, via statements that aimed at influencing all the EU institutions, including the 
EP. Yet, the economic conditions and the consequential port industries’ stance prevailed 
over the shipowners’ capacity to determine policy outputs. 
 
 
Shippers 
 
Shippers, like other interest groups of the maritime sector, participated in the EP 
public hearing of June 2005, demonstrating a change in their interests’ representation 
strategy. They chose a ‘voice’ strategy with a more public appeal, instead of an ‘access 
strategy’ (Beyers, 2004). 
The European Shippers Council (ESC) expressed similar positions to the shipowners, 
while, in some respects (i.e. ports in which the directive would apply), it advocated a 
more liberalised regime. ESC welcomed the PSD II proposal and pushed for further 
services liberalisation. Their stance was in favour of the further extension of the scope 
of the PSD, in a way that it would cover all EU ports and all port services, rather than 
those defined in the proposal. Advocating that shippers are often victims of 
protectionism of the liner shipping industry, they lobbied for the ‘full liberalisation’ of 
port services. Among others, the latter was the opportunity to liberalise a part of the 
transport chain, with other parts expected to follow. As regards the PSD II proposal, the 
shippers’ major concerns related to two issues: the durations of authorisations and self-
handling, respectively. On the issue of self-handling, shippers were positive, whilst they 
demanded a specific period determination of concessions’ durations by the regulatory 
regime. As regards self-handling, they pursued a liberalised regime that would not 
create an exclusive right of services provision by the carriers of the cargoes 
(shipowners) but would create opportunities for them to handle these cargoes. 
 
 
Trade Unions 
 
Dockworkers were the most discontent stakeholders. Their stance had been expressed 
in the context of the discussions of the first PSD proposal, with their strong opposition 
contributing to the failure of the proposal. This happened despite the fact that in this 
process transport workers were not exactly united. Different organizations, including the 
European branch of ITF (International Transport Workers Federation), the ETF 
(European Transport Workers Federation) and the IDC (International Dockworkers 
Council), followed separate campaigns. There were sporadic national level campaigns 
(i.e. the Netherlands), as well. Progressively, trade unions realised that a united front 
would contribute to the accomplishment of their goals and provoke the greatest pressure 
possible. 
In order for this collective action to result in effective union articulation, new labour 
networks were established aiming at a trans-national corporation (Turnbull, 2005) that 
would take advantage of two industrial characteristics: firstly, the immobility of capital 
and secondly a strong workplace union organization. The trade unions had a ‘weak 
start’ during the first PSD proposal, but during the discussions of the PSD II proposal 
they were more organised and expressed their resistance dynamically. 
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Three were the topics that concerned port workers mostly: (a) the mandatory character 
of authorisations, (b) the prospect of self-handling, and (c) the definition of the 
competent authority. Port workers advocated that authorisations should be optional, 
rather than mandatory, and that further criteria for potential service providers should be 
introduced. They also argued that in all cases the port authority should differ from the 
competent authority. This should be ensured by the existence of an anti-trust 
organisation. As expected, trade unions were in principal against any form of self-
handling, arguing that self-handling was against Decision 137 of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), on safety and social grounds. 
Maintaining a dynamic momentum, dockworkers continued to declare their 
opposition to the liberalisation of port services. Unlike other maritime interest groups, 
trade unions like any social character interest groups followed a voice strategy 
throughout the policy-making process. With their statements and especially their 
dynamic demonstrations, they pressed to influence public opinion, as well as the vote of 
the members of the European Parliament. Their campaign was marked by the dynamic 
demonstrations of January 2006, when dockworkers marched (and had a violent 
confrontation with police forces) in Strasbourg. These events took place in proximity to 
the European Parliament’s buildings. As they were ‘heard and felt’ by the MEPs, it can 
be argued that these events contributed in favour of the dockworkers’ stance during the 
voting that took place some days later: the vote resulted in the rejection of the PSD II 
proposal by an overwhelming majority. 
 
 
Other Interest Groups 
 
The other interest groups that expressed their point of view during the policymaking 
process were the Euro-groups representing freight forwarders (CLECAT), the European 
Tug-Owners Association (ETA), the European Maritime Pilots Association (EMPA) 
and the European Boatmen Association (EBA). Each of these associations had different 
priorities and focused on different aspects of the proposed port policy. 
Overall, CLECAT identified a very positive development for the European port 
industry in the proposal. However, it put forward some amendments, in particular the 
provisions concerning granting of authorisations and self-handling. In the latter case 
CLECAT was in support of allowing self-handling in European ports. The EBA 
statement was also positive, as it stated that the main disagreement was not the principle 
but the details of the proposed PSD II: their demand was the exclusion of self-handling 
from the span of the directive. 
EMPA’s main concern was the potential inclusion of pilotage services within the span 
of the PSD. Strongly arguing that pilotage as a service has a lot to do with matters of 
safety and cannot be treated as a profitable occupation, EMPA made clear that pilots in 
the EU would not tolerate the pilotage inclusion in the PSD.  Finally, the ETA stated 
very clearly that it did not support the drafted directive. This stance was based on the 
fact that the revised proposal ignored the details of the agreement that had been reached 
in the conciliation committee. That said, ETA did not clarify if it condemned the whole 
effort in principle or because of some specific details. It might be assumed that for ETA 
the main problem was that it wanted different criteria for the service of towage. 
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Consumers 
 
As they are not organised in an interest-group, the ultimate consumers’ perspective 
was not expressed in a systematic way during the discussion of any of the two PSD 
policy proposals.  The debate was dominated by other interest groups and the outcome 
was determined by the power of interested parties on the supply side and their success 
in preserving their own powerful positions. 
Notably, these consumers would be among the beneficiaries of the proposed increased 
competition in the European port sector. The main effects of the endorsement of the 
proposed regime would be the lowering of entry barriers for entering the market and the 
enhancement of the intra-port competition. Today, regulatory (as well as economic, and 
geographical) entry barriers are substantial in most seaports and are getting more 
complex as modern ports are increasingly embedded in supply chains and parts of 
multilayered networks with multiple entry-levels. Lowering entry barriers is desirable 
from an economic point of view, since they enhance the contestability of markets and 
increase the level of intra-port competition (De Langen and Pallis, 2006b). The latter 
might result in substantial benefits, such as preventing abuse of market power and 
fostering specialisation. Users of services, especially the captive ones, are less exposed 
to monopolistic pricing conditions and excess rent seeking from service providers, a 
positive effect that results in lower final prices that the consumer ultimate pays. 
Furthermore, in conditions of intra-port competition, port service providers have 
incentives to specialise and differentiate their services from competitors in the same 
port. This results in faster implementation of new technologies and business models, in 
turn leading to more tailor-made services. The ultimate effects are the efficient and 
effective transportation of every type of cargo to be consumed (De Langen and Pallis, 
2006a). 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
A core element in the search of a long-term EU port policy has been the opening of 
access in the provision of port services in European ports. Free market operation is in 
line with the wider project of European political and economic integration, a fact that 
was recently highlighted by the Bolkenstein directive aiming at liberalising services in 
the EU. However, due to the peculiarities of the market, port services were excluded 
from this directive and have been the subject of a different Commission’s proposal on a 
port services directive (PSD). This measure would restructure the industry, thus the 
proposal became part of a lengthy debate. As the PSD has been rejected twice by the 
EP, the debate has (at least temporarily) closed with a policy output failure.   
The analysis demonstrated that interest groups formed an informal ‘issue network’, 
aiming at influencing the policy-making process. Although they do not share the same 
perspectives, vested interests lobbied for the same goal: to achieve the withdrawal of the 
PSD II proposal, due to the identification of structural deficiencies in the proposed 
regime (Table 2). 
In the aftermath of the introduction of the PSD II proposal, maritime interest groups 
identified institutional tensions. They realised the unease of the European Parliament 
and used voice strategies towards this institution in order to influence the final policy 
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outcome successfully. Assisted by the core characteristics of the economic environment 
(mostly by the heterogeneity of the European port sector and the difficulties that this 
heterogeneity causes any attempt to adopt any ‘one size fits all’ supranational port 
policy), the stance of organised maritime interests decisively contributed to the second 
rejection of this EU port policy initiative. 
By seeking a strict pan-European regime with minimum implementation flexibility, 
the Commission was unable to address the concerns of stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
Commission overlooked the draft of the Conciliation Committee that had been agreed in 
2003, even though this agreement was considered as a good starting point for further 
discussions by several interest groups. On the contrary, the Commission preferred to 
draw up a new proposal virtually from scratch. In certain aspects, this second proposal 
was stricter (i.e. durations of authorisations) and thus less attractive to maritime interests 
than the conciliation committee draft, or even the initial PSD proposal. Moreover, this 
Commission’s stance created certain institutional tensions. This situation gave the 
opportunity to several organised interests to advocate the maximum of their preferences, 
and seek the accommodation of all of their demands rather than search for a workable 
policy regime. 
Table 2: Maritime interest groups vs. the PSD II proposal 
 ESPO FEPOR
T 
ECSA ESC ETF EMPA CLECA
T 
ETA EBA 
Mandatory nature of 
authorizations for port 
services provision 
- - + + + + n.e - -- n.e 
Selection procedure - - + - n.a. n.e n.e n.e. n.e 
Limitation of service 
providers + - CC - n.a. n.e. n.e n.e. n.e 
Mandatory nature of 
authorizations for port 
services provision 
- - + + + + n.e - -- n.e 
Compensation of 
existing providers - - - CC - n.e n.e + - n.e 
Transitional periods - - - CC - - n.e - -- n.e 
 Liberalisation of Self-
handling - - - - + + - - - - + + n.e. - - 
Liberalisation of  
Pilotage services - - n.e. + + + + - - n.e. n.e. - - 
Competent Authority - - n.e. n.e. + n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e. 
+ +: strongly positive.  
+: positive, but amendments.  
- : negative. 
- -: strongly negative. 
CC: support of the Conciliation Committee text.  
n.e.: No opinion Expressed.  
n.a.: non available. 
 
In terms of content, the Commission could have worked towards the creation of a 
more homogenised port operating framework, before proposing such a strict regime that 
the PSD II aimed to introduce. For instance, there is considerable scope for initiating a 
European policy proposal that would create the essential background conditions, like the 
clear and similar public funding regimes of port infrastructure projects, and legal 
certainty regarding the application of existing competition rules. Even then however, the 
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best policy option might remain to move away from a strict regulatory approach and 
look for alternative solutions such as a code of good practice or interpretative guidelines 
on the application of the rules of the Treaty. In any case, the ultimate goal needs to 
remain the same: to ensure a level playing field and lower entry barriers enhancing 
intra-port competition and benefiting consumers. 
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Abstract 
 
This work aims to acquire greater knowledge on the structure of heterogeneous oligopoly in the 
superyacht production industry, and to investigate how the fierce competition mounted by newcomers 
who seek to beat down the price of superyachts can lead to problems for the large European, American 
and above all Italian yards  as well as small accessories manufacturers. As a reference point of this study 
attention will focus on the Viareggio cluster whose companies are recognized as ranking first in all the 
international classifications. If stiffer competition or a decline in demand or, above all, sharply predatory 
prices set by the newcomers,  were to create severely adverse conditions, the large companies in EU and 
USA and particularly in Italy mounting their counter-attack. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This work aims: to acquire greater knowledge on the structure of heterogeneous 
oligopoly in the superyacht production industry and to investigate how the fierce 
competition mounted by newcomers who seek to beat down the price of superyachts can 
lead to problems for the large European, American and above all Italian yards as well as 
small accessories manufacturers. As a reference point of this study attention will focus 
above all on the well known Viareggio cluster.  
In the first section in depth the main countries, the most important shipyards, the 
structure, performance and conduct  of the superyacht industry are examined.  
In the second section  the fierce battle to capture a share in the megayacht production 
market is underlined. Financially aggressive new entrants such as Taiwan or Hong 
Kong, China, or Dubai and others, have now entered the battle.  
All these new comers are low labor costs countries and all the shipbuilding countries 
are endeavoring to ensure that their yards capture not only the markets of the rich 
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Western countries but also at least a part of the Middle Eastern markets and the 
emergent markets of Russia, India and the Far East as well as demand from the charter 
companies. 
In conclusion we suggest that if stiffer competition or a decline in demand or, above 
all, sharply predatory prices set by the newcomers,  were to create severely adverse 
conditions, the large companies in EU and USA and particularly in Italy declare that 
they are already reducing costs with various different methods. Among the latter, the 
following are of considerable importance: an already highly accentuated process of 
consolidation and diversification in the field of superyacht services, marinas, hotels is 
being further speeded up; production systems similar to those characterizing the 
automobile sector are increasingly adopted; a further process of selection of 
suppliers/outsourced enterprises is being undertaken, retaining close cooperative links 
only with the best suppliers and moving towards a more vertically integrated 
organization; the shift towards buying all or part of the accessories from the more 
esteemed SMEs that are developing in the newcomer countries,  and/or towards 
expanding relations with international suppliers, is already well under way; finally, 
delocalizing all or part of production in emerging countries has already begun. 
We specify that even if the issue is of a great interest, unfortunately the scientific 
literature doesn’t treat it; only statistical data are available. 
 
 
2. The superyacht industry 
 
 
2.1 A special industry 
 
Analysis of the structure of superyacht shipyards requires a number of complex 
considerations. Firstly, it is important to note that superyachts represent a very special 
type of production, they are situated in the top range of the pyramid of luxury (Icomia 
2005) and currently account for about 40% in value of the world nautical market. 
Luxury yachts are extremely costly products in the supreme luxury range.  
These "super-yachts" cannot fail to be privy to a very wealthy clientele that, in the 
glossary of high finance is defined as "ultra high net worth individuals". This elite 
category includes those individuals with financial assets of over thirty million dollars. In 
2002 the number of "ultra high net worth individuals" present around the world 
amounted to about 60,000, of which more than half evenly distributed between the USA 
and Europe.  
The fact that from 1996 to 2002 the number of "ultra high net worth individuals" rose 
by 60% shows how even a negative macro-economic result has a lesser impact on this 
clientele compared to the average one of the sector.  The ultra-high net worth 
individuals (UHNWIs) is comprised of people with financial assets in excess of 
US$37.2 trillion. In the global population, they represent approximately 1% of the total 
high net worth population (Source: Merrill Lynch, http://www.capgemini.com; Global 
Private Banking/Wealth Management Survey 2006, PricewaterhouseCoopers). Three 
years ago, Forbes magazine listed 476 billionaires on its list of the world’s richest 
people. The magazine’s most recent list, released in March 2006, shows the number of 
billionaires around the globe has climbed to 793. This cannot fail to be reflected also in 
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the demand for super-yachts, these too marginally affected by the general economic 
trend, for these boats, in fact, literature speaks of anti-cyclical demand. Thus the 
demand of superyachts keep on with factors such as perception of one’s personality, 
exclusiveness and uniqueness in the sense that it is impossible even for the rich to own a 
similar product of niche. 
Secondly, it should also be noted that the growth of world GNP has influenced 
demand for these special luxury goods (normal luxury goods are typically dependent on 
the economic cycle). The great increase in world GNP after 2002 has led to a rise in the 
number of the super rich in some countries (in 2003 GNP rose by 4.0%, in 2004 by 
5.1%, in 2005 by 4.3%, in 2006 by 4.3%, Source IMF). 
The growth of the economic worldwide cycle affects the demand for superyachts in 
the sense that the rich who are not sufficiently affluent to be able to purchase and 
maintain superyachts may opt instead to hire them. Thus superyacht hiring is a 
financially profitable investment for the chartering companies engaged in this rental 
sector. In addition to purchasing for hiring, as is typical of chartering companies but 
also banks and financial institutions (which frequently use yachts as venues for 
corporate hospitality events with their best customers), other forms of purchasing can 
also be found, such as shared ownership. 
 
 
2.2 Superyachts: countries and shipyards. 
 
The Global Order Book 2006 of Showboat International reports that 688 projects 
(81,852 feet of yachts) are currently contracted or under construction. Italy retained its 
position as the world’s leading luxury yacht-building nation, with 260 units (29,804 
linear feet of boats). The United States ranked second in that category, with 85 units 
(10,621 linear feet). The Netherlands and the United Kingdom retained third and fourth 
place, respectively, while Germany surged to fifth place. 
Table 1: Top 10 countries in 2006. 
Country Total length 
in meters 
Average length 
in meters 
N° of project Rank 2005 
1   -  Italy 9084,26 35,05 260 1 
2   -  USA 3237,28 38,10 85 2 
3   -  Holland 2430,17 46,63 52 3 
4   -  UK 1602,94 29,26 55 4 
5   -  Germany 1414,58 74,37 19 6 
6   -  China 1092,10 30,48 36 8 
7   -  Taiwan 1045,46 28,35 37 5 
8   -  Denmark 907,08 31,39 29 9 
9   -  NewZealand 740,97 46,33 16 7 
10 -  France 462,08 38,40 12 10 
Source: ICOMIA. 
 
On the strength of its total construction, Azimut-Benetti (I) retained its position as the 
world’s leading builder, while the Ferretti Group (I) held its position in second place.  
Sunseeker (UK) advanced to third place, supplanting Rodriguez Group, which fell to 
fourth (Rodriguez produces only semicustom superyachts).  Royal Denship (NL), which 
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ranked ninth last year, jumped to fifth place. We point out that Germany and the 
Netherlands in the custom motor superyacht business produce superyachts with a length 
longer than all other countries in EU. 
Table 2: Top 20 Shipyards in 2006. 
Shipyard Total length 
in meters 
Average length 
in meters 
Number of projects Rank 2005 
1   -  AzimutBenetti 2575,56 37,19 69 1 
2   -  Ferretti Group 2555,77 32 77 2 
3   -  Sunseeker 1329,84 27,13 49 4 
4   -  RodriguezGroup 1035,71 28,65 36 3 
5   -  RoyalDenship 907,08 31,39 29 9 
6   -  Fipa Group 718,72 34,14 21 - 
7   -  Feadship 642,21 58,22 11 6 
8   -  Lurssen 631,55 70,1 9 5 
9   -  Horizon 604,42 27,43 22 11 
10 -  Trinity 579,42 48,16 12 8 
11 -  Westport 571,2 38,1 15 7 
12 -  Heesen 500,48 41,76 12 19 
13 -  Sensation 464,82 51,51 9 13 
14 -  PeriniNavi 446,23 55,78 8 15 
15 -  Hatteras 402,34 24,99 16 12 
16 -  Kha Shing 331,93 30,18 11 10 
17 -  Cheoy Lee 317,6 28,96 11 - 
18 -  Burger 297,79 42,37 7 80 
19 -  Amels 295,35 59,13 5 14 
20 -  Christensen 283,77 47,24 6 17 
Source: Showboat International 2006. 
 
It is worth noting that Italian shipbuilding industry is in continual growth: over the 
last  years (2003-2005) it has gone from 33.5% to 38.2% of the total output, almost 5 
percent in only 3 years.  
But since 2004 also the growth of shipyards of the so-called emerging countries with 
lower labor costs has been considerable: in 2006 the ten yards of Taiwan that are active 
in the sector of superyacht production, in which they have been present for quite some 
time, have orders for 37 yachts. We underline that Taiwan is also planning a 46.5 
hectare yacht manufacturing center for small accessories or third party manufacturers, 
which are expected to provide support above all for superyacht construction.  
Four Chinese yards (Cheoy Lee, CMI, Kingship, Marlow Marine), despite having 
only recently entered this particular sector, already boast 36 orders.  
In Moscow, where there are three yards (MCC3, Hotchya, Nakhimov), there is 
undeniably a development of superyacht construction specifically oriented towards 
large constructions made of steel based on know-how acquired in the building of metal 
ships, above all military vessels.  
In Poland a number of yards, among which Royalship plays a prominent role, have 
been converted for use in the construction of large recreational boats. Brazil registered 
one yacht on the order book in 2001, this year’s list shows three yards building 11 
yachts. Also worth mentioning are the large united shipyards of Dubai in the UAE, the 
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seven Turkish yards, one in Argentine Philippines, those in Croatia etc. Source: Global 
Build Report, 2005-6, Luxmedia Group. 
Competition is becoming fiercer and even though the engines, the steel, various parts, 
famous naval architects or special skills have to be bought in on the international market 
at the same price for all purchases, the low labor costs enable the new yards to achieve 
considerable savings. 
 
 
2.3 Structure of the market 
 
On the worldwide level, the structure of megayacht construction yards is that of 
heterogeneous oligopoly.  
In heterogeneous oligopoly a small number of large yards dominate the market. Each 
country has just a  very few large yards, a number of medium-sized yards and a plethora 
of small yards which may engage in independent production activity or work as third 
parties, or may undertake refitting, or possibly only wintering, or in some cases a mix of 
all these activities. The small yards may produce one or two superyachts roughly ever 
two years (which represents the average length of time required for completion of a 
yacht). All the large and medium yards with their wide range of small suppliers 
(accessories manufacturers) assemble the products in the yard that bestows its own 
brand on the superyacht. (D. Cazzaniga Francesetti 2005). 
The presence of strong demand enduring over time, as has been the case during 
approximately the last ten years, together with a context of recognized tradition and 
capacity, may also lead to new entrants. Thus in countries with a well-known tradition 
in this type of construction (USA and Europe) small/medium-sized yards may enter the 
market. (On account of world mean yard size, these yards are considered small in the 
main producing countries, but the number of employees are above the world average in 
the USA. The world average stands at roughly 20 employees, Source Icomia.) However, 
this should not be confused with the case of new entrants in low labor cost countries, 
where new entrants on this growing market represent often a speculative investment. 
The Viareggio cluster, whose ramifications extend throughout Tuscany, will be taken 
as the reference point of this study, on the basis of its world-wide fame. Data from 2005 
show that Tuscany has one of three major internationally esteemed Italian yards, Benetti 
(Azimut-Benetti) located in Viareggio, the second is Ferretti located in Forlì, and at a 
distance the third: the Rodriguez group.  
The cluster in Tuscany features roughly 229 small/medium-sized yard companies 
involved in recreational boating, 26% of these being located in Viareggio. In addition, 
the Tuscan cluster includes roughly 450 small accessories manufacturers (producers of 
goods and services). These are mainly located in Viareggio and the surrounding Lucca 
area (27%), 11% in Massa Carrara and a similar percentage (11%) in Pisa.  
Some of the medium-sized yards located in Viareggio, known on a world level, 
likewise produce superyachts with the typical assembly procedure used throughout the 
world in both large and small/medium shipyards. It is worth mentioning medium-sized 
yards such as: Codecasa, CBI Navi Viareggio, Overmarine 1 and 2, Polo Nautico, 
Versilcraft, Italyachts, Tecnomar, Antago, Falcon (owned by Spreafico),  Cantieri Riva 
(owned by Ferretti). In the surroundings of Viareggio one also finds medium-sized 
yards, same owned by the major Italian protagonists, who draw advantage from the 
closeness to Viareggio, such as Cantieri Arno (Rodriguez), Cantieri di Pisa (Camuzzi), 
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Cantieri Rossi, Fita Maiora. Both the large and medium sized yards make use of the 
SMEs of the Tuscan districts (for example the furniture-making district) and of the 
enterprises belonging to the cluster. 
It may seem surprising that quite a number of yards which are far from large have 
orders for yachts over 24 meters. But this is precisely due to the fact that the demand is 
growing and that Viareggio has achieved solid international renown as a producer of 
large recreational craft.  
Alongside the yards, in Viareggio highly skilled workmanship are assured at very 
high level by the galaxy of accessories manufacturers of the local system, the districts 
and the third parties that surround the megayacht construction yards. Fine craftsmanship 
is not only an intrinsic feature of the central assembly yard. It is worth to emphasized 
that accessories manufacturers do not serve merely the national and international 
shipyards, but also pleasure harbors and private or chartered boats or other customers 
who constitute important market segments.  
In effect, Viareggio has become a ‘brand’, and producing in Viareggio is now a 
guarantee. 
 
 
2.4 Performance and conduct 
 
Superyachts are either totally custom-made or are ‘semicustomized’ products but it is 
always problematic to distinguish between custom and semi-custom yachts. It is 
important to note that in the superyacht construction sector the large yachts, have a 
partially industrial character. The ‘industrial’ aspect refers to the materials used for 
megayacht construction. The use of steel or fiberglass implies an industrial type of 
production as compared to the earlier wood treatment processes performed by 
shipwrights.  
Semicustomized yacht production allows preparation and delivery times to be speeded 
up, with the benefit that the challenge of competition can be faced more successfully 
and marketing activities aimed at satisfying the demands of impatient customers are 
facilitated. The larger yards have a substantial share of profits from these preconstructed 
vessels. Profits are higher as customers’ requirements can be met promptly. As is 
frequently the case for successful yacht designs, a small series of identical hulls is 
produced, each of which will then be personalized according to the customer’s desires 
and under the customer’s supervision. The demand for semicustomized yachts is 
increasing, as the range of customers now includes not only individual purchasers but 
also the chartering companies (which also purchase a substantial quantity of second-
hand yachts). 
At the same time, a new philosophy highlights the production not only of semicustom 
yachts but also of totally custom-made superyachts. For the industry this means 
increasing investment in Research and Development and involving all SME suppliers of 
the main components in a model of a ‘shared platform’.  
The 'platform' approach to product development means accelerating time to market 
and getting it right the first time. 'Platform' is a team of professionals who work together 
on the design of a new boat from the start under the guidance of the large yard. With 
this approach, the supplier can pre-assemble the parts as in the car industry, but this 
implies that suppliers must learn know-how in a drive to improve performance by the 
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combined use of R&D, computer-aided design and expertise. Clearly, however, in this 
perspective the dependence of SMEs on the larger company is intensified. 
The LVMH Group and Azimut group are implementing this model. Owing to the high 
labour and wage costs as well as high technological capabilities that characterize the 
European (and, within Europe, the Italian) production landscape, these companies in the 
boat-building sector here, like their counterparts in other manufacturing segments, are 
increasingly orienting themselves towards technology-based mass production methods. 
The costs and the prices of superyachts cannot be defined univocally for all yards and 
all yachts as they depend on volatile elements such as the fame of the yard and the 
designer, quality and innovative character of the fittings that are typical of the particular 
yard in question, perception of the luxury of the interior fittings, the latter being the 
most costly aspect: according to P. Miller of IUMI (2002 data), 30% of the costs are 
attributable to ‘interior design and fittings’, plus 3% of ‘extras’ and ‘special equipment’. 
An increase of just a few meters in the length of the yacht may double the overall price. 
Megayachts are often a brand of a large nautical company, or sometimes of a large 
conglomerate , due to the considerable financial backing required. 
 
 
2.5 Concentration 
 
The first thing to underline is the considerable concentration of the market: in fact the 
first 4 countries (Italy, the United States, the Netherlands, the UK) represent overall the 
biggest share (over 60%) . 
Yet the overall degree of concentration in the main superyacht producing countries 
decreased from 2003 to 2004 as compared to 2004-2005. 
For the 2004-2005 shipbuilding year all the main industries/countries show a 
diminishing market share, with the exception of Italy and the United Kingdom which 
shows a trend inversion. 
Tabel 3: Number of orders: Italy, USA, Holland, UK, New Zealand, World. 
 Italy USA Holland UK NewZealand WORLD 
2000 100 78 50 8 17 317 
2001 140 86 53 17 15 428 
2002 170 99 61 18 22 505 
2003 178 82 65 34 22 481 
2004 189 76 49 33 22 507 
2005 249 97 48 58 22 651 
2006 260 85 52 55 16 688 
Source: UCINA, ICOMIA, 2006. 
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Figure 1: Orders: Italy, USA, Holland, UK, New Zealand, World. 
 
Demand’s growth push Europe's boat-building industry into a transformation to even 
stronger industrial manufacturing and a stronger consolidation of companies.  
The top ten companies generate more than one quarter of Europe's total market 
volume.  The top three companies in Europe and in the world (2006) Azimut-Benetti, 
Ferretti, Sunseeker, account for more than 10% of total market sales.  
We show two examples. 
The Azimut-Benetti group consolidated and systematically diversified its position: in 
2000 it acquired the Lusben area in Viareggio and set up a boat repair and maintenance 
service center, with a roughly 40 berth private marina. During 2001 the group took over 
the Gobbi-Sariano yard of Piacenza and the yard of Fano in the Marche region, and in 
2003 the Orlando yard in Livorno. It also entered into commercial agreements with 
Fraser Yachts World-wide and with Fincantieri for the design, building and marketing 
of steel megayachts over 70 meters long. The group can offer a service covering the 
complete cycle, from construction and management to the hiring of exclusive yachts for 
a select clientele. In addition, it organizes marinas and has interests in the hotel sector. 
Ferretti is second of the world's leading manufacturers of high performance luxury 
motor yachts (2006). The group has grown the business significantly both organically 
and via complementary acquisitions. In 1998, Ferretti acquired Bertram Yachts and 
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Pershing, CRN in 1999, Riva in 2000, Apreamare and Mochi Craft in 2001, and Itama 
in 2004. Now the business operates through nine leading brands: Ferretti, Pershing, 
Itama, Riva, Apreamare, CRN, Custom Line, Mochi Craft and Bertram, all focused on 
the top end of each market segment. Permira acquired the Group in 1998, brought the 
Company public in 2000 and took it private again in 2002.  
On 2006-11-07 Candover and Permira, announce the acquisition by Candover of a 
majority stake in Ferretti SpA ("Ferretti") from Permira. Majority equity funding is 
being provided by the Candover 2005 Fund (approximately 60%) with Permira Funds, 
Norberto Ferretti, Chairman, and his management team re-investing the remaining 40%. 
The acquisition is conditional upon EU antitrust approvals. 
But this strong concentration-consolidation to favor economies of scale and to 
improve the market control must take into account new phenomena. 
 
 
3. New comers and competition 
 
The annual growth rate of the global recreational superyacht market was over 20% 
from 1998 to 2006. It is clearly a highly attractive market. 
It is not only Italy, the USA, New Zealand, Holland, UK, Germany and other 
traditional production countries that are engaged in a fierce battle to capture a share in 
the megayacht production market. Other (above mentioned) financially aggressive new 
entrants such as Taiwan or Hong Kong, which has construction yards in China, or the 
United Arab Emirates with shipyards in Dubai and others, have now entered the battle.  
All these new comers are low labor costs countries and all the shipbuilding countries 
are endeavoring to ensure that their yards capture not only the markets of the rich 
Western countries but also at least a part of the Middle Eastern markets and the 
emergent markets of Russia, India and the Far East.  
The most interesting feature is that all the new entrants seek to avail themselves of 
highly skilled operatives and top ranking naval architects: in other words they “buy” in 
the USA and Europe not only the design engineers but also the outsourced/accessories 
manufacturing firms and the best workers and fitters for the period of the fitting out the 
boat. Thus local craftsmen learn by the Western know how. 
The new entrants once again demonstrate the extremely competitive and globalized 
nature of the sector. 
Within this far-reaching international panorama, China is beginning to occupy a 
special position (D. Cazzaniga Francesetti, 2006). For instance in July 2004 Kingship, 
financed by capital from Hong Kong, opened a shipyard at Zhongshan on the estuary of 
the Pearl River in Guangdong, only 40 km from Canton. A number of other superyacht 
producers are also present in China, such as Cheoy Lee Shipyards of Hong Kong, the 
foreign companies Marlow Marine and CMI Custom Marine International, financed by 
American capital.  
Yet according to reliable forecasts there will be no domestic market in China for 
another 10 years or so. Thus, taking a quick look at an example, Kingship is already 
producing luxury yachts for foreign customers. The yard carries out on-boat assembly 
of international products deriving above all from Dutch and American accessories 
manufacturers who do not yet find it advantageous to delocalize but who send their own 
experts for the assembly phase. Kingship also assembles Chinese products, which 
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increasingly are high-quality products as shown by their success at international trade 
fairs such as Mets at Amsterdam. 
Thus even the Chinese yards are adopting the production model whereby it is the 
large yard that assembles the parts manufactured by other smaller enterprises, including 
the local SMEs. 
The aim of Kingship, with the two superyachts that the yard has already produced and 
a similar number in progress, is to build up a strong position on the domestic and 
international market. Like other shipyards in China, Kingship is adopting a strategy that 
seeks to train and take on the greatest possible number of employees. At present they 
have 200 employees but they aim to reach 500, in order to have the capacity to assemble 
up to 7 yachts at a time. 
All the newcomers set their prices much lower than Italian levels or those of other 
European countries, and likewise lower than American levels,  despite the fact that they 
have to accept the international prices of many of the parts to be assembled. But the 
core of their challenge is always based on price. 
Despite the fact that their purchasers are immensely wealthy, the markdowns are such 
(even up to 30%) that the substantial reductions prove highly attractive. In particular 
these superyachts are attractive if the boat is destined to be used by chartering 
companies. 
The growth, but also the cases of rapid disappearance, of large yacht yards 
demonstrates the rising attraction and the difficulties of the international nautical luxury 
business (speculation investments). Source:Yachts Magazine, Global Build Report 
2004-2005, LuxMedia group. 
Although the growth of orders in 2006 even Italy lost a few points despite benefiting 
from 37 new orders, by virtue of which it raised the performance, i.e. the total market 
share of the first four countries. 
This decrease (see particularly the Netherlands and the USA) followed by an overall 
growth of the whole international order book is certainly the symptom of an increasing 
level of competitiveness on the luxury vessel market. It is also a result of the entry of 
new shipbuilding industries from the so called emerging countries, which until not long 
ago could be defined as of little importance in this sector. Basically, the exceptional 
increase of 144 orders in 2005 resulted in a favorable outcome for numerous yards not  
belonging to the four major countries. 
But a much more interesting aspect is the presumed growth trend, see Figure 2. The 
‘other’ countries, which do not include New Zealand since the latter is not a low labor 
cost country, are experiencing an increase that appears to be unstoppable; it is countered 
only by the continuous growth trend of just one country, namely Italy, while the USA, 
Germany, Holland, the UK and New Zealand seem to be undergoing a marked decline, 
at least as far as number of orders is concerned. 
Maybe, in few years, the newcomers (the ‘others’) will outstrip European yards – 
among which Italian yards – and those of America. 
The great fame of Italian production in this sector to some extent shields it from the 
challenge of competition by newcomers. However, the great Italian shipyards are 
already preparing to defend themselves against the danger represented by the low prices 
of the newcomers (see the project to form ‘platforms’, consolidation of the larger yards, 
diversification in the field of superyacht services, marinas, hotels etc). 
But in Italy, in particular, there exists another problem for the larger yards. The 
problem consists in the fact that the greatest competition faced by the major Italian 
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yards comes not only from abroad, that is to say from the traditional American, 
European, New Zealand competitors and the new comers, but also from within Italy 
itself. 
A considerable number of small/medium-sized Italian yards have been set up in the 
wake of the rise in worldwide demand and the success of the Italian style. The presence, 
mentioned earlier, of numerous medium-sized yards producing superyachts in Viareggio 
is a very obvious example of this phenomenon. 
Tabel 4: Trend of market shares of the main production countries. 
 Italy USA Holland UK New Zealand Others 
2000 31,55% 24,61% 15,77% 2,52% 5,36% 20,19% 
2001 32,71% 20,09% 12,38% 3,97% 3,50% 27,34% 
2002 33,66% 19,60% 12,08% 3,56% 4,36% 26,73% 
2003 37,01% 17,05% 13,51% 7,07% 4,57% 20,79% 
2004 37,28% 14,99% 9,66% 6,51% 4,34% 27,22% 
2005 38,25% 14,90% 7,37% 8,91% 3,38% 27,19% 
2006 37,79% 12,35% 7,56% 7,99% 2,33% 31,98% 
Source: Our elaboration from UCINA, ICOMIA data. 
 
Tabel 5: Annual Growth %. 
 World Italy USA Holland UK New Zealand Others 
2000        
2001 35,02% 40,00% 10,3% 6,0% 112,5% -11,8% 60,3% 
2002 17,99% 21,43% 15,1% 15,1% 5,9% 46,7% 15,4% 
2003 -4,75% 4,71% -17,2% 6,6% 88,9% 0,0% -25,9% 
2004 5,41% 6,18% -7,3% -24,6% -2,9% 0,0% 38,0% 
2005 28,40% 31,75% 27,6% -2,0% 75,8% 0,0% 28,3% 
2006 5,68% 4,42% -12,4% 8,3% -5,2% -27,3% 24,3% 
Source: Our elaboration from UCINA, ICOMIA data. 
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Figure 2: Trend of orders. 
Source: Our elaboration. 
 
The table demonstrates clearly that the ‘others’ show a steep linear trend in % (from 
2003). The extrapolation suggests that Italy could be overtaken in a short time: 
2004: +38, 2005: +39, 2006: + 43. 
Summarizing: superyacht builders display the following characteristics: 
A - All yards seek to achieve an optimal size and organization. 
B - A production setup in which superyachts are products resulting from assembly by 
experienced small-sized accessories manufacturers or outsourced businesses. These 
constitute the so-called pipeline that produces for yards, and it is undergoing rapid 
development in newcomer countries as demonstrated by the earlier cited example of 
Taiwan. 
C - A structural model of heterogeneous oligopoly, which however is even more 
competitive because each enterprise deploys its optimal choice given the strategy of its 
rivals, but acts within an environment where neither a predatory price policy nor 
collusive activities are possible as long as all the stronger yards in EU and USA are 
facing the same production conditions and specialized high cost labor markets, as has 
indeed been the case to date. On the one hand, megayachts require a minimum scale of 
efficient high capital intensity production, yet at the same time economies of scale do 
not occur or are low (but it is possible that it will change with the new ‘platforms’). The 
markets are affected by the fierce competition arising from the need to produce yachts 
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with highly differentiated production features, where product uniqueness and luxury are 
considered outstanding features and play a overwhelmingly important role. 
Thus while the market structure can be described as heterogeneous oligopoly, it is of 
an ambiguous type, which cannot make use of all the typical instruments of this 
structure. In this framework it is of particular relevance that US and EU yards are 
becoming under attack by the newcomers who are setting their prices far lower 
(predatory policy). 
As a consequence it is interesting to inquire into the type of circumstances that could 
trigger a fall in demand for luxury. 
The following aspects can be mentioned for all countries: 
- a sudden change in luxury tastes; 
- an excessive numerosity of yards, as excessive supply would result in a 
decreased perception of “uniqueness” by the purchaser. 
And for USA and EU shipyards: 
- an extremely strong pressure on prices, with true predatory features, by the 
new Arab, Chinese and other competitors in parallel with qualitative 
development of productions in low cost countries. 
In the complex scenarios outlined above, it is of interest to determine whether the 
large American, European - among which the Italian- shipyards would consider it more 
advantageous to set more binding conditions on the cluster enterprises. 
At present particularly in Italy top level yards adopt a mixed organization, awarding 
priority to close relations with outsourced groups of trusted and highly skilled first-level 
but partially verticalized suppliers, also maintaining horizontal relations with businesses 
that form part of the clusters or districts. 
If stiffer competition or a decline in demand or, above all, sharply predatory prices 
were to create severely adverse conditions, the large companies in EU and USA and 
particularly in Italy declare that they are directing efforts towards reducing costs by: 
- adopting production systems similar to those characterizing the automobile 
sector;  
- carrying out a further process of selection of suppliers/outsourced enterprises 
retaining close, cooperative links only with the best suppliers, 
- imposing to SMEs very strict times scales, more tightly controlled 
specifications moving towards a more vertically integrated organization 
- buying abroad all or part of accessories from the more esteemed SMEs that are 
developing in the newcomer countries or/and accept to expand relations with 
international suppliers 
- delocalizing all or part of production in emerging countries. This is, for 
instance, the choice opted for by Codecasa and by  Perini (the latter having 
produced the ‘Falcon’ entirely in Turkey. Maltese Falcon is a $ 100 million 
(source: http://news.com.com/2300-1008_3-6094519-1.html) sailing-yacht 
boasting top technology for an 87,5 meter yacht that evokes the image of 
nineteenth-century ships. The ship has fifteen square sails (five per mast) 
which open in six minutes. This example indicated the level of expertise 
achieved by some yards where Italy has delocalized and put considerable 
effort into increasing know-how. 
What can be proposed in order to safeguard Italian SMEs and their creative flare? 
Experience shows that these small enterprises are reluctant to work in some form of 
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associative arrangement or to cooperate, or engage in acquisitions in order to achieve 
medium-large size. Independence is their buzz word and perhaps their strength.. 
However we note that the majority of accessories manufacturers/outsourced 
enterprises, in particular those in the Viareggio area and generally in Italy and in high 
cost countries, have already acquired international renown, they are branded and have 
high export levels (as much as 100%, Cazzaniga Francesetti, 2005). This points to a 
possible opportunity for accessories manufacturers/outsourced enterprises. It could be 
based on a strategy of even greater internationalization of the products of the cluster. 
Enhancing the international image of the accessories manufacturers/outsourced 
enterprises would perhaps become the only alternative open to these small businesses as 
a means to counter the pressure towards verticalization  and rough selection. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Examination of this rather special niche sector of superyacht production yards reveals 
that precisely because it has experienced a prolonged period of growth in demand, a 
series of new phenomena have arisen. 
The pressure on prices brought about by the new entrants (but also the possibility that 
demand may in the future suffer a decline - and the decline could be abrupt) seems to be 
leading towards: 
- fierce selection among EU and US yards, from which only Italy has so far 
escaped unscathed; 
- a situation whereby the low labor cost emergent countries are taking over 
greater and greater market shares; 
- a stronger de-localization, among other defense methods, of Western and 
Italian yards; 
- the development of technological platforms by the major yards (which are 
undergoing pronounced consolidation); such platforms are likely to result in 
savings on costs, verticalization of relations with SMEs and a strong increase 
in production delocalization) 
Finally, a fresh look should be taken at the possible means of defense of cluster SMEs 
as well as Western and Italian districts operating in the field of large yacht production. 
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Abstract 
 
The development of upgraded transport networks in the SEE (South East European) region(Balkan), 
connected and compatible with the corresponding EU(European Union) internal networks and those of 
the neighbouring countries, is an important means of improving links within the region and integrating 
the countries of the area into the political and economic mainstream of Europe. 
However,Balkan countries seem to have many problems in developing such upgraded transport 
networks The quality of infrastructure in the region at present remains inadequate to support a significant 
increase in transport flows. While in this part of Europe, after a long period of political unrest and 
reform, transport flows are increasing in an impressive way and solutions are urgently needed… 
The EU has gone through extensive planning exercises resulting in trans-european networks for the 
European Union and the accession countries. The participation of the EU derives from the EU´s as well as 
the countries’ long term vision on accession of all countries of the area to the European Union. 
This paper starts with a brief review of the EU efforts to develop a common transport policy in the 
area. Then, it describes in detail the HLG-SEE(High Level Group-SEE) work , which may be considered 
as an important effort in the above mentioned planning process in recent years. The proposed 
methodology by the HLG to identify major transnational axes is outlined . The outcome of this 
exercise is given, together with the final proposals made. 
Following this, the paper proceeds to an investigation of the current situation and of the future 
prospects of the Balkan international transport axes , on the basis of the experience gained until now, and 
the reality applying to this SEE area. 
 In concluding, the need is stressed, in the name of both the environment and safety, to address urgently 
the problem of the Balkan’s road network, since the vast majority chooses road as the preferred means of 
transport for freight and passengers alike. This seems to be a first priority to bring fast progress in this 
still underdeveloped SEE area and to promote European integration. 
 
Keywords: International transport axes; Balkan countries; South East Europe; Trans-European networks; 
EU High Level Group. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In reaching the end of the first decade of the 21st century, most politicians in the 
Balkan countries seem to have a vision: they seek and pursue a new status for the 
transport infrastructure of the region, where transportation flows traverse without 
problems this SouthEast Area of Europe(Balkan) , by use of e.g. 6- lane motorways, and 
with very few bottlenecks at the various border lines, where vehicles are transferred 
from country to country! 
The reality however is completely different, and we are far away from reaching this 
status. Vehicles wait for hours in the borders of the various Balkan countries, delayed 
due to the time-consuming processes of control. The numerous plans for the upgrade of 
transport networks in the Balkans on the basis of the models of the EU, with 
international financing, are not making progress, in contrary they are already delayed. 
In the meantime transport flows in the region are increasing rapidly in recent years, 
because, after a decade of political unrest,(1998-2006) political stability seems to return 
in the Balkans. Especially the volumes of transported goods are increasing in an 
impressive way. 
The quality of infrastructure in the region is still inadequate to support - or indeed 
facilitate - this significant increase in trade. The following Table 1 is quite 
characteristic. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Basic Infrastructure Development Indicators 
Category Balkans Central Europe European Union 
1. Road network 
1.1. Density 41.06 105.04 100 
1.2. Paved main road network, percent 59.82 67.04 100 
2. Railway network 
2.1. Density (standard gauge) 75.62 139.20 100 
2.2. Electrification (standard gauge), percent 86.30 89.93 100 
3. Telecommunication network 
3.1. Main connections per 100 inhabitants 37.9 50.4 100 
3.2. Mobile telephony connections per 100 
inhabitants 
7.0 30.0 100 
4. Energy network 
4.1. Electricity production per inhabitant 45.6 66.0 100 
4.2. Natural gas consumption per inhabitant 61.2 58.70 100 
5. Education 
5.1. Public expenditure as a percentage of GNP 73.97 92.12 100 
5.2. Public expenditure per student in tertiary 
education as a percentage of GNP per capita 
86.26 124.50 100 
6. Health 
6.1. Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP 85.57 107.21 100 
6.2. Hospital beds per 1 ,000 inhabitants 81.20 102.56 100  
7. Science and technology infrastructure  
7.1. R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP 67.80 65.54 100  
Source: P. Skayannis, "Infrastructure Comparisons in Transition Countries: A New North-South Divide 
in Europe?" in The Development of the Balkan Region, ed. G. Petrakos and S. Totev 
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Let us have a more thorough look: 
 
Roads: Most of the main roads used for freight were built in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
have been poorly maintained since then owing to a lack of resources. In addition, many 
routes in ex-Yugoslavia suffered war damage, either directly through bombing and 
landmines, or as a result of heavy tank traffic, which the roads were not designed to 
withstand. However, the quality of roads in the Balkans varies enormously: between e.g. 
Bulgaria and Croatia, where good new motorways have been built recently and more are 
under construction, and Albania, where few roads are asphalted and almost all are in 
very poor condition. 
Rail: Most lines need modernisation, and there is a severe backlog in maintenance 
which, in some areas, reduces the operational capacity and travel speed substantially. 
85% of the network is single track, and only 10 % is in good condition. It should also be 
underlined that the railway companies in general will require major restructuring to 
provide efficiently adequate transport services. In some areas, incompatible technical 
track specifications also slow down goods transit; less than 10% of track in the Western 
Balkans is electrified (compared to around two-thirds in Bulgaria). The railways are 
under state ownership throughout the region, although Croatian Railways is slated for 
privatisation. Border crossings represent another major bottleneck, largely reflecting a 
lack of computerised customs facilities or cooperation between neighbouring countries' 
border-guards. There are also costs and uncertainty arising from visa requirements for 
drivers and corruption in the customs services. 
Investment Priorities: The rehabilitation of existing infrastructure and the construction 
of new links are priorities not just for national governments, but also for the 
international organisations providing aid, loans and transition assistance to the region. 
Faster and safer road and rail links would bring a number of benefits: better links would 
facilitate trade, both within the region and within the EU, which accounts for more than 
50% of exports. In particular, faster freight would create more opportunities to export 
such perishables as agricultural produce. Foreign investors would be more attracted to 
the region if goods could be cheaply, reliably and quickly exported to richer markets in 
the West and developing markets in the East. 
Tourism is a key growth industry in the region. However, the summer season always 
brings traffic congestion. More investment is needed in roads - and airports - to improve 
access. 
Financing Frustrations: Most governments in the region lack the resources required to 
build and maintain roads, and rely heavily on aid and loans from the EU, the European 
Investment Bank, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. All these institutions are heavily involved in co-financing road repair and 
rebuilding. Routes on the main European 'transport corridors' crossing the Balkans -- 
notably north-south Corridor X, running from Austria to Greece through Belgrade, and 
east-west Corridor VIII, running from Durres in Albania on the Adriatic, through 
FYROM to Bulgaria's Black Sea coast - receive priority. 
However, the transport of goods across the region remains costly, over-regulated and 
inefficient. Moreover, the creation of four new states in SEE has resulted in a 
multiplicity of international borders/check-points and of decision-making centres for 
planning, regulating and investing in the transport sector with negative repercussions for 
integrated regional economic development and trade. 
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2. Brief history of EU efforts towards a common transport policy for the region 
 
A common transport policy for south-east Europe dates back to 1999, when the 
Stability Pact for South-East Europe was set up at the initiative of the European 
Commission(EC). 
The western Balkans were gradually moving out of war and the region was regaining 
its potential within Europe. Hence the growing presence of the EU in the region 
beginning in 2000, in a number of policy areas such as energy and transport, with an 
overall promising roadmap for enlargement. 
The participation of the EC derived from the EU´s as well as the countries’ long term 
vision on accession of all countries to the EU which required to work towards the 
adoption of EU´s goals and strategies as well as to satisfy its acquis communitaire in the 
transport sector. 
At the end of 2001 the EC finalised its strategy and released the document “Transport 
and Energy Infrastructure for South Eastern Europe” (European Commission2001). This 
strategy, which has been discussed and agreed with the countries of the region and with 
relevant international agencies and IFIs, constitutes the framework of an ongoing 
process to promote regional cooperation among the countries of the Region, facilitate 
coordination between donors and allow adequate prioritisation of the regional 
infrastructure investments in Southeast Europe” (quote from SEETO, 2006). 
In 2002 the TIRS (Transport Infrastructure Regional Study) determined the SEE Core 
Transport. (Agence Francaise de developpement (financier)/European Conference of 
Ministers of transport, 2002) 
In mid-2003, the “Regional Balkans Infrastructure Study Transport - REBIS 
Transport” was released (European Commission financier, 2003). This project aimed at 
preparing investment plans for transport infrastructures and at preparing pre-feasibility 
studies for selected project proposals, prior to investment decisions. The project focused 
on the development of the Core Network based on the previous study (TIRS). It is 
broadly composed of the Trans European Transport Corridors and of the links between 
capitals of the Region and to capitals of the Regional Balkans Infrastructure Study 
Transport (REBIS Transport). However this study was based on data up to 2000, when 
there existed no standard trends in socio-economic development of some countries e.g. 
Serbia and Montenegro. Predicted GPD growth rates were from 4 to 4.5%, while in 
previous years they were much higher (for example, higher than 6% in Serbia). 
An assessment of the Core Network was made through TINA methodology (2004), 
which provided the status-at that time- of completed sections, ongoing and future 
projects, missing links and bottlenecks including those of administrative and technical 
nature. 
This work also produced 20 pre-feasibility studies of selected projects towards 
alleviating bottlenecks and upgrading the Core network to “EU-standards” (European 
Commission/External relations directorate general Regional Strategy Paper, 2002-
2006). 
In mid-2004, the EE founded the HLG -High Level Group on the extension of the 
major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries and regions. The 
HLG followed the ministerial seminar organised in June 2004 in Santiago de 
Compostela, Spain (European Commission HLG, 2004). The objective of the HLG was 
to recommend how to extend the major trans-European transport axes to the 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 47-60 
 51
neighbouring countries and to identify priority projects on these axes. A particular HLG 
for the SEE region was set up. 
In September 2005 the final proposals decided by the EC on the basis of the HLG 
project, were released. (European Commission HLG, 2005). 
There has also been much progress with the establishment of an EU Network Steering 
Committee (NSC), composed of high level representatives of the participants, which co-
ordinates the joint work of the MoU’s (Memorandum of Understanding, 2005) and, the 
establishment of a South East Europe Transport Observatory (SEETO, 2005). The core 
mandate of SEETO is to assist the NSC in implementing the MoU to ensure that the 
signatories co-operate on the development of the main and ancillary infrastructure on 
the Network and enhance policies in this area which facilitate such development. 
In April 2006 the First Core Regional Transport Network Development Plan 2006-
2010 was presented and accepted by EC (SEETO, 2005).2011 
In December 2006 Mr Jaques Barrot and EC Ministers accepted the 2007- 2011 SEE 
Core Regional Transport Network Development Plan (SEETO, 2006). 
 
 
3. The main aspects of the HLG -SEE region work 
 
The HLG project can be considered as the most serious effort in recent years to 
promote transport in the wider Balkan Area. The author of this article, had the occasion 
to participate as Greece’s representative in this HLG for the SEE region (Balkans). 
This paragraph outlines the methodology that was proposed by HLG for adoption and 
that provided the framework for the exercise to identify and select potential axes and 
projects on the SEE region. The proposed methodology consisted of two steps: 
• Identification of major transport axes connecting the EU with the broader SEE 
region. 
• Selection of priority projects on these major axes that were feasible and which 
demonstrated best value for money in terms of their economic, social and 
environmental impact. 
 
 
3.1. Step 1: Criteria proposed for identifying major axes connecting the EU with its 
neighbours 
 
The first step of the methodology aimed at identifying a limited set, some 5-7, of 
priority transport axes, which connect the EU with the neighbouring countries of the 
SEE region and which are particularly relevant for international transport. The concept 
of major transnational axis was seen as important to focus efforts and to get countries 
together in a cooperative international setting.  
The axes would in many cases have a multimodal character in addition to their Pan-
European dimension, being used by traffic between the European Union and the 
neighbouring countries. Special attention would be granted to nodal points, such as 
ports given their potential strategic role as industrial and logistic platforms. The 
networks that have been the subject of international agreements and other joint 
decisions and actions should be considered as the starting point for the whole exercise.  
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 47-60 
 52
The following two aspects were proposed for the identification of priority axes 
connecting the EU with the neighbouring countries or broader regions: 
• Pan-European interest - a priority axis should facilitate and stimulate the 
development of exchanges between the European Union and its neighbours by 
extending the major TEN axes to the neighbouring countries or regions, taking due 
account of existing priority reference networks and corridors. 
• Functional dimension - a priority axis should be an important route for 
international traffic flows between the EU and the neighbouring countries or 
regions, in particular in the longer term. In addition, a priority axis can be a route 
that allows traffic to avoid a major environmental bottleneck or barrier. This 
dimension should be assessed using one the following three criteria: 
- amount and share of international traffic, today and forecast for 2020, with 
origin or destination in the EU and a neighbouring country or region, 
measured e.g. in tonne and passenger kilometres or vehicles crossing a border, 
and as % of overall long-distance traffic; or 
- volume of transit traffic, in the current situation and estimated for 2020, with 
origin or destination in the Union and using the infrastructure of the 
neighbouring country or region; or 
- the axis offers an alternative, which is potentially much shorter (less costly to 
users), environmentally friendlier or safer than the alternative, established 
route. 
 
 
3.2. Step 2: Criteria for selecting priority projects 
 
At a second step, priority projects on the major transnational axes, as identified 
according to the objectives and criteria presented in the previous section, will be 
selected paying particular attention to the most pressing bottlenecks for international 
traffic. As funding transport investments is inevitably a difficult issue, a proper 
evaluation prior to putting forward projects is fundamental. 
A two-stage procedure was thus proposed for project selection. 
 
First stage - pre-selection 
 
The first stage aimed at pre-selecting a restricted number of projects worthy of being 
examined in detail by the Group. The methodology should be simple and allow a rapid 
analysis of project proposals. This should be done through the elimination of those 
projects not meeting all of the following three criteria: 
- the project should form part of one of the priority transnational axes, as identified 
by the Group in step 1, taking notably due account of projects which cross or 
circumvent natural barriers, alleviate congestion or other bottlenecks or offer safer 
or environmentally friendlier alternatives to main corridors used today; 
- to eliminate projects which are too small or too regional in their character to merit 
inclusion, the project should be of sufficient significance. The particular situation 
of the countries concerned would, however, be taken into account. 
To avoid a multitude of small projects without significant impact, the cost of each 
infrastructure project should be above the indicative threshold of [0.15%] of the GDP of 
the country/region concerned. Lower indicative thresholds may, however, exceptionally 
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be approved for the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, for traffic management 
systems, including security systems, or for projects which promote maritime transport 
or transport using inland waterways or which address environmental or safety concerns. 
The technical solution proposed should be more cost efficient in reaching its stated 
objectives than alternative technical options, including e.g. type of action (new 
construction/rehabilitation; motorway/dual/single carriageway) or investments in other 
modal routes (motorway of the sea/land based solution). 
- There should be a firm commitment of the country or region concerned to 
implement the project, notably by checking whether the project will be subject to 
national selection tests and relevant international conventions: 
- the project is scheduled in national transport plans with the start of works prior 
to 2010 and completion by 2020 at the latest; 
- realistic financial plan, which indicates the various funding sources, including, 
in particular, the amount of national and international funding and where 
appropriate private funds. 
 
Second stage - evaluation 
 
In the second stage, the objective is to identify those projects, which contribute most 
to balanced sustainable development in terms of their economic, environmental and 
social dimension using the following three criteria: 
- improving economic efficiency - notably cost savings, including time savings, to 
international users and operators/firms of the transport system taking into account 
possible charges paid for the infrastructure use. Impact on economic growth and 
employment; 
- enhancing environmental sustainability of the transport system - Reduction in air 
pollution, noise, green house gases and other environmental impacts such as 
biodiversity, e.g. through changes in the existing modal shift, re-routing to 
environmentally friendlier modes or infrastructures or through reduction in 
congestion; 
- improving transport safety and security - Reduction in the number and severity of 
accidents caused by international traffic and in security incidents to international 
operators, e.g. through modal shift or re-routing to safer modes or infrastructure. 
The above criteria should be calculated for the situation with the project proposed and 
compared to a situation without the project. The impacts, calculated in monetary terms 
as far as possible, should be checked against the investment, maintenance and running 
costs of the project. The net benefits should be significantly positive overall, only 
projects with a sufficiently high internal rate of return [>6%] will be considered, and to 
the extent possible for each separate criterion. 
It is also important to stress that the projects proposed should respect international 
conventions and that environmental assessment, procurement procedures etc. are carried 
out in accordance with national legislation, donors' funding rules and best international 
practice. 
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3.3. Results: the decisions taken and the proposals made 
 
On the basis of the above, HLG-SEE region submitted its proposals. In line with the 
mandate given to it, the HLG- EU decided to adopt five multimodal transport axes at its 
sixth plenary meeting in September 2005. 
All of the five axes comprised one or more branches reflecting the volumes of 
international traffic and the forecast for 2020 and ensuring connectivity between the 
neighbouring regions and the trans-European networks of the EU. 
Out of the five, the transnational axis adopted by the Group and referring to the SEE 
region is the so-called South Eastern axis. 
This South Eastern axis links the EU through the Balkans and Turkey to the Caucasus 
and the Caspian Sea as well as to Egypt and the Red Sea. Access links to the Balkan 
countries as well connections towards Russia, Iran and Iraq and the Persian Gulf are 
also foreseen .The alignment of these connections is the following: 
- Multimodal connection Salzburg - Ljubljana - Zagreb/Budapest - Belgrade - Nis, 
including the following connections  
- Sofia - Istanbul - Ankara - Georgia/Armenia - Azerbaijan (Traceca) 
- Skopje - Thessaloniki  
- Multimodal connection Budapest - Sarajevo - Ploce 
- Multimodal connections Bari/Brindisi - Durres/Vlora - Tirana - Skopje - Sofia - 
Burgas/Varna  
- Inland waterways Danube -Sava 
In addition to the above connections and branches, Austria supported by Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina raised the so called Pyhrin corridor linking Berlin to Zagreb 
and connecting to the TEN priority project no
 
22 and the Pan-European Corridor X. 
UNMIK/Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro and Albania stressed the importance of the 
Balkan regional core network in providing access to the main axes. 
It should be mentioned that the parties which actually took place in this process were: 
Albania, Bosnia/Hertzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, FYROM, 
UNMIK/Kosovo, Italy, Greece and Slovenia - the last three were already EU members, 
Romania and Bulgaria - the latter joined EU in 2007 and Turkey. 
 
 
4. The current situation and the future prospects 
 
 
4.1. Current situation 
 
Today the EU remains the major and rather unique promoter of the common transport 
policy for south-east Europe. 
There are still four conspicuous problems: 
• Inadequate and unsafe road and rail networks, leading in many places to delays, 
congestion, pollution and accidents. Most major arteries in the Balkan are unable 
to handle the EU standard of 11.5 tonnes per axle. Road and rail safety also needs 
urgent attention: Serbia and Croatia's road casualties per 1,000 population are up 
to four times the rates found in the UK, a performance gap which is increasing 
every year. 
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• No stable financing mechanisms: According to official sources, 70% of major 
road and rail axes in the region need improvement or replacement.. However, 
basic maintenance of the region's road and rail networks requires levels of funding 
which are simply not available from the public sector. 
• Discrepancy between the EU and national governments in terms of prioritizing 
particular projects and modalities. 
• Incomplete regulation with the risk of unfair competition with the EU-27. For road 
haulage, checks on admission to the occupation, driving times and rest periods are 
woefully inadequate. In the medium term, the Balkan Countries are facing or will 
face the challenge of implementing and enforcing a large body of transport acquis 
communuautaire comprising several hundred regulations, directives and decisions. 
The road transport acquis is particularly extensive, covering market access and 
social, technical, fiscal, safety and environmental requirements. 
Also, the level of intra-regional co-operation – a vital element for the effective 
development of any common policy and, above all, for transport – remains rather poor, 
so the EU has tried to compensate for this with various strategic actions. For instance, it 
has strived to tighten up co-ordination and to secure a greater commitment of southeast 
European countries in the area of the common transport policy. This has implied the 
gradual replacement (Stability Pact for South East Europe, 2006) of all fora that had 
been involved in regional transport infrastructure activities with two main EU co-
ordinated structures. These two main policy-making and implementation levels are: 
• the Infrastructure Steering Group(ISG) run by the European Commission and the 
World Bank Office for SEE (Brussels) and made up of the European Commission, 
the World Bank, the Council of Europe Development Bank, the EBRD, the EIB 
and the Stability Pact for South-East Europe; 
• the South-East European Transport Observatory(SEETO), which includes the 
European Commission, the Banks (IMF, the World Bank, EIB and EBRD) and 
representatives of the western Balkan countries. 
The ISG gives the possibility to the EC and the banks to discuss and co-ordinate 
policies before disseminating them, via SEETO, within the region. 
 
 
4.2. Future general prospects 
 
There is no doubt that the EU’s main objective for the SEE area is to make sure that a 
common transport policy for the region will be established, which will support rather 
than challenge regional cohesion as well as social, economic and political stability. For 
the Balkans in particular, regional stability depends on the steadiness of each and every 
component country. 
Moreover, any threat to social/economic/political instability may easily have a spill-
over effect and compromise the fine balance that has been, with great effort, achieved so 
far in the region and its vicinity. 
In developing a common transport policy for south-east Europe, the declared goals of 
the EU are to contribute to economic growth, stability and cohesion in this part of 
Europe that has been heavily confronted with conflict and recession. 
However generous these initial goals, one cannot ignore that there is an ever-
increasing gap between the purely economic policy objectives and the context of 
broader sustainability. Thus, while there is an unprecedented level of regional 
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mobilisation towards the implementation of a common regional transport policy for 
southeast Europe, there has been certainly no matching effort in other areas, e.g.the 
social policy area. 
In July 2007 ,the newly enlarged and amended Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA 2006) came into force, for five parties in South Eastern Europe - 
Albania, FYROM, Moldova, Montenegro and UNMIK/Kosovo (European Commission, 
2007). 
This ambitious and far-reaching agreement was signed by the five parties plus Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia in December 2006 following several months of 
intensive negotiations chaired by the Stability Pact and supported by the European 
Commission. In addition to harmonising the trade regime among the parties, the 
agreement also includes new areas of trade policy such as government procurement and 
intellectual property, with profound effects on transport in the area. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The HLG final proposals 
 
 
4.3. Emphasis on road transport 
 
The EU does not leave much space for road transport, after all it is the general EU 
approach to augment other transport means, as e.g. rail and sea transport. 
In contrast, it is in the 11 Balkan countries that form the Balkan sub-continent, that 
the need for creation of new road links is most acute. In general, these countries have 
very few motorways. Helping them to built, as swiftly as possible, the network of 
motorways and expressways essential to the economic development of the whole 
region, should be a priority target for European funds. Other countries in their way 
towards development are acting the same way e.g. China, which is devoting 2.5% of its 
GDP to building over 5,000 kilometres of motorways every year, and giving clear 
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priority to road over other forms of land transport as a key to the country's development. 
No greater service could be rendered to the 11 Balkan countries concerned. 
To give an illustration, the 220 billion euros being mentioned in 2006 for Europe's 
"grand projects", over 80% of which are rail projects, would correspond to 20,000 
kilometres of inter-city motorways in the 11 Balkan countries, far in excess of their 
needs (Eurostat, European Commission, 2006). 
On the other hand, coverage by motorways of national territory is virtually complete 
in most of the Western EU countries. The bulk of the effort was completed in past 
decades, and there is no question of endlessly building more and more motorways. 
The task remains to be completed, however, for other countries, such as the Balkan 
countries, which already are, or are will soon be, members of the EU. 
The EU could thus contribute usefully to completing motorway coverage in the 11 
countries and for the gaps which have to be to be filled. 
As a roundtable of the ECMT (European Conference of Ministers of Transport) has 
found, there is no inter-city motorway in Western Europe with a current traffic volume 
of 100,000 vehicles per day, and a level of 80,000 is a maximum reached only on 
certain very rare sections. 
In other words, four-lane motorways at most (or five lanes in exceptional 
circumstances) are adequate virtually everywhere in Europe for the foreseeable future. 
And, as the ECMT has pointed out again, it is physically possible to create such 
motorways everywhere, and the returns on such operations are always high when traffic 
is heavy. 
Helping to built four–lane motorways, where they are needed in the Balkan, could 
therefore be a priority for the use of European funds. 
A first essential factor – and one that carries no cost – would be a complete change of 
tone in the messages coming out of Brussels. In the future, these messages should 
recognise the reality of the specific needs of the Balkan countries, which most of the 
time can only be met by the car and the truck for there is no realistic alternative. 
The already forecasted strong increase in road transport for the Balkan area in the 
coming years cannot be ignored. Therefore, sooner or later, most effort will be directed 
to the development of the road network in the area under consideration. 
 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 47-60 
 58
 
 
Figure 2: Internationale traffic volumes between EU, NEE and SEE neighbouring countries 
 
 
5. Concluding Comments 
 
1. The SEE Area(Balkan) cannot have accelerated economic growth without a 
corresponding growth in transport. Major transport axes connecting the EU with the 
broader SEE region must proceed without delay. The major transport axes that were 
defined by the EU and relevant bodies, and which demonstrated best value for money in 
terms of their economic, social and environmental impact should be prioritized. 
 
2. On the other hand, the selection of a limited number of transport infrastructure 
projects of regional interest (selection of main road and rail axes, selection of seaports, 
etc.) with a subsequent aim of channelling investment towards pre-selected projects is 
not always the best way and a fair way to proceed. While national governments’ 
projects should be stepping together with EU priorities. 
 
3. There is a certain oscillation in defining the regional scope of EU regional transport 
policies. There are initiatives - such as SEETO - which include only the western 
Balkans. It may be that the Balkan countries have different levels of development, 
however, when we speak about Balkan we must consider all of the countries in a SEE 
context, i.e. the western Balkans plus Greece, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, the 
Republic of Moldova, and Turkey. 
 
4. In relation to the above and beyond that, to ensure long-term sustainability, EU 
transport policy for the Balkan must take into account a wide range of sustainability 
issues, such as the physical environment, safety and quality, security, social conditions 
and the financing of well-maintained infrastructure among others. 
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Consumer needs and consumer demand, market-based incentives, and robust 
financing plans must be guiding principles for investment in transport in the area, but 
this new generation of investment must seek to progressively facilitate the development 
of sustainable and less resource demanding alternatives to the current situation. (See 
The Region, 2005) 
 
5. The EU approach is topped up by the strong presence in the region of the 
international financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank). Much blunter 
recommendations are expected to come within their financial and technical assistance 
‘package’ for SEE countries. e.g. a rather recent World Bank document in the Western 
Balkans (December 2005) contains a list of recommended timely railway reform 
measures to be implemented by each western Balkan country. Staff reductions, 
privatisation of the freight operator and closing loss-making local lines are some of the 
most frequently-recommended measures. It should be recalled these are necessary, but 
may not be easily welcomed by local populations (Cristina Tilling, 2006). 
 
6. Most effort should be directed by the EC and relevant bodies involved in the SEE 
to the development of those of the axles that refer to road transport in the area under 
consideration. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a pragmatic approach for reducing the environmental impacts of transport in the 
German Federal State Saxony. The aim is to use the potential of pricing measures for effectively reducing 
environmental impacts of transport. They are combined with less-effective but more accepted non-pricing 
measures in a policy package. The development of this approach starts with the calculation of the current 
external costs of transport in the case study area. Second, a policy package reducing these external costs is 
composed. Third, the development of the external costs is assessed and compared in two scenarios, a 
BAU-scenario and the policy scenario where measures reducing the environmental impacts of transport 
are implemented. Fourth, the public and political acceptability of this policy package are investigated. 
The results show that it is possible to develop a policy package that is effective for reducing the 
environmental impacts as well as acceptable to the public and politicians. Therefore, such a package 
approach is suitable to guide future political decisions and actions towards a more sustainable transport 
sector. 
 
Keywords: Sustainability; Transport; Environmental impacts; External costs; Acceptability; Saxony. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For several decades, European transport policy has sought to reduce the 
environmental impacts of transport and to support the concept of sustainability in the 
transport sector. Significant progress was made in different areas, especially in the 
development of new technology. However, the reductions in emission achieved by 
innovations were largely overcompensated by an increased transport performance.  
Economic measures are regarded as a promising way for reducing the environmental 
impacts of transport. Such measures include not only direct operating (internal) costs 
but also costs resulting from environmental impacts, congestion, accidents etc. (the so-
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called external costs). These external costs are not covered by travellers but are imposed 
on the whole society, other regions or future generations. As a result, current transport 
prices do not reflect the full costs caused by transport. However, these prices influence 
mobility behaviour by setting the financial scope in which people realise their travel. If 
they do not include the external cost components people will not include them into their 
travel decisions either. Thus, pricing measures for internalising the external costs, i.e. 
making the users pay for all the costs they cause, are a powerful instrument to change 
these decisions and reduce the environmental impacts of transport.  
From a theoretical point of view the situation is clear. In practice, political initiatives 
to move forward with this approach are hardly implemented even though there are some 
notable exemptions, like the heavy good vehicle tax in Switzerland (Schade & Schlag, 
2003). A reason could be that external costs, on which these internalisation measures 
are based, are highly variable and their calculation contains a number of uncertainties 
especially for long-term effects. Another and probably more important reason is the lack 
of acceptability. Politicians are reluctant to increase the costs for transport because they 
fear resistance from the public and the business community. 
To overcome this problem a pragmatic approach was developed for reducing the 
environmental impacts of transport. The aim was to design a policy concept that is 
effective for reducing environmental effects as well as acceptable to the public and 
politicians. A package approach was used combining effective but less acceptable 
pricing measures with more acceptable non-pricing measures. These non-pricing 
measures do not directly internalise external costs but still contribute to the reduction of 
environmental effects of transport. Hence, we do not intend to stick to the 
internalisation principle in the classical economic sense but extend it and include non-
pricing measures that support the reduction of environmental effects as well. This 
approach moves transport significantly towards sustainability as outlined in the national 
and international guidelines published for example by the ECMT/OECD and the 
European Commission (EC, 2006; ECMT 2004).1 
This paper is based on a series of research projects that aimed at designing such a 
policy package for the German Federal State Saxony. The development process 
included the calculation of the current external costs of transport for the case study area. 
These costs can be seen as a mirror of the environmental impacts of transport which are 
transformed to monetary units. Second, a package of policy measures was designed to 
reduce these external costs and the environmental effects behind them. Third, the 
effectiveness of the policy package to reduce the environmental effects was assessed. 
This was done by modelling the impacts of the policy package and comparing them 
with a Business-As-Usual-scenario (BAU). The BAU-scenario is based on the 
assumption that no significant changes in transport policy will be implemented. The 
comparison between both scenarios also illustrates the savings for the economy if the 
policy package is implemented. Finally, the public and political acceptability of the 
policy package was assessed (see Becker, 2002; Gerike, 2000, 2004, 2006b).  
The paper is organised in a similar way. The next section introduces the case study 
area which is the Free State of Saxony, its regional structure and local conditions. In 
section 3 the methodology to calculate the external costs is described, with special 
                                                 
1
 A sustainable transport development requires the consideration of further aspects besides the 
implementation of the polluter-pays-principle and the reduction of environmental effects of transport; 
see Gerike, 2007 for a comprehensive specification of the concept of sustainable transport 
development. 
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emphasis on the specifications for Saxony. Section 4 presents the current amount and 
spatial distribution of external costs of transport in Saxony. In section 5 the policy 
package composed to reduce these external costs and the environmental damages of 
transport is outlined. In section 6 the results of the modelling exercise are described. To 
illustrate the effectiveness of the policy package its impacts are compared with a BAU-
scenario. In section 7 the methods and results for assessing the public and political 
acceptability of the policy scenario are presented. The paper finishes with a discussion 
of the results in section 8. 
 
 
2. The regional structure of Saxony (Germany) 
 
The Free State of Saxony is one of 16 Federal states of Germany situated in the 
eastern part of the country (see Figure 1). It covers an area of 18,415 km2 with 
approximately 4.3 million inhabitants.  
Saxony, just as the other parts of Germany, is affected by serious demographic 
changes that affect passenger as well as freight transport (Scharfe, 2004; Saxon State 
Office of Statistics, 2003). Two main trends in the development of the population are 
observed. 
First, the population is expected to decline due to low birth rates and employment 
migration to the western part of Germany. According to the population forecast of the 
Statistical Agency of Saxony, the number of inhabitants will decrease from 2000 to 
2020 by 14 percent to approximately 3,786,000 inhabitants (Saxon State Office of 
Statistics, 2003). The differences in the density of the population will increase since 
sparsely populated rural areas will depopulate more strongly than the urban centres. 
Only for the biggest cities Leipzig and Dresden a slight increase in the population is 
predicted. 
Second, the population is expected to grow older on average due to higher life-
expectancy, as well as again low birth rates and migration (of mostly younger people). 
The mean age will increase from 43 years in 2000 to 49 years in 2020. In 2020 the share 
of people older than 65 years will be higher than 30 percent in almost one third of the 
Saxon municipalities. 
Furthermore, Saxony is situated between various European centres and therefore used 
as transit route. In 2003 the share of foreign vehicles on Saxon motorways amounted to 
20 percent and is expected to increase further (BASt, 2006). 
These developments impose potential problems for the transport sector. There will be 
no significant decrease in transport volumes but fewer taxpayers covering the costs for 
the maintenance of transport infrastructure. 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 61-84 
 64
 
Figure 1: The Free State of Saxony: Regional administration. 
 
 
3. Methodology for calculating external costs 
 
The methodology used for calculating externals costs of transport in Saxony was 
based mainly on the studies carried out by Infras/IWW (Infras/IWW, 2000, 2004), the 
EU-projects UNITE (Nash, 2003) and ExternE (Bickel, 2005) as well as on Swiss 
projects (ARE, 2004 a-d; Ott, 2005). The methods chosen were modified to incorporate 
the more detailed data available for the case study area. Figure 2 gives an overview over 
the main input data, the methodology and the basic assumptions for quantifying the 
external costs of transport in Saxony. 
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Figure 2: Input data and methodology for quantifying external costs of transport in Saxony. 
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
 
The following general approaches to monetise the environmental impacts of transport 
were applied: 
• Damage costs: Environmental damages that are caused by the transport sector are 
directly converted into monetary units. This approach is the most suitable way of 
assessing the costs of the environmental damages. However, it can only be applied 
if dose-response-functions are known. 
• Willingness to pay (WTP)/hedonic price methodology: People are willing to pay 
for measures to improve the environment. This WTP can be regarded as the price 
for this environment. The first option to quantify this price is to ask people how 
much they are willing to pay for e.g. a certain amount of noise reduction (WTP). 
The second option is to investigate the differences between prices e.g. for 
dwellings with more and less noise exposure (hedonic price methodology). These 
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differences can be interpreted as lost money due to noise pollution. Both 
approaches indicate upper limits of external costs and are used here e.g. for 
quantifying noise and intangible costs. 
• Prevention costs: This method quantifies the costs that are necessary to avoid 
certain environmental damages. To assess prevention costs it is necessary to set 
goals for environmental protection. These goals could be the result of a political 
process or scientific consensus. This method is often used for estimating climate 
costs. 
 
Based on these general approaches specific methods to calculate the different external 
costs have been used. The following paragraph describes them in more detail (see also 
Figure 2): 
Accident costs: The first component was the costs of reproduction including costs of 
medical treatment, professional rehabilitation and judicial costs. The second cost 
component, the costs of resource losses, included societal production losses causes by 
death or temporary inability to work. Net-production losses were quantified as product 
of losses of future working time and average per-capita income minus future 
consumption. The third and very sensitive cost component was intangible costs of 
health damages. These costs are quantified by using a “risk value” of 1.5 million Euros 
per fatality. This risk value was applied only for non-causers of accidents. The 
assumption was that the causers know about the risks related to their driving behaviour 
and have included it into their personal cost-benefit-calculation. The fourth cost 
component, the costs outside the market, included the production of goods and services 
that are not included into the national account. All those costs were reduced by motor 
vehicle third party liability insurance contributions in order to get the external accident 
costs. 
Noise costs: The noise costs were calculated by using the cost rates developed by 
Infras/IWW (Infras/IWW, 2000, 2004). These cost rates were applied for a combined 
target value of 55 dB(A) for daytime and 45 dB(A) for night-time. This assumption is 
based on the recommendations of the German Advisory Council on the Environment.2 
Air pollution costs: The air pollution costs are composed of health costs, building 
damages, costs due to crop losses and forest damages. Health costs are by far the 
dominant component. They were calculated based on epidemiological results of the 
WHO (Infras/IWW, 2000, 2004; WHO, 1999). As with accident costs, the intangible 
costs are a very sensitive component also for the calculation of air pollution costs. These 
costs were quantified in the same way than the accident costs. 
Climate change costs: For quantifying the climate change costs a shadow price of 135 
Euros per ton CO2 was used. This shadow price is based on calculations on avoidance 
costs related to the goal of reducing transport CO2-emissions by 50 percent until 2030 
compared to 1990 (Infras/IWW, 2004; Becker, 2002). The chosen value is much higher 
than the shadow price of 20 Euros per ton CO2, which would result from using the 
Kyoto-aims (Nash, 2003). The decision for the higher value was based on the 
assumption, that the shadow price should reflect the apparent deviations from long-
term, scientific goals. The Kyoto protocol is an important step to achieve reductions of 
CO2 emissions, but it is a political compromise and in the long term not sufficient. Even 
                                                 
2
 See SRU, 2005; using the target values of 65 dB(A) daytime / 55 dB(A) night-time recommended by 
the Environmental Noise Directive (RL 2002/49/EG) would lower the external noise costs by about 60 
percent, see Gerike, 2004 for an analysis of sensitivity. 
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if all Kyoto aims will be met, there will be costs of climate change that future 
generations have to bear and that were caused by today’s transport. These costs should 
be reflected by the external climate costs. 
Nature and landscape: A biocentric approach was used to monetise the effects of 
transport infrastructure on nature and landscape: Starting from a predefined carrying 
capacity it was analysed to what degree the current transport system exceeds this 
carrying capacity and what costs would be necessary to keep it. The following 
components were included: unsealing and repair costs, costs of contamination of soil 
and water and a flat-rate value to consider further effects like visual constraints. 
Separation effects: These effects were monetised by time losses due to waiting times 
and detours which pedestrians face at transport infrastructure in built-up areas. They are 
based on FGSV (1997) and Infras/IWW (2000). 
Land consumption: These costs were quantified by the costs of scarcity based on 
FGSV (1997) and Infras/IWW (2000): “The legitimisation of these costs is based on a 
fairness principle: The road sector is leading to space scarcity in cities, which causes 
additional cost especially for non-motorised transport.“ (Infras/IWW, 2000, p. 48). 
Thus, the costs for bike lanes which have to be built at highly frequented roads were 
quantified. 
Up- and downstream effects: The external costs of up- and downstream effects 
comprise all effects that are caused by activities for the transport sector that go beyond 
moving goods or passengers. Examples for those activities are the provision of energy, 
the production of vehicles and infrastructure. Based on Infras/IWW (2000) costs of air 
pollution and costs of climate change were included here as main components of up- 
and downstream effects. 
The resulting costs of the environmental damages that transport causes comprise a 
certain degree of uncertainty. It arises from the different degree of accuracy of the input 
data as well as the methods for calculating the costs. Two strategies were applied to 
cope with this uncertainty. First, different methods were used in parallel to monetise one 
effect. In this way an interval with upper and lower limits was determined. Second, the 
precautionary principle was used: In case of any uncertainty concerning methodology 
and / or quality of input data lower limits were calculated. That means the results rather 
underestimate the “true” external costs of transport. 
Input data was available at different spatial level of disaggregation depending on the 
type of external cost and transport mode. Data on traffic volumes, air pollutant 
emissions and energy use was available per link for a very detailed network for all 
transport modes. The road noise register of Saxony provided detailed data on noise and 
population. Data on air pollutant immission was taken from the Saxon immission 
register with a spatial disaggregation of 2.5 x 2.5 km2. Information on number and 
severity of accidents was available on municipal level. Land-use data was obtained from 
official Saxon statistics.  
All environmental effects of transport were included into the analysis as well as 
external costs of accidents.3 The calculation was carried out at different levels of spatial 
disaggregation. Depending on the input data and the methodology the most 
disaggregated level possible was used. Finally, the results per cost component were 
converted to municipal level so that data on external costs of transport is available for 
all of the 522 municipalities of Saxony. 
                                                 
3
 See Becker, 2002 for the discussion of congestion and infrastructure costs. 
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All external costs of transport were calculated according to the inland principle: All 
environmental effects within Saxony were considered no matter whether they were 
caused by Saxons or by other people. Therefore, only the LTO-cycle (Landing-Take-
Off) was taken into consideration for aviation up to 915 m (3000 ft) (Gerike, 2000). 
 
The methodology described above was applied to determine the status quo in Saxony 
and to forecast the external costs for the policy scenario as well as the BAU-scenario. 
For both forecast scenarios the following assumptions were made: 
• Only real changes were calculated: No rate of price increase was included. Thus, 
the changes of external costs predicted only reflect the changes of real 
environmental effects. Consequently, the risk value and the shadow price for 
climate costs are not extrapolated by any interest rate. 
• Accidents: The estimated number of unreported accidents was taken from the 
status quo based on the assumption that no relevant changes in regulation will 
come into effect. Furthermore, the share of causers compared to all casualties is an 
important input parameter. It differs between the vehicle categories: For accidents 
with two-wheeled vehicles involved, almost all injuries are causer (80% with 
motor bikes, 84% to 90% for mopeds). This share decreases to about 18 percent 
for duty vehicles and 33 percent for private cars (Gerike, 2006b). In the BAU-
scenario it is assumed that the transport volume for two-wheeled vehicles and duty 
vehicles increases, while it decreases for private cars compared to the status quo. 
Since these trends are contrary to each other and the share of causers was stable in 
the years analysed for the status quo, the status quo share of causers to non-causers 
was applied to the BAU-scenario too. 
• Air pollution, noise: For the air pollutant emissions it could be referred to the 
DAVUS-project and to the road noise register of Saxony (Scharfe, 2004). The 
immissions were predicted from the status quo based on the development of air 
pollutant emissions as well as of climatic conditions.4 
 
 
4. External costs of transport in Saxony - the status quo 
 
Table 1 shows the external costs of transport per cost component for all transport 
modes in the year 2002. This is the most recent year calculated in the status quo. The 
dominant transport mode is road transport which causes about 95 percent of all external 
costs of transport. Rail transport is responsible for about 4 percent of total external 
costs. Waterborne and aviation together cover 1 percent. 
Table 2 gives an overview over the shares of the different vehicle categories within 
road transport. Here, the car is dominant causing 64 percent of all external costs. The 
most important cost component of cars is the accident component. That is, because of 
the risk value used to quantify intangible costs.5 The risk value also influences the 
external health costs caused by air pollution as further important cost component. The 
climate costs are very sensitive to the shadow prices used. These costs are also very 
                                                 
4
  See LfUG, 2005 for a discussion of climate change problems for Saxony. 
5
  See section 3 for the methodology used for quantifying intangible costs. See Gerike, 2000 for a 
sensitivity analysis for all cost components. 
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high since a shadow price of 135 Euros per ton CO2 was taken as basis. The up- and 
downstream costs depend mainly on external costs of air pollution and climate change. 
 
Table 1: External costs of transport modes in 2002. 
[m Euros] Road Rail Aviation Waterborne Total 
Accidents 2,185 0 1 0 2,186 
Air pollution 1,386 63 0 8 1,457 
Climate change 1,061 43 14 5 1,123 
Up- and downstream processes 547 42 2 3 594 
Noise 406 102 2 n.c. 510 
Nature and landscape 197 0 0 n.c. 197 
Land consumption 97 n.c. n.c. n.c. 97 
Separation effects 1 0 n.c. n.c. 1 
Total 5,880 250 19 16 6,165 
Note: N.c. = not calculated. 
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
 
Table 2: External costs of different vehicle categories in road transport in 2002. 
[m Euros] Car LDV/HDV MC Bus Total 
Accidents 1,879 170 123 13 2,185 
Air pollution 556 770 0 60 1,386 
Climate change 659 370 9 23 1,061 
Up- and downstream processes 324 208 3 12 547 
Noise 125 260 16 5 406 
Nature and landscape 133 60 2 2 197 
Land consumption 78 17 2 1 98 
Separation effects 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 3,755 1,855 155 116 5,881 
Note: LDV = Light Duty Vehicle; HDV = Heavy Duty Vehicle; MC = Motorcycle 
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
 
Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of external costs for all transport modes. Here 
the concentration of external costs in the main cities becomes apparent: The 10 biggest 
municipalities, where 37 percent of inhabitants live, cause 31 percent of total external 
costs. The three biggest cities Dresden, Leipzig and Chemnitz alone, covering 5 percent 
of the whole area of Saxony and 28 percent of inhabitants, generate a share of 24 
percent of external costs of transport (Gerike, 2005). 
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Figure 3: Total external costs of all transport modes in Saxony in 2002.  
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
 
 
5. The policy package 
 
The development of the policy package was guided by the following considerations 
(see Gerike, 2004, 2006b): 
 
• The results so far have shown that external costs and thus the environmental 
effects in transport consist of several components which are each characterised by 
different qualities: Noise exposure depends for instance mainly on traffic volumes, 
road surface and technology of the vehicles, such as the engine performance. 
Number and severity of accidents, however, depend on driving behaviour and on 
road design. Because of these varying characteristics it is not possible to choose 
one single measure that effectively reduces all environmental effects. Different 
measures that target the different environmental impacts of transport are needed.  
• Pricing and non-pricing measures differ in their degree of effectiveness and 
acceptability. Pricing measures are very effective for reducing environmental 
effects, but they are lacking public and political acceptability. Non-pricing 
measures are on the other hand well accepted, but not as effective. By combining 
pricing and non-pricing measures in a so-called package approach a reasonable 
degree of acceptability even for pricing measures can be achieved (Jones, 2001; 
Schade & Schlag, 2000; Goodwin, 1989). 
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• The results of section 4 and the knowledge about the characteristics of the external 
costs of transport in Saxony to date enabled us to identify the most relevant 
components and areas in order to set the priorities within the policy package 
accordingly. 
• Furthermore, mainly measures were chosen which Saxony is responsible for the 
implementation. However, this requirement needed to be relaxed somewhat, 
because the legal responsibility to implement some of the most effective measures 
is assigned to the Federal or even European level. Thus, a compromise had to be 
made between the aim of effectiveness and the possible implementation by the 
Free State of Saxony.  
• Finally, when specifying each measure current policy developments in Saxony 
were taken into consideration in order to facilitate the implementation of the 
policy package by using current and possible future windows of opportunity. 
 
These considerations let us conclude, that a package of policy measures is necessary 
which focuses on different environmental effects and includes pricing as well as non-
pricing measures. The aim was twofold. On the one hand the intention was to include 
the main effects that cause the highest amount of external costs (air pollution and 
climate costs, accident and noise costs). On the other hand the spatial distribution of 
external costs of transport in Saxony was considered. Here, a significant concentration 
in urban areas became apparent (see section 4). 
Figure 4 describes the measures chosen and their specification for the modelling 
exercise and the acceptability study. Since the package became quite comprehensive, it 
was decided to divide it into four parts to keep it clear and manageable. The four parts 
of the package also represent the main foci of the policy package resulting from the 
Saxon conditions: urban transport, land consumption, climate change and safety. 
The first part of the policy package focuses on urban transport. It contains measures 
which should be mainly implemented in the main Saxon cities (Chemnitz, Dresden, 
Leipzig). The focus was set on air pollution and noise that are above average in these 
urban areas. Furthermore, the measures are aimed at reducing traffic volume in the inner 
cities in general in order to achieve an overall reduction of environmental effects of 
transport. The two pricing measures in this part of the package are urban road pricing 
and parking management. The level of charge for urban road pricing was determined to 
correspond with a single ticket for public transport. Parking management is explicitly 
proposed for both, the city centre as well as shopping centres outside the city. That is, in 
order to prevent the distortion of the competition between the retail sector in the city 
centres and the shopping centres outside. Since a number of shopping centres outside 
the cities exist, this specification seems necessary not only to prevent negative side-
effects but also to get support from the local business community. Thus, the level of 
both pricing measures was explicitly not based on marginal external costs but was 
chosen pragmatically. The aim was to move towards the polluter-pays-principle while 
simultaneously keeping the pricing measures comprehensible for the public. 
The external costs of land consumption do not belong to the main costs mainly 
because of the methodological difficulties in monetising changes in soil and water 
quality caused by transport. However, this is a serious long-term problem from an 
environmental point of view that attracts increasingly attention especially in the 
discussion on sustainable development. Therefore, the problem of land consumption 
should be included in any policy package reducing the environmental impacts of 
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transport. Furthermore, the continuing migration of people to other parts of Germany in 
combination with the demographic change in Saxony will lead to declining tax revenues 
in the future. This makes investments in infrastructure and even the maintenance of the 
existing transport infrastructure an expensive endeavour (Ahrens, 2005). By linking new 
construction projects to existing public transport connections, developments in new 
areas will become less attractive which reduces land consumption considerably. 
Furthermore, if public transport access needs to be in place prior construction, the costs 
of building new transport infrastructure become part of the overall land development 
costs. That again makes areas that are closer to the existing public transport network 
more attractive. 
The third part of the policy package deals with climate change. It is regarded as key to 
the effectiveness of the policy package as a whole. A reduction of external costs in that 
area will influence all other environmental effects in a positive direction and is therefore 
vital for environmental protection. Thus, the measures belonging to this part of the 
package have been included despite the fact that they mainly do not fall into the legal 
responsibility of Saxony. However, on the European and Federal level there is 
considerable progress in the discussion on climate change and the transport sector. 
Recently, the European ministers of environment decided to commit to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent until 2020 in the frame of an international 
agreement on climate protection (compared to 1990). The EU intends to reduce their 
emissions at least by 20 percent until 2020 (compared to 1990) until a new agreement 
will be arranged and independent of their position in international negotiations. The 
German government announced even more ambitious targets. Thus it seemed 
reasonable to include these policy measures, even though they cannot be implemented 
by the Saxon authorities themselves. 
The last part of the package was devoted to traffic safety. That is, because first 
accidents cause significant external costs (see section 4). Second, in previous years 
Saxony has invested considerable resources in improving traffic safety. For example, 
Saxony participated in a pilot project introducing the learner driver's license, which 
allows teenagers to drive already at the age of 17 (instead of 18), provided that they are 
accompanied by a licensed driver. Therefore, the positive political climate in Saxony 
may be used as window of opportunity to facilitate the implementation of these policy 
measures. 
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Policy measures Specification in the policy scenario 
Measures focusing on urban transport 
1: Urban road pricing City centre cordon: flat rate for entry of 1.70 €/day 
2: Parking management In city centres as well as shopping centres outside 
cities: 1.00 €/hour 
3: Pedestrian zones  Extension of existing pedestrian zones 
4: Higher environmental standards in public 
transport 
EEV for all public transport vehicles 
5: Promotion of cycling Extension of the cycle network, bicycle parking 
facilities 
6: Promotion of car sharing Centrally located parking facilities, co-operation of 
car sharing operators with public transport 
7: Access restrictions Access restrictions for high emission vehicles in 
sensitive areas such as city centres or nature reserves 
Measures focusing on land consumption 
8: Sustainable transport planning Public transport access must be in place prior new 
developments 
Measures focusing on climate change 
9: CO2-tax To cover climate damages an additional tax on 
petrol: + 0.32 €/litre and diesel: + 0.36 €/litre will be 
levied 
10: Promotion of fuel saving driving behaviour Driver’s education and training programmes 
emphasis and practice fuel saving driving behaviour 
11: Promotion of alternative fuels Biodiesel will be subsidised by lower prices, more 
petrol stations and research programmes  
Measures focusing on safety 
12: Risk differentiation of driver’s third party 
liability insurance 
Bonus-Malus system according to accident risk 
13: Speed reductions Motorways: 120 km/hour , urban areas: 30 km/hour 
14: Reform of driver’s education Pilot projects of learner driver's licenses, which 
allow a person to drive provided they are 
accompanied by a licensed driver 
15: Higher safety standards Legal alcohol limit for driving reduced to 0.00‰. 
Figure 4: Package of policy measures. 
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
Note: EEV = Enhanced environmentally friendly Vehicle (category used in European emission standards) 
 
 
6. Effectiveness of the policy scenario 
 
In this section the results of the modelling exercise analysing the effectiveness of the 
policy scenario are presented. The impacts of the policy scenario are compared to a 
BAU-scenario. The BAU-scenario was based on the assumption that there will be no 
significant changes in transport policy within the time span of modelling. The policy 
and BAU-scenario were modelled for the year 2020. This time span has been chosen 
because it is far enough into the future to capture not only short time but also long-time 
effects. On the other hand, the year 2020 is close enough to the status quo so that 
reliable results could be obtained by taking current transport trends into consideration. 
Furthermore, the project DAVUS (Scharfe, 2004) which was an important data base for 
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Vehicle Kilometres Travelled (VKT) and air pollutant emissions provided detailed data 
for the year 2020. 
First, the expected development of key input data is described since these changes 
considerably influence the development of external costs. Second, the development of 
external costs itself will be presented. Table 3 shows the Vehicle Kilometres Travelled 
(VKT) in the policy scenario as well as in the BAU-scenario. Car traffic performance in 
the policy scenario is about 12 percent lower compared to the BAU-scenario. Bus traffic 
performance is significantly higher, about 10 percent. 
Table 3: Differences in vehicle kilometres travelled in the policy scenario compared to the BAU-scenario. 
[m vkm] 2020 BAU 2020 Policy Difference in % 
Car 26,047 22,843 -12% 
MC 805 792 -2% 
Bus 198 218 +10% 
LDV/HDV 6,428 6,114 -5% 
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
 
Figure 5 describes the results for the air pollutant emission. The total emissions are 
significantly lower in the policy scenario compared to the BAU-scenario. This holds 
true for the CO2-emmissions, the PM10-emmissons as well as the NOx-emissions. The 
reasons for these reductions are a changed fleet mix and driving patterns as a 
consequence of the policy measures. However, the development of the emissions is 
partly compensated by the further increase in the traffic performance (see section 2). 
 
 
Figure 5: Reduction of air pollutant emission in the policy scenario compared to the BAU-scenario. 
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
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The policy scenario furthermore results in reductions of accident rates by 23 percent 
compared to the BAU-scenario. That means that in the policy scenario there are 23 
percent fewer injuries per vehicle mile travelled than in the BAU-scenario. Figure 6 
shows how this affects the total accident figures. The number of injuries decreases by 
31 percent. Hence, the reduction of accident rates is facilitated by decreasing transport 
performance achieved through the policy measures. 
 
 
Figure 6: Number of causalities in road transport. 
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
 
Table 4 shows the external costs of road transport predicted for the year 2020 for the 
BAU-scenario and the policy scenario. The total external costs of road transport amount 
to nearly 4,000 million Euros in the policy scenario, which corresponds to 82 percent of 
the total external costs in the BAU-scenario. That is a reduction of 18 percent. The 
strongest reduction is observed for the accident costs that decline to 69 percent in the 
policy scenario. This effect is exclusively due to the lower number of injures in the 
policy scenario (cf. Figure 5). The noise costs decline to 94 percent due to decrease in 
traffic performance in some of the different vehicle categories. The costs of air pollution 
and climate change are reduced because of the reductions of air pollutant emissions and 
energy use. It is expected that the policy measures achieve improvements in the specific 
environmental performance per vehicle kilometre as well as in the total environmental 
impacts. The external costs of nature and landscape, land consumption and separation 
effects remain stable because it is assumed that the transport infrastructure remains 
unaffected by the policy package. Despite the fact that no changes were assumed for 
these effects, they are included in Table 4 and Figure 7 for making the absolute numbers 
comparable to the status quo presented in section 4.6. 
                                                 
6
  Spatial effects were treated separately (Spiekermann, 2005). 
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Looking at the shares of the cost components the share of accidental costs declines 
from 26 percent in the BAU-scenario to 22 percent in the policy scenario. The share of 
all other components remains stable respectively goes up even if the absolute numbers 
decline. The share of air pollution costs for instance goes up from 27 percent to 30 
percent, the share of noise costs increases from 7 percent to 9 percent. 
 
Table 4: External costs of road transport: BAU- and policy scenario (in prices of 2000). 
 2020 BAU 2020 Policy Difference in % 
Accidents 1192 819 -31% 
Noise 337 318 -6% 
Air pollution 1,235 1,093 -12% 
Climate change 1,015 806 -21% 
Nature and landscape 149 149 - 
Usage of space 94 94 - 
Separation effects 1 1 - 
Up- and downstream processes 503 414 -18% 
Total 4,528 3,694 -18% 
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
 
Figure 7 gives an overview over the distribution of costs components within the road 
sector as dominant transport mode in the two scenarios. The strongest reduction of 
externals costs is achieved within cars. The external costs decline from 2,592 million 
Euros to 1,976 million Euros in the policy scenario. The main reason for this decrease is 
again the declining accident figures. 
 
 
Figure 7: Total external costs of road transport in 2020: BAU-scenario and policy scenario. 
Source: Gerike, 2006b. 
Note: Car BAU = Car BAU-scenario, Car Intern. = Car Policy scenario 
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7. Acceptability of the policy package 
 
A political and public acceptability survey was conducted to assess the acceptability 
of the policy package. A semi-standardised interview with Saxon citizens as well as 
politicians and decision-makers was designed and conducted. The policy package was 
presented to the participants using the card sorting technique. That means, the 
specification of each proposed policy measure was printed on a 15 cm x 21 cm card. 
Theses cards and the specifications of the policy measures respectively were presented 
to the participants one by one with no reference to the four parts of the package (see 
Figure 4). After the presentation participants were asked about their assessment of this 
particular policy measure. If participants did not understand the meaning of a policy 
measure further explanations were given prior to the assessment questions. These 
explanations were determined beforehand and in this way standardised for all 
participants. Each interview lasted approximately 60 minutes. 
The citizen sample consisted of 40 participants, 19 male and 21 female participants. 
The average age was 42 years (SD = 16.45 years). 57.5 percent of the participants were 
living in Saxon cities and 42.5 percent were living in rural areas. 92.5 percent of the 
participants had a driving licence and 77.5 percent owned a private car. Those 77.5 
percent also used their private cars as main mode of travel, only 22.5 percent used 
public transport. 
The sample of politicians and decision-makers consisted of 15 participants, 13 male 
and 2 female participants. The average age was 46 years (SD = 7.29 years). All of them 
were working in the transport sector in Saxony at the time of the interview and therefore 
chosen as experts. However, this sample just as the citizen sample is not representative 
for the population of Saxon citizens and decision-makers. 3 participants belonged to the 
Federal state level, 1 participant to the district level, 9 participants to local authorities 
and 5 participants to relevant companies and associations. Every participant possessed a 
driver’s licence. 53 percent of participants used their private car as the main travel mode 
followed by 40 percent using public transport. 
After the presentation of each policy measure participants were asked to evaluate 
three aspects: the acceptability, the perceived effectiveness and the knowledge of each 
measure on a 4-point scale from 1 = not at all known/effective/acceptable to 4 = most 
well known/effective/acceptable. The politicians and decision makers were not asked 
about their knowledge. It was assumed that as experts in the transport sector they are 
familiar with these measures. Finally, the acceptability of the whole policy scenario was 
assessed using the 4-point scale again.  
In contrast to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the policy scenario (see section 6) 
the acceptability was not only assessed for the whole scenario but also for each policy 
measure separately. Only after participants evaluated each policy measure they were 
asked about their acceptability of the whole scenario. The reason for this procedure was 
twofold. First, the composition of the policy package was based on a number of 
considerations (see section 5). For example, it was assumed that pricing measures are 
least accepted whereas non-pricing measures are well accepted. These considerations 
are mainly based on the results of international studies and have not been validated in 
the Saxon context. Thus, the results of the single measures were used to verify the 
considerations of the package composition. The second reason was to give participants 
enough time to get familiar with each policy measure before they are asked to evaluate 
the whole policy scenario.  
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The results of the public acceptability, the knowledge and the perceived effectiveness 
of each policy measure are presented in Table 5. In general most policy measures are 
rather unknown. The most well-known measures were the learner driver's license, the 
legal alcohol limit of 0.00‰ and car sharing. The least known measures were the reform 
of driver’s third party liability insurance, parking management and the CO2-tax. 
According to the participants their knowledge about the policy measures results mainly 
from the political discussions in the media. Against this background it is not surprising 
that for example the new learner driver’s license is a rather well-known measure 
whereas the more established parking management did not receive a high knowledge 
score. At the time of the interviews a pilot project concerning the new learner driver’s 
license has just started and pictured in the media.  
The effectiveness of the measures is assessed somewhat more positive. On average 75 
percent of the policy measures were regarded as effective or rather effective. The legal 
alcohol limit of 0.00‰ and the access restrictions in sensitive areas are assessed as most 
effective whereas the learner driver's license, the parking management and the 
promotion of alternative fuels were regarded as least effective measures. Hence, the 
theoretical assumption that more well-known measures are also regarded as more 
effective does not apply to all cases (Schade & Schlag, 2000).  
The acceptability of the policy measures was quite mixed. As expected the pricing 
measures such as urban road pricing or the CO2-tax were rather unacceptable. In 
contrast non-pricing measures such as the promotion of cycling and car sharing were 
more acceptable to the public. The promotion of cycling and fuel saving driving 
behaviour were regarded as most acceptable. Least acceptable were parking 
management and the CO2-tax as well as the learner’s driving licence. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 61-84 
 79
Table 5: Public acceptability of the policy package (1=not at all to 4=most, mean values). 
Policy measures Knowledge Perceived 
Effectiveness 
Acceptability 
Measures focusing on urban transport 
1: Urban road pricing 1.75 2.90 2.30 
2: Parking management 1.23 2.30 1.70 
3: Pedestrian zones  2.48 2.87 3.47 
4: Higher environmental standards in public transport 2.00 3.22 3.35 
5: Promotion of cycling 2.28 2.82 3.65 
6: Promotion of car sharing 2.70 2.65 3.15 
7: Access restrictions 2.35 3.35 3.45 
Measures focusing on land consumption 
8: Sustainable transport planning 1.65 2.50 2.90 
Measures focusing on climate change 
9: CO2- tax 1.40 2.82 1.60 
10: Promotion of fuel saving driving behaviour 2.10 3.10 3.57 
11: Promotion of alternative fuels 2.05 2.32 2.25 
Measures focusing on safety 
12: Risk differentiation of driver’s third party liability 
insurance 
1.13 3.02 3.45 
13: Speed reductions 2.33 3.00 2.27 
14: Reform of driver’s education 2.95 1.90 1.97 
15: Higher safety standards 3.53 3.50 3.40 
Note: the highest mean values are indicated by white/grew numbers, the lowest mean values by black 
bold numbers 
 
The aim of composing a package of policy measures was to achieve a reasonable 
degree of acceptability especially for the pricing measures. Thus, participants were 
asked to evaluate the acceptability of the whole policy scenario. With a mean value of 
2.12 the acceptability of the policy scenario lies within the range of the lowest mean 
values (2: Parking management; 9: CO2-tax) and the highest mean values of the single 
measures (5, 10: Promotion of cycling and fuel saving driving behaviour). Overall 37.5 
percent of the participants stated that they agree at least somewhat with the policy 
scenario. Compared to the figures of 10 percent to 20 percent that are reported for 
pricing measures as single measure this can be regarded as a substantial improvement 
(see Schade & Schlag, 2000; Jones 2001; Lyons, Dudley, Slater & Parkhurst, 2004). 
That means that pricing measures received indeed a higher acceptability score within 
the policy package than as single measures. Only urban road pricing received a 
somewhat higher mean value as single measure. 
The results for the political acceptability and the perceived effectiveness of politicians 
and decision-makers are presented in Table 6. Similar to the public the decision-makers 
assessed the effectiveness of the policy measures rather positive. All measures were 
assessed as at least rather effective with mean values higher 2.50. The only exemption is 
the learner driver's license which is regarded as rather ineffective. The positive 
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assessment of the effectiveness of the policy measures by the experts can be regarded as 
a tentative validation of the modelling exercise results which demonstrated that the 
policy package significantly reduces external costs in transport in Saxony. 
For the politicians pricing measures were less acceptable than non-pricing measures 
as well. However, the level of support for pricing measures was higher compared to the 
citizens. Furthermore, the learner driver's license that was already assessed as not 
effective was rather unacceptable. Most acceptable to the politicians were the promotion 
of cycling and fuel saving driving behaviour and the reduction of the legal alcohol limit 
to 0.00‰. 
Table 6: Political acceptability of the policy package (1=not at all to 4=most; mean values). 
Policy measures Perceived 
Effectiveness 
Acceptability 
Measures focusing on urban transport 
1: Urban road pricing 2.73 2.47 
2: Parking management 2.60 2.60 
3: Pedestrian zones  2.93 2.80 
4: Higher environmental standards in public transport 2.73 3.13 
5: Promotion of cycling 3.47 3.80 
6: Promotion of car sharing 2.73 3.40 
7: Access restrictions 3.29 3.36 
Measures focusing on land consumption 
8: Sustainable transport planning 3.13 3.27 
Measures focusing on climate change 
9: CO2- tax 2.60 2.67 
10: Promotion of fuel saving driving behaviour 2.67 3.53 
11: Promotion of alternative fuels 2.73 2.73 
Measures focusing on safety 
12: Risk differentiation of driver’s third party liability 
insurance 
3.07 3.33 
13: Speed reductions 3.20 2.73 
14: Reform of driver’s education 2.07 2.00 
15: Higher safety standards 3.27 3.60 
Note: the highest mean values are indicated by white/grew numbers, the lowest mean values by black 
bold numbers 
 
With a mean value of 2.67 the acceptability of the entire policy scenario lies within 
the range of the lowest mean values and the highest mean values of the single measures 
for the politicians and decision-makers as well (1: Urban road pricing vs. 5: Promotion 
of cycling). Overall 66.7 percent of this sample evaluated the entire policy scenario as 
suitable for reducing external costs of transport in Saxony. Even thought politicians 
accepted pricing measures as single measure to a higher degree compared to the citizens 
they also supported them more as part of a policy package. 
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Comparing public and political acceptability it seems that there are only minor 
differences. Both groups regarded the promotion of cycling and fuel saving driving 
behaviour as the most acceptable measures. Furthermore, the reduction of the legal 
alcohol limit of 0.00‰ and the access restrictions received high acceptability scores. 
The smallest mean difference between both groups was observed for the learner driver's 
license. Both groups did not accept this measure. They shared the view that teenagers 
are not mature and careful enough at that age. Furthermore, they do not agree with the 
imitation of American examples, with which this kind of driver’s education is 
associated. Statistically significant differences between public and political acceptability 
were found for the CO2-tax and the parking management which were accepted to a 
higher degree by the politicians. The reverse holds true for the access restrictions which 
were accepted to a higher degree by the public (Mann Whitney U-Test, p < 0.05). 
Figure 8 compares the public acceptability with the public acceptability as it is 
perceived by politicians and decision-makers. The results show that the public 
acceptability is mostly underestimated. This replicates the results of a similar study by 
Schade and Schlag (2000). The closest correspondence was found for the CO2-tax, the 
promotion of car sharing and the promotion of alternative fuels. The biggest 
discrepancy was found for urban road pricing, pedestrian zones and the risk 
differentiation of driver’s third party liability insurance. The public acceptability of 
these measures was far higher than anticipated by decision-makers. And even though 
this acceptability study comprised only a small and not representative sample it suggests 
that not only the public acceptability of pricing measures but restrictive measures in 
general is underestimated by politicians and decision-makers. That may explain why the 
overall positive political acceptability of the proposed policy measures has not been 
translated into political actions so far. 
 
1
1
1 2 3 4 5
1: Urban road pricing
2: Parking management
3: Pedestrian zones 
4: Higher env. standards in PT
5: Promotion of cycling and walking
6: Promotion of carsharing
7: Access restrictions
8: Sustainable transport planning
9: CO2- tax
10: Fuel saving driving behaviour
11: Promotion of alternative fuels
12: Risk differentiation of insurance
13: Speed reductions
14: Reform of driver’s education
15: Higher safety standards
Public acceptability Perceived public acceptability
 
Figure 8: Comparison of public acceptability and the assumed public acceptability by politicians and 
decision-makers (mean values).  
Note: Perceived public acceptability was measures on a percentage scale from 1 = 0-20%, 2 = 21-40%, 3 
= 41-60%, 4 = 61-80% to 5 = 81-100%. The relative frequency of the public acceptability has been 
transformed into the percentage scale for comparison. 
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8. Summary and Conclusions 
 
There is scientific consensus, that external costs cause inefficiencies in the transport 
sector. Their reduction is a vital condition for making transport more efficient and 
environmentally friendly. The situation is clear theoretically. However, political 
activities to move forward with this approach have only been undertaken tentatively. 
Politicians are reluctant to increase the costs for transport because they fear resistance 
from the public and the business community. Pricing measures, which are very effective 
for reducing the environmental impacts of transport, lack public and political 
acceptability. Non-pricing measures on the other hand are well accepted, but not as 
effective. The combination of pricing and non-pricing measures in a so-called package 
approach is regarded as a promising solution to this dilemma. An increase in the costs of 
transport will probably always remain a controversial issue, but a policy package may 
gain sufficient public support to move forward with the implementation of the polluter-
pays-principle reducing the environmental impacts of transport.  
This paper presents such a package solution for the Free State of Saxony. Based on 
the current situation of external costs of transport in Saxony (the status quo) a package 
of policy measures was developed. The impact of this policy scenario was assessed and 
compared with a Business-As-Usual-scenario (BAU-scenario). Furthermore, the public 
and political acceptability of this policy package was analysed. 
The main conclusions of this research are: 
• The decline in population due to the demographic change does not solve the 
environmental problems of transport in Saxony. Even though a decrease by 14 
percent is predicted from 2000 to 2020, road transport volumes will remain stable 
with car volumes decreasing by only 4 percent and freight transport even 
increasing by 15 percent. Therefore, political actions are necessary to significantly 
reduce the environmental impacts and thus the external costs of transport. 
• The modelling results show that a package approach of pricing and non-pricing 
measures is effective for reducing the environmental impacts in transport. The 
policy package reduces the external costs by 18 percent compared to the BAU-
scenario. 
• The interviews revealed that citizens as well as politicians assessed the policy 
package as rather effective for solving the environmental problems of transport. 
As expected the acceptability of the single policy measures was mixed. Pricing 
measures such as urban road pricing or the CO2-tax were rather unacceptable. 
Non-pricing measures such as the promotion of cycling and car sharing were more 
acceptable. But overall almost 40 percent of the citizens supported the entire 
policy package. This is a substantial improvement of the acceptability of pricing 
measures. Presented as single measures they typically gain public support of only 
10 percent to 20 percent. However, the level of public acceptability especially of 
restrictive and pricing measures was clearly underestimated by politicians and 
decision-makers. That may explain why they hesitate to put forward effective 
pricing measures in the transport sector. 
This paper has demonstrated that it is possible to design a package of policy measures 
for reducing environmental impacts in transport that is effective as well as acceptable on 
a local level. Even though it is certainly not realistic to assume that this package will 
fully be implemented in a short period of time, it can serve as a guideline for a 
sustainable transport policy in Saxony in a long-term perspective. Furthermore, the 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 61-84 
 83
process of designing such a policy package described here may serve as an example for 
other cities or regions how to initiate a process of reducing external costs of transport. 
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Abstract 
 
Measuring the productivity of highway concessionaires is very relevant, especially when a price cap 
regulation is applied where tariff increases are based on expected improvements of productivity. Output 
may be measured in terms of traffic or network length, or a combination of both, while quality of service 
should ideally be accounted for. To measure productivity we consider only operating costs, as 
amortization and financial costs depend upon the original highway design and historical costs. A cross 
section analysis of the Italian concessionaires shows that: 1) operating costs depend on both traffic and 
capacity; 2) economies of scale are relevant but their estimate is very sensitive to the model specification; 
3) there are large differences in efficiency among operators, indicating that there could be significant 
room for yardstick competition.  
We subsequently consider the main economic data regarding the major Italian concessionaire 
(Autostrade spa) over two decades. Revenues increased greatly, even more than traffic, while operating 
costs remained substantially stable in real terms, as the automation of toll collection allowed the company 
to reduce the number of collectors by almost half. Finally, a comparison between Italian and French 
concessionaires shows that the latter have much lower operating costs, which cannot be entirely explained 
by economies of scale or lower personnel costs. 
 
Keywords: Highway; Regulation; Productivity; Price-cap. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this article, we examine the concept and measurement of the productivity of 
highway concessionaires. The topic has become of fundamental relevance considering 
the major privatizations of concessionaries which have occurred in some European 
countries (Autostrade in Italy, ASF, SANEF, and SAPRR in France).  
There are several reasons why the question of highway operators’ efficiency becomes 
more relevant in a private-oriented competitive framework. A first reason is yardstick 
competition. If the regulator wants to use incentives to improve the efficiency of 
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operators, he needs indicators to compare actual with optimal cost levels for each 
operator. A second reason regards the relative merits of private vis-à-vis public 
ownership. Indeed, one of the reasons for advocating privatizations is the supposed 
greater efficiency of the private sector, although empirical evidence on this point still 
needs to be consolidated. Comparing efficiency of private versus public operators is a 
key element for the determination of highway policy. In a recent contribution, 
Benfratello et alii (2005), using a panel data approach, shed some light on the cost 
structure of the highway sector in Italy. They estimate a cost function for 20 Italian 
concessionaires for the period 1992-2003. Their results indicate that private ownership 
has a positive impact on productivity while regulatory regime (Price cap versus Rate of 
Return) has no effect on productivity. 
Another reason to investigate highway operator efficiency is to determine the scope 
for scale economies and, thus, the most cost efficient market structure. Last but not 
least, the measurement of productivity changes is prerequisite for the implementation of 
price cap regulation. In Italy, for instance, tariff increases are determined as the sum of 
the change in the retail price index, minus the anticipated changes in productivity 
(usually referred to as the X factor), plus a quality premium based on accidents and road 
surface conditions (see Greco and Ragazzi, 2005, Benfratello and alii, 2006). Thus, in 
order to implement correctly the price cap regulation, regulatory authorities must have a 
clear understanding of the evolution of productivity both at the sector level and for each 
single operator. 
In order to shed light on the issue of highway operator efficiency several methods can 
be used. Highway efficiency can be analysed through comparisons among various 
operators within a single country or across countries. Cross-country comparisons may 
provide useful information on how different ownership structures or regulatory systems 
may affect cost efficiency. One may also analyse how the costs of single operators 
change over time, and how such changes relate to changes in the operating framework 
of the industry (mainly changes in the market structure and in technology). Other 
methods rely on the analysis of simple indicators (typically operating cost/vehicle.km). 
A more comprehensive method relies on the estimation of cost functions. Eventually, 
elaborating on costs functions, Stochastic Frontier Analysis models can be used in order 
to estimate the degree of (in)efficiency of various operators. 
In the present article, we make use of these various approaches in order to investigate 
highway operator efficiency. Section 1 is dedicated to the discussion of possible 
definitions of highway licensees’ output, showing the implications of each definition. In 
Section 2, we estimate a cost function for Italian concessionaires based on a cross 
section of 18 highway operators for year 2006 and provide estimates of marginal costs 
for traffic and network as well as a measurement of efficiency of each concessionaire. 
We estimate also a stochastic cost frontier where an additional single sided disturbance, 
representing inefficiency, is added to the traditional stochastic disturbance present in the 
cost function estimate. Such method allows the computation of inefficiency for each 
single operator, that can be used for yardstick competition. Section 3 analyses the 
evolution of costs and revenues of Italy’s major licensee over two decades. In Section 4, 
we compare Autostrade with three other main operators and we compare costs and 
revenues of Italian and French highway concessionaires. 
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2. How to define and measure productivity? 
 
Productivity is the ratio between output and inputs. In the case of networks, how one 
should define output is far from clear or generally accepted. There are basically two 
different approaches: the first refers to traffic (appropriately taking into consideration its 
composition), the second to the capacity that is offered by the infrastructure.  
If one considers output from the point of view of the (total) benefit obtained by the 
users, traffic would appear the best measure for output, although the quality of service 
should also be considered (safety, congestion, average speed etc.). If one considers 
instead the service provided by the operator, its output consists mainly in the provision 
of a certain capacity, which has a value (and costs) irrespective of the volume of traffic 
that goes through the infrastructure. 
Traffic depends upon the original design of the network and the subsequent evolution 
of demand; the company managing the network cannot significantly impact the volume 
of traffic. However, certain costs increase with traffic, depending upon the network. 
Unlike other network industries (the cost of maintaining an electric grid may be 
independent from the watt-hours that go through it), in the case of highways, 
incremental traffic may require additional services (and additional costs) both for toll 
collection1 and pavement repair. Traffic (especially HGVs) damages the pavement and 
thus causes additional costs. Damages may also derive from several other causes such 
as, for instance, climate (for a survey, see Bruzelius, 2004). It is therefore very difficult 
to measure the marginal cost of traffic regarding maintenance. Other costs, in particular 
collection, clearly vary in function of the traffic volume. However, traffic may not 
suffice to explain correctly operating costs. For instance, Link (2003), who considered 
operating costs (defined as "maintenance, operation and renewals") to be a function of 
traffic only, obtained models with relatively poor fitting2. 
Levinson and Gillen (1998) consider two components of highway production: "in 
general, highway segments produce two outputs: traffic flow which require capacity in 
terms of the number of lanes, and standard axle loadings which require durability in 
terms of thickness of the pavement" (Levinson and Gillen, 1998, p. 207). Further on in 
their article, Levinson and Gillen use a definition of highway production as the traffic of 
various vehicle categories. Benfratello and alii (2005) consider that the output is traffic, 
but the costs also depend on network length. Others, for instance the Italian NARS3, 
stress that measures of highway production expressed in terms solely of traffic provide 
misguiding evidence; according to them the indicators should refer to the costs of the 
network provided to road users, aside from the actual use that these users may decide to 
make. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Collection is a service provided by the licensee, but does not add to the utility of users, being a 
deadweight cost for society. 
2
 For a series of models estimated on data from Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden, the models' R² were 
ranging from 0,25 to 0,65. 
3
 The NARS (Nucleo consulenza Attuazione linee guida Regolazione Servizi di pubblica utilità) is a 
committee of experts in charge of advising the Ministry of Economics and Finance regarding the 
regulation of public services. 
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In conclusion, output may be defined as made up of three components: 
- provision of a given capacity, 
- throughput of the traffic, 
- quality of the service4 (pavement, safety, collection systems, congestion etc.) 
 
If data about the breakdown of operating costs for each of the three outputs were 
obtainable we could consider productivity separately for each of the three output 
components. Productivity in the provision of capacity could be estimated by comparing 
the network length with the operating costs dedicated to such purpose, and productivity 
in traffic handling could be estimated by comparing traffic volumes with costs related to 
toll collection and repairing pavement damage caused by traffic. It would be much more 
difficult to define a single index for quality. However, since a breakdown of operating 
costs is generally not available, in the following section we compare total operating 
costs to traffic and network size. 
 
 
3. Cost function estimate and measure of efficiency of Italian concessionaires 
 
In this section, we intend to measure the cost efficiency of Italian concessionaires. We 
first provide the results of a cost function estimation. We subsequently analyse how 
these results should be interpreted in terms of marginal costs. Eventually, we investigate 
the measure of inefficiency for the different operators. 
 
 
3.1 Cost function estimation 
 
We consider the concessionaires' production in terms of traffic and of road capacity. 
We do not consider the quality of service due to the limitations of the available quality 
index. Two types of models are used. The first estimates an average cost function and is 
based on the usual regression techniques. The second estimates a stochastic cost frontier 
where inefficiency is measured as (positive) deviation from this frontier. With regard to 
the measurement of inefficiency, we prefer to use the Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
rather than the class of methods based on Data Envelopment Analysis due to the 
deterministic nature of this last methodology. 
A common simplification, made for the assessment of infrastructure maintenance 
costs, is the hypothesis of constant marginal costs, even if the evidence is not clear-cut. 
One of the most frequently advocated advantage is the possibility to use non linear cost 
functions incorporating variable marginal costs. Although attractive, the intuition of 
variable marginal costs finds only limited support in the literature: as observed by Link 
                                                 
4
 In the regulatory framework in use in Italy, quality improvements are measured (and corresponding 
increases in tariffs are granted) on the basis of two indicators: accidents and quality of pavement. This 
method appears unsatisfactory. Accidents depend primarily on traffic regulations and are to a large extent 
outside the control of the licensee company. In recent years, accidents have diminished because of the 
stricter enforcement of speed controls and other similar measures taken at national level, and the decline 
in accidents has been similar on state roads as on highways. Operating costs for safety improvements are 
mostly those for road panels, presumably small enough to be disregarded without appreciable effects on 
the measures of productivity. 
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(2003), "in many cases the detected non-linearities were rather weak in the relevant 
range of traffic variables" (see also Ozbay et al., 2001, Deller and Nelson, 1991). 
Consistent with such findings, the simplification of relying on constant marginal costs 
has been accepted in current highway investment assessment practice as, for instance, in 
the Federal Highway Administration guidelines (FHWA, 1982) that considers "cost 
estimates of pavement wear as a fixed $/Equivalent Single Axle Load Mile". 
In our models, we consider a cost function where operating costs depend on two 
variables: capacity and traffic. The most visible challenge is to disentangle the intrinsic 
correlation among these two variables and isolate the effect of each variable. The 
dependent variable, operating cost, is defined as the sum of the following costs: 1) raw 
materials, and intermediate goods; 2) services; 3) rental and leasing; 4) personnel. Data 
are taken from the annual reports of the concessionaire companies. Amortization and 
financial costs are not considered as they mostly depend upon the historical costs of the 
infrastructure and the length of the concession. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: Capacity is expressed in weighted 
kilometres of highway (one kilometre of 3 lanes highway is supposed to be equivalent 
to 1.5 km of 2 lanes highway) and Traffic is expressed in terms of veh.km. This unit is 
preferred to other possible units: number of users, pcu.km (personal car units), t.km, 
ESAL.km (Equivalent Single Axle Load) or GVM.km (Gross Vehicle Mass.km) as it 
better fits with the purpose of our study. The number of transits would be useful to take 
into account the costs associated with toll collection but they would prove deceiving for 
other costs such as road maintenance. Pcu.km would rather be useful to understand 
traffic flow, ESAL.km or GVM.km would be apt for the estimating costs for pavement 
renewal but is not relevant for other expenses. Thus, considering that these various 
measurement units do not have advantages, we will stick to the measurement of traffic 
in terms of veh.km. We consider only the total flow of vehicles. We decided not to 
weight car traffic and HGV differently due to the relatively stable share of HGVs in 
total traffic among the different licensees. Note, as well, that due to the cross section 
nature of our data, the introduction of input prices in the cost function, that would be 
consistent with the micro foundation of the efficiency measures, would prove useless 
for our data: as input prices are invariant across our population the effect of these prices 
cannot be disentangled from the model's constant. We consider data for year 2006. We 
concentrate on one single year rather than using panel data. Panel data has already been 
implemented in previous works on highway concessionaires in Italy (Benfratello and 
alii (2005)) while we are not aware of any Stochastic Frontier Analysis based on cross 
section data. 
Table 1 provides the data as well as some relevant ratios (cost/km and cost/veh.km) 
for the investigated concessionaires. A well known feature of Italian highway sector is 
the strong dichotomy among highway operators: Autostrade per l'Italia (ASPI), without 
considering its subsidiaries, operates a network of 2,855 km and 48.2 billion veh.km, 
which is more than half of the total highway traffic; the other concessionaires are 
notably smaller (Autostrada del Brennero, the second largest operator, accounts for 
12 % of total highway traffic). Divergence from the mean is larger for concessionaires 
with a small network, see for instance RAV for cost/veh.km (11.8 eurocent per veh.km 
against an average of 3.6 eurocent) or Tangenziale di Napoli as well as Padova-Mestre 
for cost/km (1,845 and 771 thousand euro per km against an average of 504 thousand 
euro). This suggests the existence of non linearities together with possible 
heteroschedasticity that should be taken into account in the model estimation. 
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Table 1: Italian concessionaires, some descriptive data (2006) 
Operator Network Capacity Operating 
costs 
Traffic Op. costs 
per km 
Op. costs 
per veh.km 
 km Weighted 
km (2004) 
106 € 106 
veh.km 
103 €/km € cents/ 
veh.km 
Autostrade per l'Italia (ex Autostrade) 2,855 3,324 923 48,214 323 1.9 
Autovie Venete 189 182 64.7 2,629 342 2.5 
MilanoMare  184 235 89 3,091 484 2.9 
Padova - Mestre 41 54 31.6 1,148 771 2.8 
SAM. Autostrade Meridionali 52 55 36.9 1,562 710 2.4 
Torino - Savona 131 130 33.2 949 253 3.5 
Brescia - Padova 182 256 132 5,175 725 2.6 
Autostrada del Brennero 314 314 157.6 4,643 502 3.4 
Torino- Milano  130 189 61.9 2,150 476 2.9 
Torino- Piacenza 168 169 52.9 2,191 315 2.4 
ATIVA (Torino- Val d'Aosta) 156 150 54.5 2,190 349 2.5 
RAV (Raccordo Aut. Val d'Aosta). 27 27 10.4 88 385 11.8 
Centropadane 89 97 26.4 1,007 272 2.6 
SAV (Autostrade Valdostane) 68 60 21.6 405 318 5.3 
Autostrada dei Fiori 113 115 59.8 1,333 529 4.5 
SALT (Soc. Aut. Ligure Toscane) 155 154 61 2,070 394 2.9 
SAT (Soc. Autostrada Tirrenica) 37 36 10.1 248 273 4.1 
Autocamionale CISA 101 120 32.8 862 325 3.8 
Consorzio per le Autostrade Siciliane 268 217 n.a. 1,753 n.a. n.a. 
Strada dei parchi  281 285 57.9 2,296 206 2.5 
Tangenziale di Napoli 20 30 36.9 1,053 1,845 3.5 
Mean (unweighted)  265 295 101.5 4,050 504 3.6 
 
Based on these data, we estimate a set of costs function. We first estimate a linear 
model (a). Then we introduce a translog specification (model b), where all coefficients 
but log²(K) are present in the equation and have a significant coefficient. A simplified 
translog specification is also provided as model (c) on the grounds that it is more 
parsimonious than the previous model and is nearly as satisfactory considering the usual 
fitting criteria. Eventually, model (d) is the estimation of a stochastic cost frontier based 
on model (c). Model (d) includes two error terms: one is the traditional normally 
distributed disturbance, the other one is a single sided disturbance that represents the 
inefficiency of each operator compared with the stochastic cost frontier. A similar 
approach has also been tested for model (a) and (b). However, due to non convergence 
of the algorithms used for estimation (a situation that is not infrequent in the field of 
efficiency estimation), such models could not be calibrated. 
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The models are: 
 
 0 . .K Tco K Tβ β β ε= + + +        (a) 
 0 2( ) . ( ) . ²( ) . ( ) . ( ). ( )T T K TKLog co Log T Log T Log K Log T Log Kβ β β β β ε= + + + + +  (b) 
 0( ) . ( ) . ( ). ( )K TKLog co Log K Log T Log Kβ β β ε= + + +     (c) 
 0( ) . ( ) . ( ). ( )K TKLog co Log K Log T Log K uβ β β ε= + + + +      (d) 
 
where co  are operating costs (millions of euro), T is traffic (millions of veh.km), K is 
capacity (weighted kilometres) and ε  is independently (but not necessarily identically) 
normally distributed disturbance and u  follows a non-negative distribution. 
The estimates have been made after exclusion of the concessionaire ASPI, 
considering that this concessionaire is lying far outside the scatter of observations and 
would have a strong leverage effect on the estimated coefficients. The "Autostrada dei 
Parchi" has also been excluded because, for historic reasons, it has anomalous, very 
low, costs per kilometre. "Consorzio Autostrade Siciliane" is not included for lack of 
data. Consequently, the model is estimated based on 18 concessionaires. The 
estimations have been made using Limdep package, and they are presented in Table 2. 
This table features, for each model, an indicator of the quality of fitting (whether 
adjusted R², or Log likelihood, whenever relevant), together with the Root Mean Square 
Error (RMSE) of the estimated operating costs (which eases the comparison among 
models when the dependent variable is transformed5), the number of observations, as 
well as the estimated coefficients together with the critical probability associated with 
their t statistics. Note that the frontier model is estimated with the maximum likelihood 
method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 RMSE is not included for model (d), because it would not make sense to compare the forecast capability 
of a frontier model with other model. 
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Table 2: Estimate of costs function of highway concessionaires (2006 data) 
 
Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d) 
 
Linear Translog 1 Translog 2 Frontier (half normal) 
Dependent variable Costs Log (Costs) Log (Costs) Log (Costs) 
Fitting  adjR² 0.9305 adjR² 0.9458 adjR² 0.9367 LL 6.48 
         
Number of obs  18  18  18  18 
RMSE costs   9.39  7.15  8.53   
         
 Coeff. P. value Coeff. P. value Coeff. P. value Coeff. P. value 
Constant 1.169 0.80 2.849 0.00 3.036 0.00 2.883 0.00 
Capacity (K) 0.112 0.14       
Traffic (T) 0.021 0.00       
Log(K)   0.504 0.01 -0.901 0.00 -0.904 0.00 
Log(T)   -0.605 0.05     
Log²(T)   0.271 0.01     
Log(K)*Log(T)   -0.593 0.02 0.145 0.00 0.146 0.00 
Model (b) and (c) have been estimated using the White heteroschedasticity robust covariance method that corrects for 
heteroschedasticity of the error term.  
 
Model (a) estimates a constant marginal cost of traffic while capacity has limited 
explanatory value as its coefficient is not significant at the 10% probability level6. 
Results with translog specification are more satisfactory considering the significance of 
the coefficients as well as the fitting criteria RMSE. Model (b) provides the best fitting 
based on the RMSE criteria. Model (c), although slightly inferior to model (b) 
considering the fitting criteria of RMSE is presented for two reasons. First, it is more 
parsimonious. Second, model (c) can be used as a base for the estimation of frontier 
models, whilst estimation of the frontier does not converge when the specification of 
model (b) is used. This last observation is not univocally interpretable as it may be due 
both to the intrinsic limitations of the estimation tools and processes or to the 
inadequacy of the functional form. The choice between specification (c) and 
specification (b) is however not anecdotal as it provides different indications on the 
scale economies. As will be illustrated further, while marginal costs of the traffic is 
increasing in model (b), while it is decreasing in model (c). 
Model (d) estimates the stochastic frontier of the operators. The term representing 
inefficiency is distributed based on an half normal distribution distribution. Exponential 
and truncated normal have also been tested, but they were found to perform less well 
than the half normal distribution. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The critical probability associated with the constant is high. However we keep this constant in the model 
considering the undesirable properties of models without a constant. Note as well that similar estimates 
based on 2004 data also resulted in a non significant constant, although the critical probability was lower 
in magnitude (see Massiani and Ragazzi, 2006, for more details). 
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3.2 Marginal costs 
 
The understanding of marginal costs is not straightforward for models (b) and (c) as 
they produce a marginal cost that is function of traffic and/or capacity. To illustrate the 
economic meaning of equations (b) and (c), it is however possible to consider the 
marginal cost of traffic and capacity of given concessionaires. Table 3 indicates these 
marginal costs for three concessionaires that correspond to the quartiles of the 
concessionaires' population (based on increasing operating costs). For comparison 
purpose, the constant marginal costs of the linear model (model a) is also indicated in 
the right column. 
Table 3: marginal costs of traffic and capacity for three different concessionaires (2006 data) 
 Variable Marginal Cost ConstantMarginal Cost 
Model (b) Model (c) Model (a) 
Traffic Capacity Traffic Capacity Traffic Capacity 
Quartile 
(increasing 
operating 
costs) 
Concessionnaire 
€ cent/ 
veh.km 10
3
 €/km € cent/ 
veh.km 10
3
 €/km € cent/ 
veh.km 10
3
 €/km 
Q1 Autocam. CISA 0.9 231 2.4 20   
Q2 Torino Piacenza 1.5 222 2.1 79 2.1 112 
Q3 Autovie Venete 1.6 225 2.1 96   
 
The emerging pattern of the table is that, when using translog specifications, the 
estimates of the marginal costs are very sensitive to the specification of the model: 
while model (b) indicates sharply increasing marginal costs of the traffic and quite 
constant marginal costs of the capacity, model (c) indicates decreasing marginal costs of 
the traffic and sharply increasing marginal costs of the capacity. The marginal costs of 
the linear model, that are fixed by nature, have values that are within the minimum and 
maximum of the marginal costs of the translog models. 
Our findings suggest that, while attractive due to its high level of flexibility the 
translog specification exhibit a high sensitivity of the results to the functional 
specification. This may be in favour of a more modest, linear model whose limitation of 
providing constant marginal costs may be acceptable considering the limited range of 
variability in the dimension of the concessionaires under scrutiny. 
 
 
3.3 Inefficiency measures 
 
Based on model (d), we estimate for each concessionaire the inefficiency, that is 
E( u |u + ε ). The estimation is based on the method presented in Jondrow et al. (1982). 
The results are presented in Table 4. Two considerations should be made. First, the 
estimation of inefficiencies is contingent upon the choice of the distribution for the term 
u, but the relative inefficiencies are usually found to be highly correlated between 
different distribution assumptions. This is confirmed in our case, where the correlation 
between single inefficiencies estimated using the half normal distribution and the ones 
using exponential distribution is 0.98. This suggests that, while an absolute 
interpretation of inefficiencies is not robust, the relative magnitude of inefficiencies is 
informative about the efficiency of each concessionaire. Second, the measure of 
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inefficiency is contingent upon the specification of the cost function. This implies that a 
measure based on model (b) would provide different results. There is however 
considerable evidence that the impact of the specification of the cost function on the 
individual estimates is limited (cf. for instance the evidence collected, in other fields of 
applied economics, by Rosko and Mutter, 2007, p. 143). 
Table 4 indicates the inefficiency of each concessionaire. Based on these data, one 
could conclude that operators like Tangenziale di Napoli, Autostrada dei Fiori, as well 
as SAV, RAV and Autostrada del Brennero exhibit a higher level of inefficiency, while 
Torino-Piacenza, SAT and Centropadane, are among the most efficient. 
Table 4: Inefficiency measure for each concessionaire (model d) 7 
Autostrade Venete 1.08 ATIVA 1.09 
Milano Mare 1.12 RAV 1.19 
Venezia Padova 1.10 Centropadane 1.06 
SAM 1.09 SAV 1.20 
Torino - Savona 1.12 A. dei Fiori 1.34 
Brescia - Padova 1.10 SALT 1.13 
A. del Brennero 1.19 SAT 1.05 
Torino Milano 1.11 A. della Cisa 1.15 
Torino - Piacenza 1.07 Tangenziale di Napoli 1.22 
 
Our analysis suggests, however, that more effort should be dedicated to the analysis 
of the efficiency of highway operators to implement “yardstick competition”. 
 
 
3.4 Toll collection costs 
 
Eventually, one may want to consider how much these compared efficiencies may be 
affected by one single identifiable cost, that is the cost of toll collection. A rough 
estimate of the efficiency in toll collection may be obtained by comparing the personnel 
employed in collection with traffic volumes. 
                                                 
7
 The inefficiency measure is given as exp(E( u | u + ε )). Thus a figure of 1.20 indicates an inefficiency 
equal to 20%  of the minimum operating costs. 
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Table 5: Toll collection costs of concessionaires (2004) 
 
Toll collection 
staff 
Toll collection staff/ 
km 
Toll collection staff/ 
109 veh.km 
Autostrade per l'Italia 2,760 0.97 59 
Autovie Venete 267 1.48 118 
Milano Mare 454 2.48 153 
Autostrade del Brennero 398 1.27 88 
RAV (Raccordo Autostradale Val 
d'Aosta). 8 0.30 99 
Centropadane 72 0.81 80 
SALT (Società Autostrade Ligure 
Toscane) 194 1.26 97 
Autocamionale CISA 61 0.51 74 
Strada dei parchi S.p.A 293 1.04 133 
Tangenziale di Napoli 288 14.24 278 
Remark: only concessionaires whose information about employees categories was sufficiently detailed could be 
included in this table. 
 
As illustrated in Table 5, differences are very marked: Autostrade per l’Italia (ASPI), 
the major licensee, employed 59 collectors per billion vehicle.km, compared to 153 by 
"Milano-Mare" and 278 by “Tangenziale di Napoli”. However, such differences can not 
be simply attributed to different degrees of efficiency since they also depend on factors 
such as the length of the network, the number of gates and the average travelling 
distance of vehicles on each concessionaire's network. 
 
 
4. ASPI: a twenty years case study 
 
In this section, we investigate the historic evolution of the productivity of 
"Autostrade" which in 2003 changed its name to "Autostrade per l'Italia" (ASPI), 
excluding the subsidiaries that manage other highway sections as well as other 
subsidiaries which deal with activities that are not strictly related to highway operation8. 
Indeed, the group went through major organisational changes in 2003, while the activity 
of the company operating the highway has remained stable over time.  
We consider the years 1985 to 2005. Table 6 provides the following information: 1) 
Output is expressed in terms of network length (km of network) and in terms of traffic 
(millions of veh.km). The composition of traffic is not considered because it shows a 
stable pattern during the whole period9; 2) Revenues10; 3) Workforce (at year end) as 
                                                 
8
 For instance, from 1996 on, the consolidated accounts also include Pavimental, a company operating in 
road works that accounted for 7 % of the group turnover in 1997. Less important , but even more remote 
from highway operation, is the activity of Autostrade Telecomunicazioni created in 1996. 
9
 The maximum share of personal cars is 78 % in 1987, the minimum is 75,8 % in 2004. 
10
 For years 1985-1995, data are from R&S annual yearbooks (Mediobanca) and revenues are defined as 
total sales ("fatturato lordo"). For years 1996-2005 data are from the company’s financial reports and 
revenues are defined as the value of production ("valore della produzione"), i.e. Sales (“fatturato”) plus 
change in work in progress (“variazione dei lavori in corso”). 
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well as toll employees (collectors); 4) Operating costs11, indicating separately 
"personnel costs" and "goods and services" (total operating costs include also the value 
of stock variation which is not detailed in the table). Subsequently table 7 concentrates 
on the most relevant ratios (revenues per km and veh.km, costs per km and veh.km as 
well as personnel costs/employee). 
All euro data are homogenised at 2004 prices. The deflator is the production price 
index of industrial goods as provided in the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
yearbooks. To ensure homogeneity of data, the same deflator is also applied to deflate 
personnel costs. Revenues and operating costs at current prices are reported in the 
appendix (table 12). 
 
Table 6: descriptive data of Autostrade, 1985-2005 
Year Network Traffic Employees Revenues Operating costs 
   Toll 
employees 
Others Total  Goods and 
services 
Personnel 
costs 
Total 
 km 106 veh.km    (106 € 2004) 
1985 2,632 22,049 3,979 2,891 6,870 1,071 257 224 480 
1986 2,674 23,696 4,194 3,051 7,245 1,251 304 249 552 
1987 2,774 25,804 4,351 3,269 7,620 1,405 390 280 669 
1988 2,791 27,841 4,581 3,524 8,105 1,396 440 311 746 
1989 2,796 29,963 4,692 3,680 8,372 1,419 420 339 743 
1990 2,796 31,190 4,771 3,757 8,528 1,460 334 358 678 
1991 2,796 31,759 4,761 3,690 8,451 1,605 411 389 783 
1992 2,799 33,027 4,735 3,698 8,433 1,699 472 407 824 
1993 2,799 33,238 4,644 3,679 8,323 1,627 382 404 773 
1994 2,816 34,176 4,419 3,568 7,987 1,707 317 439 747 
1995 2,854 35,383 4,266 3,631 7,897 1,704 330 434 757 
1996 2,854 36,035 4,169 3,568 7,737 1,753 346 401 740 
1997 2,854 37,554 3,995 3,437 7,432 1,800 393 403 786 
1998 2,854 39,260 3,832 3,428 7,260 1,920 426 385 805 
1999 2,854 40,359 3,568 3,518 7,086 2,070 513 392 929 
2000 2,854 41,810 3,366 3,527 6,893 1,953 458 361 818 
2001 2,854 43,315 3,180 3,510 6,690 2,148 469 347 820 
2002 2,854 44,603 3,098 3,478 6,576 2,273 443 360 801 
2003 2,854 45,858 2,930 3,452 6,382 2,382 483 350 833 
2004 2,855 46,703 2,760 3,602 6,362 2,516 500 343 848 
2005 2,855 46,769 2,633 3,308 5,941 2,535 523 331 862 
 
                                                 
11
 Operating costs are the sum of personnel costs ("costi per il personale") plus purchases of goods and 
services ("acquisti e prestazioni di terzi, costi diversi di esercizio") minus the increase of work in progress 
("variazione lavori in corso”). For the years 1985-1995, data are from R&S annual yearbook 
(Mediobanca). For the years 1996-2005 data are from the company’s financial reports. 
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The length of the network increased very little up to 1995, and not at all thereafter12, 
while traffic more than doubled. Revenues (at constant 2004 prices) increased more 
than traffic as real tariffs (revenues per veh.km at constant prices) increased from 4.86 
eurocents per veh.km in 1985 to 5.42 eurocents in 2005. Real revenues per km 
increased from 407,000 euro in 1985 to 597,000 in 1995 and to 888,000 in 2005 (2004 
prices). 
Operating costs per km (table 7), although somewhat variable from year to year, after 
an initial increase to 267,000 euro (2004 prices) in 1988, remained relatively stable 
around this level for the following decade. After the privatization (with a peak in costs 
in 1999) operating costs per km increased from 287,000 euro in 2000 to 302,000 euro in 
2005 (2004 prices). We do not know if and to what extent the increase of costs for the 
purchase of goods and services after privatization was due to higher spending for road 
resurfacing. 
Operating costs per veh.km declined from 2.7 eurocents in 1988 to 2.0 eurocents in 
1996 and diminished only slightly thereafter (but for an exceptional peak in 1999). The 
decline of operating costs per km, in spite of the sharp increase in traffic, is essentially 
due to the increase of efficiency in collection. The introduction of automated collection 
systems, which started in the early ‘90s, made it possible to reduce the number of 
collectors (personnel employed in toll collection) from a peak of 4,735 in 1992 to just 
2,663 in 2005. This decline had already occurred, to a large extent, before privatization. 
Other employees declined somewhat from the early’90s to around 3,400 before 
privatisation and remained stable thereafter. Total personnel costs declined in real 
terms, in spite of the substantial increase of real average wages (see table 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 This holds even when one considers the number of lanes offered by the highway. Actually, if we take 
into consideration this element, the increase in capacity is only 10 % between 1987 and 2004. 
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Table 7: unit costs and revenues of ASPI (1985-2005) 
Year Revenues/km Revenues/veh.km Cost/km Cost/veh.km Personnel costs/ 
employee 
 103 € 2004/km € cent/veh.km 103 € 2004/km € 2004/veh.km 103 € 2004 
1985 406.9 4.9 182.4 2.18 32.6 
1986 467.7 5.3 206.6 2.33 34.4 
1987 506.5 5.4 241.3 2.59 36.7 
1988 500.0 5.0 267.4 2.68 38.4 
1989 507.4 4.7 265.6 2.48 40.5 
1990 522.3 4.7 242.3 2.17 42.0 
1991 574.0 5.1 280.1 2.47 46.0 
1992 607.1 5.1 294.2 2.49 48.2 
1993 581.1 4.9 276.0 2.32 48.6 
1994 606.0 5.0 265.3 2.19 55.0 
1995 597.0 4.8 265.1 2.14 54.9 
1996 614.4 4.9 259.2 2.05 51.9 
1997 630.5 4.8 275.2 2.09 54.3 
1998 672.7 4.9 282.1 2.05 53.0 
1999 725.4 5.1 325.5 2.30 55.3 
2000 684.2 4.7 286.7 1.96 52.4 
2001 752.5 5.0 287.2 1.89 51.9 
2002 796.4 5.1 280.8 1.80 54.7 
2003 834.6 5.2 291.9 1.82 54.8 
2004 881.4 5.4 297.0 1.82 53.9 
2005 888.0 5.4 301.8 1.84 55.8 
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the main indicators13. We may 
summarize the main findings as follows: 1) there is no evidence of any gain in 
efficiency following privatization; 2) revenues per veh.km. increased by more than the 
price index (production prices of industrial goods), i.e. tariffs increased in real terms, 
from 1995 on; 3) this, and the sharp increase in traffic, caused an even larger increase of 
revenues while operating costs remained substantially stable; 4) there is no evidence 
that the increase of traffic appreciably increased operating costs; actually, the 
automation of collections allowed the company to sharply reduce the number of 
collectors. 
 
                                                 
13
 In the year 1999, when the company was privatized, there was an exceptionally high increase of both 
revenues and costs. The decrease from 1999 to 2000 is due to the fact that the production prices index 
increased by more than nominal revenues. 
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Figure 1 - costs and revenues of ASPI (1985-2004, million euro, 2004 prices) 
 
Amortization and provisions are another major component of total costs, in addition 
to operating costs and financial charges. Since the company invested very little from the 
early ‘90s on, over this period amortization and provisions remained substantially 
constant in monetary terms (see table 13 in the appendix) and declined in real terms, 
from over 60% of operating costs in the mid ‘90s to 40 % in 2004 (excluding goodwill 
amortization14). From 1995 to 2004, amortization plus operating costs declined by 4% 
to 1.18 billion euros (at 2004 prices) while revenues increased by 48% to 2.51 billion 
euros. 
 
 
5. Comparison among operators  
 
5.1 Comparing Autostrade with three other highway operators in Italy 
 
In this section, we compare ASPI with three other major concessionaires: Brescia-
Padova (BSPD), Autostrada del Brennero (BREN), Autostrada Torino-Milano (TOMI) 
excluding their subsidiaries. 
The data considered (table 8) are: network length (kilometres), traffic (light vehicles + 
heavy vehicles) expressed in millions of veh.km, operating costs (purchase of goods and 
services + personnel costs), total number of employees (and the number of toll 
collectors when available), revenues15. Operating costs and revenues are expressed in 
2004 euro using the production price index. Revenues include, in addition to highway 
tolls, other incomes, mainly sub-concession fees paid by restaurants and petrol stations.  
 
The network length of all four licensees remained unchanged; traffic increased by 30-
35%, with the exception of TOMI where traffic increased by only 17% perhaps due to 
                                                 
14
 From 2003 on, amortization more than doubled, but this was entirely due to the amortization of the 
“book” capital gain (“avviamento”) following the group reorganization. 
15
 Revenues are defined as "valore della produzione", ie. Sales (“fatturato”) plus change in work in 
progress (“variazione dei lavori in corso”). 
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works which reduced substantially the potential traffic flow. Comparing revenues to 
traffic we observe that the average toll (at constant prices) declined for BSPD, remained 
about unchanged for BREN and increased instead sharply for TOMI, whose revenues 
increased by twice as much as traffic. Also revenues of ASPI increased by much more 
than traffic, but this was due mostly to higher income from royalties and sub-
concessions while real tolls did not increase much. 
Operating costs per veh.km declined by 14-17%, except for TOMI (table 9). This was 
due mostly to the increasing use of automated collection systems which allowed a sharp 
cut in personnel employed in collection, particularly relevant in the case of ASPI. ASPI 
has the lowest operating costs per veh.km, almost half those of BREN.  
The very steep increase of real profits in this period is the consequence of revenues 
increasing by much more than operating costs, while capital costs (depreciation and 
financial costs) declined in real terms. 
Table 8: Comparison of Autostrade with three other concessionaires (1997-2006)16 
a - Network, costs and revenues 
Network Traffic Operating costs Revenues 
kilometres (106 veh.km) (106 € 2004) (106 € 2004)  
1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  
ASPI 2,854 2,855 0% 37,554 48,214 28% 786 840 7% 1,800 2475 38% 
BSPD 183 183 0% 3,864 5,175 34% 106 120 13% 178 211 19% 
BREN 314 314 0% 3,437 4,643 35% 129 144 12% 191 249 30% 
TOMI 127 127 0% 1,838 2,150 17% 46 56 22% 88 120 36% 
 
b - Employees 
Employees 
Total Toll employees Other employees  
1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  
ASPI 7,432 5,695 -23% 3,995 2,522 -37% 3,437 3,173 -8% 
BSPD 835 708 -15%       
BREN 864 946 9% 407 388 -5% 457 558 22% 
TOMI 457 459 0% 215     242     
 
                                                 
16
 Brennero Highway costs include the use of “renewal fund” (“fondo di rinnovo”). Operating costs of the 
Highway Brescia-Padova show large fluctuations over the years - around 100 millions euro from 1997 to 
2000, around 80 million euros from 2001 to 2003 and around 120 thereafter. This is due essentially to 
variations in the cost of external services (“costo per i servizi”). Data for the highway Torino-Milano are 
difficult to estimate, because the company was merged into SATAP (a company that operates the 
highway between Torino and Piacenza) in 2003. Moreover, revenues and operating costs are affected by 
the construction of a high speed rail track along the highway. Part of the construction operations have 
been undertaken by the highway operating company and reimbursed by the rail company. Costs and 
revenues of such activities have been estimated and excluded from the figures shown in the table, which 
thus refer only to activities pertaining to the highway 
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Table 9: Comparison of Autostrade with three other concessionaires, unit costs (1997-2006) 
Cost/network km Cost/106 veh.km Revenues/veh.km 
(106 € 2006) (€ cent 2006) (€ cent 2006)  
1997 2004 ∆  1997 2004 ∆  1997 2004 ∆  
ASPI 0.28 0.29 7% 2.09 1.74 -17% 4.79 5.13 7% 
BSPD 0.58 0.66 13% 2.74 2.32 -15% 4.61 4.08 -11% 
BREN 0.41 0.46 12% 3.75 3.10 -17% 5.56 5.36 -3% 
TOMI 0.36 0.44 22% 2.50 2.60 4% 4.79 5.58 17% 
 
Costs per million of veh.km for three operators declined markedly, mainly due to the 
automation of collection which allowed a sharp reduction in the number of collectors, 
especially by ASPI. ASPI has the lowest unit operating costs. Regarding cost per 
kilometre of highway, Brescia - Padova (BSPD) costs are more than double compared 
with those of ASPI, and they exhibit the sharpest increase over the period. The Brenner 
highway has the highest costs per veh.km, but it succeeded in reducing costs more than 
the others17. 
 
 
5.2 Comparison between Italian and French highway operators  
 
In this section we compare the operations of highway concessionaires in France with 
those in Italy. There are eight highway concessionaires in France, six of them are part of 
three groups, namely: ASF (Autoroutes du Sud de la France together with ESCOTA - 
autoroutes Esterel Côtes d’azur Alpes), SANEF (Société des Autoroutes du Nord et de 
l'Est de la France together with SAPN- Société des Autoroutes Paris Normandie) and 
APRR (Autoroutes Paris Rhin Rhône together with AERA). There is a rough 
geographical split of the highway network with ASF operating in the southern part of 
the country, SANEF in the area north and east of Paris and APRR in the Paris-Lyon 
corridor and in the Alps region. The two other concessionaires are Cofiroute (Paris-
Bordeaux Corridor with some extensions in south-west France) and Alis (which started 
operations in 2005 on a 125 km route in Normandy). 
 
                                                 
17
 In its bookkeeping, Brennero highway makes use of a special fund called renewal fund. In the 
computation of costs, we take into account the use of this fund. This however makes the computation of 
costs subject to more uncertainty as it gives the company some discretionality in the use of the fund. 
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Table 10: Descriptive data of highway concessionaires in France (2005 data) 
Operating costs 
Network size Traffic Staff Revenues Purchase of 
goods and 
services 
Personnel 
costs 
Total Group Operator 
km veh.km units 106 € (2005)  
SANEF Group  1,742 14,200 N. A. 1,152 108 142 249 
incl. SANEF 1,374 11,048 2,380 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
incl. SAPN 368 3,198 728 265 39 32 71 
ASF Group  3,422 32,603 7,975 2,474 218 336 554 
incl. ASF. 2,963 26,332 5,665 1,958 158 258 416 
incl. ESCOTA 459 6,271 1,828 516 60 78 138 
APRR Group  2,205 19,989 4,391 1,571 155 190 345 
incl. APRR 1,810 15,896 3,236 1,210 111 146 257 
incl. AREA * 384 4,047 1,143 361 44 44 88 
Cofiroute  928 9,041 1,919 889 91 89 180 
Note: AREA data are for year 2003. 
 
Revenues of French operators (Table 10) are almost entirely from tolls, with only a 
few million coming from sub-concessions, which represent instead a sizeable portion of 
revenues of Italian operators. 
Table 11: Operating ratios of French highway concessionaires and comparison with Italian concessionaires (2005 
data, current prices, unless specified) 
Traffic 
intensity 
Operating 
costs/ 
network km 
Operating 
costs/ veh.km 
Revenues**/ 
network km 
Revenues**/ 
veh.km Group Operator 
106 veh.km/ 
km 10
3
 €/km € cent/ 
veh.km 10
3
 €/km € cent/ 
veh.km 
SANEF Group  8.2 143 1.8 661 8.1 
incl. SANEF 8.0 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
incl. SAPN 8.7 193 2.2 719 8.3 
ASF Group  9.5 162 1.7 723 7.6 
incl. ASF. 8.9 140 1.6 661 7.4 
incl. ESCOTA 13.7 301 2.2 1,124 8.2 
APRR Group  9.1 156 1.7 712 7.9 
incl. APRR 8.8 142 1.6 669 7.6 
incl. AREA * 10.5 229 2.2 940 8.9 
Cofiroute  9.7 194 2.0 958 9.8 
Weighted Average France 
(2005)  9.1 160 1.8 734 8.0 
ASPI (2005)  16.4 314 1.9 924 5.6 
Weighted Average Italy 
(without ASPI) ( 2004)  13.2 379 3.1 710 6.2 
* AREA data are for year 2003. 
** Revenues are defined as: turnover (“chiffres d’affaires”) for French concessionaires, net toll revenues (“ricavi 
netti da pedaggio”) for Italian concessionaires, except for ASPI where it refers to toll and concession revenues. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 85-106 
 103
Traffic intensity in France is well below that of Italy (Table 11). In spite of this, the 
operating costs per veh.km of Italian concessionaires are more than 50% higher than 
those of the French concessionaires, and their operating costs per km are more than 
double. This difference is partially due to the fact that average personnel costs are 16% 
higher in Italy (the average annual cost per employee is around 44,000 euro for French 
concessionaires (2005) and around 51,000 euro in Italy (2004)). Another reason may be 
the very large difference in the size of the operators in France and in Italy. Although 
scale economies did not clearly emerge from the analysis of 18 Italian operators, we are 
unable to exclude the relevance of scale economies for large size differences; this is 
consistent with the observation that ASPI has much lower operating costs than all the 
other smaller concessionaires in Italy. Differences in operating costs in the two 
countries are however strikingly large and this would certainly deserve further 
investigation. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Measuring the productivity of highway concessionaires is very relevant, especially if 
a price cap regulation is applied. Productivity of highway concessionaires is generally 
defined as the ratio of traffic to costs. However, the volume of traffic is outside the 
control of the operating company, depending mostly upon the original design of the 
infrastructure and the growth of the economy. The output of a company operating an 
existing infrastructure may best be measured in terms of the provision of a given 
capacity plus incremental services for traffic, including quality of service. To measure 
productivity one should consider only operating costs, since amortization and financial 
costs depend upon historical investment costs and length of the concession. 
A cross section analysis of 18 Italian concessionaires shows that:1) operating costs 
depend on both traffic and capacity (size of the network); 2) economies of scale may be 
relevant, but they do not emerge clearly on the basis of our estimations. Translog 
specifications, that would be suitable for the description of scale economies, provide 
sharply different estimates of scale economies for models with slightly comparable 
fitting; 3) based on Stochastic Frontier Analysis, we find large differences in cost 
efficiency among operators, suggesting that there is room for yardstick competition. 
Data over two decades for the major Italian concessionaire indicate that: 1) the 
volume of traffic doubled and tariffs were also increased in real terms, thus revenues per 
network km (at constant prices) more than doubled, reaching 3 times operating costs; 2) 
the increase of traffic did not noticeably increase operating costs (at constant prices), as 
the automation of collections allowed the company to sharply reduce the number of 
collectors; 3) there is no evidence of significant gains in efficiency following 
privatization. 
The analysis of three other main italian concessionaires, over the period 1997-2004, 
confirms that the increase in traffic did not result in comparable increases in operating 
costs, while there are large differences in cost efficiency among operators. 
Finally, a comparison between Italian and French concessionaires shows that the latter 
have much lower operating costs, which cannot be entirely explained by economies of 
scale or lower personnel costs. 
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On the whole, the evidence that is collected in this article casts doubt on the validity 
of the competitive framework prevailing in the highway industry in Italy. There is no 
evidence that the privatisation of Autostrade improved efficiency, costs in the industry 
are much higher than in France, revenues have increased more than costs leading to the 
creation of large rents that regulation should have avoided. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 12: ASPI - Revenues18 and operating costs at current prices 
Revenues Total Operating costs Income/veh.km 
 
106 € (current prices) 106 € (current prices) € cent/km (current prices) 
1985 639 286 2.9 
1986 747 330 3.2 
1987 803 412 3.1 
1988 889 476 3.2 
1989 958 501 3.2 
1990 1,026 476 3.3 
1991 1,165 569 3.7 
1992 1,258 610 3.8 
1993 1,248 593 3.8 
1994 1,359 595 4.0 
1995 1,463 650 4.1 
1996 1,535 647 4.3 
1997 1,595 696 4.2 
1998 1,704 714 4.3 
1999 1,833 822 4.5 
2000 1,833 768 4.4 
2001 2,055 784 4.7 
2002 2,179 768 4.9 
2003 2,319 811 5.1 
2004 2,516 843 5.4 
2005 2,637 896 5.6 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Revenues refer to gross turnover ("Fatturato Lordo") for years 1985-95 and production value (Valore 
della produzione)  from 1996 on.  
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Table 13: ASPI - Allowances for maintenance and amortization funds 
Amortization 
Amortization 
of goodwill 
Deferred 
charges 
Financial Industrial Total 
Provisions for 
maintenance 
fund 
Total 
(amortization + 
provisions) 
Year 
106 € 2004 
106 € 
(current 
prices) 
1985  1 150 152 303 
 
303 181 
1986 
 
1 194 187 382 
 
382 228 
1987 
 
3 125 219 347 
 
347 213 
1988 
 
4 155 213 372 
 
372 237 
1989 
 
6 172 205 383 
 
383 259 
1990 
 
7 179 220 407 
 
407 286 
1991 
 
10 197 214 421 
 
421 305 
1992 
 
11 212 214 436 
 
436 323 
1993 
 
10 228 207 445 
 
445 341 
1994 
 
9 248 197 455 
 
455 362 
1995 
 
8 283 182 474 
 
474 407 
1996 
 
7 268 53 328 76 404 354 
1997 
 
7 140 58 206 196 401 356 
1998 
 
7 141 54 202 247 450 399 
1999 
 
8 144 57 209 194 403 357 
2000 
 
10 137 65 212 101 313 294 
2001 
 
11 135 68 214 144 358 343 
2002 
 
13 139 76 227 124 352 337 
2003 448 28 107 52 635 144 779 759 
2004 436 34 108 45 624 151 775 775 
Source: R&S yearbook until 2000. Annual Reports from 2001 on. 
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Abstract 
 
In this paper, passenger willingness-to-pay (WTP) for improving the quality levels of a bus service is 
examined. Specifically, the objective of this research is to provide a tool for evaluating passenger 
willingness-to-pay by considering some qualitative service aspects, in addition to the traditional 
quantitative service aspects like travel time and cost. The adopted methodology is built on the calibration 
of behavioural models based on user choices. The WTP values are obtained as marginal rates of 
substitution between some service quality attributes and travel cost at constant utility. For this purpose, 
Multinomial and Mixed Logit models are introduced. The models were calibrated by using the data 
collected from an SP experiment in which each user makes a choice between an alternative representing 
the current service and two alternatives representing hypothetical bus services. In order to take into 
account the randomness of the estimated WTP, the limits of the confidence intervals are calculated. 
 
Keywords: Service quality; Public transport; Willingness-to-pay. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the field of public transport, service quality measure is a subject of the greatest 
interest both for planners and transit operators. Generally, service quality is measured 
by asking the users their perceptions and expectations about some service quality 
aspects. By considering the importance and satisfaction levels stated by users, the 
service quality attributes to be improved can be identified. 
A service quality measure can be obtained by discrete choice models based on the 
Random Utility Theory (RUT), and particularly by Logit models. Over the last few 
decades, Logit models have been widely used for the calibration of the mode choice 
models in which the alternatives are different transport modes. However, more recently 
“within mode” models have been proposed, in which the alternatives relate to a single 
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transport mode, usually public transport mode. In the specific case of service quality 
each alternative is a bus service characterized by some service quality attributes. Some 
Logit models, like Multinomial, Nested or Mixed Logit, were proposed by Hensher 
(Prioni and Hensher, 2000; Hensher, 2001; Hensher and Prioni, 2002; Hensher et alii, 
2003). By means of the coefficient estimation of these models, the importance of 
service quality attributes on global service quality is evaluated. 
These models can be calibrated by using the combination of Revealed Preferences 
(RP) and Stated Preferences (SP) data. The SP data applications have assumed a 
growing importance in the last few decades. The major advantage of SP data compared 
with RP data is that they exploit a more extensive attributes space (Pearmain et alii, 
1991). 
From Logit models a subjective value of time can be derived; this value represents the 
user willingness-to-pay in terms of monetary cost for savings in travel time. The 
concept of value of time was extended to the widest concept of willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) in order to evaluate in monetary terms some external effects of transport 
systems, like accidents, air pollution, noise, and landscape deterioration. The WTP 
measures represent an important tool in the valuation of transport investments, because 
they allow the rate which could be debited to the users to be established. 
In this paper, the WTP concept was adopted in order to evaluate willingness-to-pay of 
public transport users for an improvement in quality of service. To this purpose some 
Logit models in which the choice alternatives are some bus services were introduced. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents an overview of some 
methods for measuring consumers’ willingness-to-pay; section 3 introduces a 
theoretical background of the discrete choice Logit models; in section 4 the 
experimental context is described and the statistical-descriptive results of the survey 
realized to support the research are reported, this section also discusses the estimation 
results; finally, section 5 summarises the main conclusions. 
 
 
2. Willingness-to-pay measures 
 
On the basis of the assumption that consumer choices reflect their preferences, it is 
possible to deduce from choice behaviour or from direct questions about preferences, 
whether transportation improvements or public policy initiatives are socially desirable 
(McFadden, 1997). A quantitative measure of the social desirability of improvements 
can be obtained by the WTP valuation. In the literature different WTP valuation 
methods have been proposed. The most widely used approaches are the Hedonic Pricing 
Method (HPM) and the Contingent Valuation (CV) method. 
The HPM relies on actual behaviour observed in the housing market, while the CV 
method (known in marketing as Conjoint Analysis, CA) relies on respondents’ 
statements about their willingness to pay for a hypothetical improvement of a transport 
system. The HPM has been specifically used to estimate the environmental externalities, 
like traffic noise, air pollution, urban development, transport safety, and so on (see for 
example, Garrod and Willis, 1999; Freeman, 2003; Jim and Chen, 2007). 
The determination of WTP by means of SP data has traditionally been associated with 
the CV method. The CV method consists in asking people how much they are willing to 
pay in monetary cost for a benefit; analogously, the Willingness-to-Accept (WTA) in 
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compensation for deterioration can be calculated. A number of studies have been 
proposed in order to valuate WTP for reducing traffic air pollution and noise (Feitelson 
et alii, 1996; Saelensminde, 1999; Ortùzar and Rodrìguez, 2002; Bjorner, 2004; 
Fosgerau and Bjorner, 2006), for reducing road accidents (Rizzi and Ortùzar, 2003; 
Iraguen and Ortùzar, 2004), for saving travel time (Brownstone et alii, 2003; Hensher 
and Goodwin, 2004; Hensher, 2006a; Hensher, 2006b), for improving transport 
information services (Mehndiratta et alii, 2000; Denant-Boèmont and Petiot, 2003; 
Khattak et alii, 2003; Molin and Timmermanns, 2006), for improving the paved road 
surface (Walton et alii, 2004), and for not losing one’s driving licence (Jorgensen and 
Wentzel-Larsen, 2002; Jorgensen and Dargay, 2007). In the specific case of public 
transport service quality, Ramanayya et alii (2007) measured the willingness-to-pay for 
better services across different categories of commuters by asking them their 
willingness to pay higher fares for an assured seat, for a comfortable journey, for fast 
service, and to accommodate luggage. On the other hand, Espino et alii (2006a) 
proposed a discrete choice model between the private and public transport mode in 
order to estimate willingness-to-pay for better bus services in terms of frequency 
increases, reduction in walking time, and improvements in the level of comfort. 
Traditionally, WTP for savings in travel time (in the classic transport microeconomic 
literature normally referred to as the subjective value of time) has been estimated by 
using mode choice models based on RUT, by considering travel time and cost attributes 
in the utility function of the modal alternatives. Travel time can be expressed in terms of 
total travel time, or by considering separately some parts of the total time, like in-
vehicle time, waiting time, access/egress time, parking time, and so on; travel cost 
represents the monetary cost linked to the transport mode. 
According to this approach, a useful way to calculate the value of time is to find the 
marginal rate of substitution (i.e. the trade-off) between perceived travel times and costs 
at constant utility. For the linear-in-parameters specification of the utility function, the 
value of time corresponds to the ratio between the estimated parameters of time and cost 
attributes. The subjective values of time are heavily dependent on the model 
specification and data (Gaudry et alii 1989). 
As is well-known, the maximum likelihood estimation method used for the calibration 
of Logit models provides asymptotically distributed multivariate normal parameters 
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). The probability distribution for the ratio between two 
normally distributed variables is unknown a priori, and therefore the value of time is a 
random variable with an unknown probability distribution function. This circumstance 
does not allow an easy definition of confidence intervals for the estimated value of time. 
To this purpose, in the last few years, a number of works have focused on this subject 
and several methods for constructing confidence intervals of the value of time were 
proposed. Ettema et alii (1997) discussed a general method based on multivariate 
normal simulation, while Yadlin, as reported in Armstrong et alii (2001), constructed 
confidence intervals assuming that a continuous function of normal variates follows a 
normal probability distribution function. Re-sampling methods were also adopted; in 
this case, numerous sub-samples are generated by an original sample or artificially 
created, and models are estimated for each one of them by using the same model 
specification. In this way, a large number of average values of time are obtained 
allowing an approximation of its probability distribution. Thus, the limits of the 
confidence interval are computed by determining the values that correspond to pre-
specified percentiles (Armstrong et alii, 2001). The Jackknife and Bootstrap techniques 
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(Shao and Tu, 1995) are widely used in practice. More recently, Ortùzar introduced 
other two methods (Armstrong et alii, 2001). The first one, founded on the likelihood 
ratio test, is based on imposing a linear restriction to the maximum likelihood estimation 
process and comparing the statistical efficiency of the estimation with respect to the 
unrestricted case. The procedure consists in searching for values of time for which the 
linear restriction is valid, given a certain significance level. The second one is based on 
the asymptotic t-test, generally used in order to prove whether a normally distributed 
parameter is significantly different from zero. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) proposed 
an extension of this test for a linear combination of the parameters. As the parameters 
are asymptotically distributed normal, the following null hypothesis can be postulated: 
 
0:0 =⋅− ct VTH ββ          (1) 
 
where, tβ  is the time coefficient, cβ  is the cost coefficient, and VT represents the value 
of time estimate. The confidence interval is given by the set of VT values for which it is 
not possible to reject 0H  at a given level of significance. The corresponding test 
statistics is (Garrido and Ortùzar, 1993): 
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This expression distributes normal for linear models and asymptotically normal for 
non-linear models, like Logit models. 
On the basis of these assumptions, Garrido and Ortùzar (1993) derived the upper and 
lower bounds for the confidence interval as follows: 
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where tt  and ct  correspond to the t-statistics for tβ  and cβ  respectively; crt  is the critical 
value of t  statistics given the degree of confidence required and the sample size, and ρ  
is the coefficient of correlation between both parameter estimates. 
These approaches were also extended in order to construct confidence intervals for the 
largest WTP concept. As an example, some authors have recently proposed willingness-
to-pay measures derived by discrete mode choice models and have calculated 
confidence intervals for WTP estimated values (see Greene et alii, 2006; Espino et alii, 
2006b). 
The construction of the confidence intervals provides the range of possible benefits 
derived from a given project (Espino et alii, 2006b). Specifically, WTP confidence 
intervals allow planners to consider the lower and upper limits of the benefits obtained, 
for example, from travel time savings or service quality improvements in terms of 
frequency, reliability, comfort, and so on. 
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3. Discrete choice logit models 
 
Logit models are the better-known discrete choice models. These models are based on 
the Random Utility Theory (RUT), and on the hypothesis that the errors in the utility 
function are distributed according to the type I extreme-value (EV1) distribution. 
Multinomial Logit (MNL) is the model with the simplest structure inside the Logit 
family. There are three fundamental hypotheses that underlie the MNL formulation. The 
first one is that the random components of the utilities of the alternatives are 
independent and identically distributed (IID). The second one is that the MNL model 
maintains homogeneity in responsiveness to the attributes of the alternatives across 
individuals. Finally, the third hypothesis is that the error variance-covariance structure 
of the alternatives is identical across individuals (Bhat, 2003). 
In the last few years, by relaxing the hypotheses of the MNL model, more complex 
model formulations have been derived, like Heteroskedastic Extreme Value (HEV) 
models, Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) class of models, and Mixed Logit (ML). 
Specifically, the ML models have more recently been used in order to consider the 
heterogeneity among users and permit the differences in user perceptions and responses 
to be considered. Traditionally, these differences were taken into account by introducing 
some socioeconomic characteristics of the users among the model attributes. Mixed 
Logit models spread at the end of the nineties (McFadden and Train, 1997; Bhat, 1998; 
Train, 1998) as a consequence of the development of specific software for their 
calibration. ML models can be formulated according to two different structures: “error 
component structure” and “random coefficients structure” (reported in the literature also 
as Random Parameter Logit, RPL). In the first structure some hypotheses of correlation 
between alternatives are made; in the second one some hypotheses of unobserved 
heterogeneity among users as regards observed variables are made (Bhat, 2003). RPL 
has the standard form of an MNL model except that one or more parameters can be 
considered as random parameters, with the standard deviation estimated together with 
the mean. 
For a more exhaustive discussion about Logit models one could refer to Domencich 
and McFadden (1975), Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), Ortuzar and Willumsen (1994), 
Cascetta (2001), Train (2003). 
In this research some Logit models were specified and calibrated in order to calculate 
users willingness-to-pay for improving service quality. In addition to an MNL, an RPL 
model was introduced in order to allow the heterogeneity of customers with respect to 
the service quality responsiveness to be investigated. 
 
 
4. Empirical application 
 
4.1. Experimental context 
 
A sample survey of the University of Calabria students was conducted. The 
University is like an Anglo-Saxon campus and is situated in the urban area of Cosenza 
(in the South of Italy); it is attended by approximately 32,000 students and 2,000 
members of staff (March 2006). At the present time, the University is served by bus 
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services connecting the urban area with the campus; extra-urban bus services connect 
the campus with the other towns of Calabria. The urban bus service is available from 
7.30 to 00.30; service frequency is 1 run every 60 minutes. The cost of one-way ticket is 
0.77 Euros, while one-day travel card costs 1.55 Euros; in addition, weekly and monthly 
travel cards are available with a special price for students; the cost of a weekly travel 
card is about 7 Euros, while a monthly travel card costs about 18 Euros. On a working 
day, about 8,000 students travel by urban bus. 
The survey, realized in the winter of 2006, involved a sample of 470 students who 
live in the urban area and habitually use the bus to reach the campus. Therefore, the 
sampling rate is approximately equal to 5.8%. Respondents were asked to provide 
information about their trip habits regarding getting to the university and, in addition, 
about public transport service quality. 
The interview is divided into three sections: in the first and second section some 
information about socioeconomic characteristics (gender, age, income and car 
availability) and travel habits was elicited; the last section of the interview includes an 
SP experiment proposed to the users, in which they made a choice between the current 
bus service and two hypothetical bus services. The current service is defined by the user 
taking into account the bus service used at the time of the interview according to the 
attribute levels reported in table 1. The alternatives are defined by nine attributes 
varying on two levels. Each SP alternative is a combination of the attribute levels and 
represents a bus service. Some levels used in the SP alternatives are not available for the 
current service. Table 1 reports the attribute levels. The full factorial design includes all 
the possible combinations among the attribute levels. In this case, it consists of 29 
combinations producing 512 alternatives. We restricted the number of alternatives to 50 
by adopting the usual partialization techniques of the full factorial design. 
Only three alternatives were proposed to the users because they may have some 
difficulties in making a choice between more than three alternatives when several 
attributes define the alternatives (see for example Prioni and Hensher, 2000; Hensher 
and Prioni, 2002); in this cases the matter of interviewee’s fatigue and burden occurs. 
Table 1: Service quality attributes and levels. 
Service quality attributes Levels 
Walking distance to the bus stop same as now (1); 10 minutes more (0) 
Frequency every 15 minutes (1); same as now (0) 
Reliability on time (1); late (0) 
Bus stop facilities bus shelter, seats and lighting (1) 
no shelter, no seats, no lighting (0) 
Bus crowding no overcrowded (1); overcrowded (0) 
Cleanliness clean enough (1); not clean enough (0) 
Fare 25% more than the current fare (1); same as now (0) 
Information timetable, map, announcement of delays (1) 
no timetable, no map, no announcement of delays (0) 
Transit personnel attitude very friendly (1); very unfriendly (0) 
 
The hypothetical alternatives were coupled producing several types of experiments, 
each of which was proposed to a group of users. The alternatives were coupled by using 
an empirical simulation procedure. An example of experiment is shown in table 2. To 
some users two SP experiments were proposed generating 640 observations. In these 
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cases only an SP alternative was replaced in the second experiment in order to reduce 
the fatigue effect in the respondent. 
The sample is spread over 46% male and 54% female respondents. 89% of the student 
sample was between 18 and 24 years old. The sample was divided, also, in “in course”, 
and “out course” students; in Italy, the “out course” condition relates to a university 
student who has not finished his studies in the prescribed time. The “in course” students 
represent a percentage of 78% of the total. About 50% of students belong to a middle 
class of family income and about 35% to a lower-middle class. Almost all the students 
do not have the possibility of using a car to reach the campus (92%). 
Table 2 - Example of an SP experiment proposed to the interviewed 
Attributes Current service Service bus A Service bus B 
Walking distance to the bus stop same as now 10 minutes more same as now 
Frequency same as now same as now every 15 minutes 
Reliability on time late late 
Bus stop facilities no shelter, no seats, 
no lighting 
Bus shelter, seats and 
lighting 
no shelter, no seats, no 
lighting 
Bus crowding overcrowded overcrowded no overcrowded 
Cleanliness clean enough clean enough not clean enough 
Fare same as now same as now 25% more than the 
current fare 
Information no timetable, no map, 
no announcement of 
delays 
timetable, map, 
announcement of delays 
no timetable, no map, no 
announcement of delays 
Transit personnel attitude very friendly very friendly very unfriendly 
 
 
4.2. Experimental results 
 
An MNL and an ML model were calibrated by using AMLET package. The package 
is based on a procedure which uses Monte Carlo sampling to produce the approximate 
likelihood function and dynamically adapts the number of draws on the basis of 
statistical estimators of the simulation error and simulation bias (Bastin et alii, 2006). 
All the service quality attributes are defined as dichotomous variables, except 
“Walking distance to the bus stop” and “Ticket cost” that are continuous, measured in 
minutes and in Euros respectively. Specifically, when people use daily, weekly or 
monthly cards, the cost was divided by 2, 6, and 24, respectively. The values of the 
dichotomous variables are defined like the attribute levels reported in table 1. Two 
socioeconomic characteristics are included in the utility function of the alternative 
representing the current service: gender (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student is 
female and 0 otherwise) and car availability (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student 
does not have the possibility of using a car to reach the campus and 0 otherwise); other 
socio-economic variables were introduced in the model but were not statistically 
significant. 
Specifically, in the ML model, 4 random parameters distributed with a normal 
distribution and the remaining as fixed parameters were considered. The random 
parameters are “Reliability of buses that come on schedule”, “Bus overcrowding”, 
“Information at bus stops” and “Helpfulness of personnel”. Some ML models were 
specified and calibrated in which the other attributes were considered random. In this 
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paper the model characterised by the best results is described. In table 3 the results of 
the ML compared to the MNL model results are shown. 
Some measures of overall model fit were effected. The Rho squared corrected statistic 
of the ML model has a value superior (0.334) to the MNL model (0.326). The final 
values of Log-Likelihood of both models are comparable. An LR statistic for verifying 
the hypothesis that all the parameters are significantly different from zero was effected; 
for both models it is notably higher than the critical value. Another LR statistic was 
effected to compare the ML with the MNL model; the value of this statistic (14.81) 
confirmed that the ML is statistically better than the MNL model. 
All parameters have a correct sign. Both the mean and the standard deviation of the 
random parameters assume a value statistically different from zero, at a 95% level of 
significance; also the fixed parameters are significant, except for the “Gender” variable, 
which have a t-statistic equal to 1.8. 
Socio-economic variables assume a positive sign; this result indicates that the utility 
of the current service has a higher value, ceteris paribus, for the students of female 
gender and for the students who do not have car availability. These categories of 
students are more satisfied with the current bus service. 
In table 4 the WTP values and their confidence intervals are reported. The confidence 
interval limits (lower and upper) were calculated by using the method proposed by 
Garrido and Ortùzar (1993). All the WTP values have a negative sign, except for the 
walking distance to the bus stop; in this last case, in fact, WTP represents the 
willingness to pay for reducing the time spent to reach the bus stop, while all the other 
WTPs represent the willingness to pay for an improvement in the various service 
aspects from a lower level to an upper one. 
The maximum value of WTP concerns service frequency, the minimum one 
information at bus stops. WTP for an improvement in service frequency is 2 times 
higher than WTP for improving service reliability, 3 times higher than WTP for 
improving cleanliness on board, and 5 times higher than the other WTP values. 
In the following, only the WTP values obtained from the ML model are discussed; 
analogous considerations can be effected for the MNL basic model. Currently, the 
service is available for 17 hours in a day, therefore there are 17 runs/day. Instead, a 
service frequency of 1 bus every 15 minutes corresponds to 68 runs/day. The obtained 
WTP value suggests that users would pay 22.8 Euros in order to have 68 runs/day, that 
is 0.34 Euros per run. This means that users would pay an increase of the ticket equal to 
44%, and therefore a ticket cost of 1.1 Euros/run. Analogously, users would pay more 
expensive weekly and monthly cards (about 10 Euros/week and 26 Euros/month) for an 
increase in service frequency. The travel expenses in one year would be equal to 312 
Euros against the current annual cost of 216 Euros, with an additional travel cost of 96 
Euros/year. 
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Table 3 - ML and MNL model results (in bracket the t-statistics are reported) 
variable estimation 
name parameter MNL ML 
Walking distance to the bus stop mean -0.101 (-4.3) -0.207 (-7.6) 
Service frequency mean 2.678 (11.5) 4.424 (7.1) 
Reliability of buses that come on 
schedule 
mean 1.202 (7.6) 2.370 (7.1) 
 st. deviation - 1.090 (3.1) 
Availability of furniture at bus stops mean 0.583 (3.8) 0.952 (3.6) 
Bus overcrowding mean 0.643 (3.4) 1.138 (3.6) 
 st. deviation - 1.980 (2.9) 
Cleanliness of interior, seats and 
windows 
mean 0.741 (5.0) 1.390 (4.9) 
Ticket cost mean -5.451 (-4.2) -11.617 (-7.2) 
Information at bus stops mean 0.561 (3.6) 0.936 (3.6) 
 st. deviation - 1.533 (2.2) 
Helpfulness of personnel mean 0.451 (3.1) 0.981 (3.9) 
 st. deviation - 2.496 (4.5) 
Gender mean 0.328 (1.8) - 
Car availability mean 0.422 (2.0) - 
Final value of Log-Likelihood -462.860 -455.453 
Log-Likelihood with Zero coefficients -703.112 -703.112 
Rho squared 0.342 0.352 
Rho squared corrected 0.326 0.334 
Likelihood Ratio 480.504 ( χ 2=19.675) 495.318 ( χ 2=22.362) 
 
Analogous calculations can be effected by considering the other WTP values. The 
only exception is for the WTP for reducing the walking time to the bus stop because this 
value is expressed in Euros/h and it refers to a single run. By considering the average 
walking distance (in terms of time) occurred in the sample (3 minutes and 43 seconds), 
a WTP value of 0.07 Euros/run was obtained; therefore, users would pay a ticket cost of 
0.84 Euros/run, a weekly card of about 7.50 Euros and a monthly card of about 20 
Euros. The travel expenses in one year would be equal to 240 Euros, with an additional 
travel cost of 24 Euros/year. 
By referring to the global service, the users are willing to pay an increase of about 1 
Euro/run for an improvement in all the service aspects considered in the SP experiment. 
This means that a ticket could cost 1.8 Euros/run, a weekly card about 16 Euros and a 
monthly card about 40 Euros. Obviously, these values were obtained by considering the 
WTP values referred to 68 runs/day. By considering the estimated WTP confidence 
intervals the ticket cost varies from a lower value of 1.5 Euros/run to an upper of 2 
Euros/run, the weekly card from 13 to 19 Euros, and the monthly card from 34 to 50 
Euros. 
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Table 4 - WTP calculation 
MNL ML 
variable 
WTP Confidence interval WTP Confidence interval 
Walking distance to the bus stop 1.112 0.773 to 1.620 1.069 0.914 to 1.260 
Service frequency -29.477 -53.152 to -20.292 -22.849 -28.067 to -18.559 
Reliability of buses that come on schedule -13.231 -24.349 to -8.579 -12.241 -15.812 to -9.455 
Availability of furniture at bus stops -6.417 -12.655 to -3.053 -4.917 -7.266 to -2.528 
Bus overcrowding -7.078 -14.094 to -3.034 -5.878 -9.291 to -2.825 
Cleanliness of interior, seats and windows -8.156 -15.895 to -4.528 -7.179 -10.329 to -4.527 
Information at bus stops -6.175 -13.183 to -2.602 -4.834 -7.327 to -2.424 
Helpfulness of personnel  -4.964 -10.642 to -1.777 -5.067 -8.115 to -2.554 
 
The travel expenses in one year could be equal to 480 Euros, with an additional travel 
cost of 264 Euros/year. By considering the estimated WTP confidence intervals the 
potential annual travel expense varies from a lower value of 408 to an upper value of 
600 Euros. 
These amounts are quite considerable if compared to the total travelling passengers. 
As an example, by considering a number of 8,000 habitual bus passengers, transit 
operators could have an additional amount of about 2 million Euros to invest for 
improving the current bus service. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The main purpose of this research is to provide a tool for calculating user willingness-
to-pay for improving service quality in public transport. To this purpose some MNL and 
ML models were calibrated on the basis of the user choices made in SP experimental 
contexts. Specifically, the ML model allowed investigation on the heterogeneity across 
individuals about some service quality attributes. The heterogeneity about the 
perceptions of “Reliability”, “Bus overcrowding”, “Information at bus stops”, and 
“Helpfulness of personnel” attributes was investigated. The standard deviation values 
obtained from the model calibration suggest that there is a notable difference in user 
perception of these attributes. 
The willingness-to-pay in terms of service quality attributes represents a quantitative 
measure of the monetary cost that the user would pay for improving some qualitative 
service aspects, such as comfort and safety during the journey. These service aspects are 
generally neglected because of the difficulty of their evaluation and quantification in 
monetary terms. WTP values may be used for calculating the project revenues in 
transport service investments. As an example, in the analysed experimental context, an 
increase of 22% of the amounts derived from the monthly cards was calculated from the 
estimated WTP values. 
In order to take into account the randomness of the estimated WTP, the limits (lower 
and upper) of the confidence intervals were calculated by using the method proposed by 
Garrido and Ortùzar (1993). The confidence interval calculation provides a sensitivity 
analysis of the possible investments that a transit operator can make starting from the 
amounts the users are willing to spend for improving service quality. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 38 (2008): 107-118 
 117
A limitation of the adopted methodology is linked to the estimation both of WTP 
values and their confidence intervals. In fact, the obtained values vary strongly with the 
model specification because of the strong dependence of the WTP values on the 
functional form assumed for the utility function of the alternatives, and on the model 
structure. 
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